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JUN 09 2005

HEARING OFFICER OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA
BY *[Signature]*

**BEFORE A HEARING OFFICER
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA**

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5 IN THE MATTER OF A MEMBER) Nos. 01-1292, 02-1823
6 OF THE STATE BAR OF ARIZONA,)
7)
8 **HARRY E. CAWOOD,**)
9 **Bar No. 003769**)
10) **HEARING OFFICER'S REPORT**
11)
12) **RESPONDENT.**)

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

13 The State Bar filed a Complaint in File No. 01-1292 on June 25, 2002.
14 Respondent filed an Answer on July 15, 2002. A hearing was then scheduled for
15 November 20, 2002. On October 31, 2002, the parties filed a Request and
16 Stipulation to Stay the matter. The Commission granted the Request and stayed
17 the matter on November 5, 2002. On November 2, 2004, the parties filed a
18 Request and Stipulation to Lift the Stay. The Commission granted the Request
19 and the stay was lifted on November 8, 2004. The State Bar filed an Amended
20 Complaint on November 22, 2004. Respondent filed an Answer to the Amended
21 Complaint on December 20, 2004. The Settlement Officer conducted a
22 settlement conference on March 25, 2005 and scheduled a second settlement
23 conference for April 15, 2005. Subsequently, the parties reached an agreement
24 and their desire to waive the second settlement conference; the Settlement Officer
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1 then vacated the scheduled settlement conference. The parties filed a Tender of
2 Admissions and Agreement for Discipline by Consent (Tender) and a Joint
3 Memorandum in Support of Agreement for Discipline by Consent (Joint Memo)
4 on May 18, 2005. No hearing has been held in this matter.
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6 **FINDINGS OF FACT**

7 1. Respondent was at all relevant times an attorney licensed to practice
8 law in Arizona, having been admitted to the State Bar on October 5, 1974.
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10 **COUNT ONE – FILE NO. 01-1292**

11 2. Lori Margolis retained Respondent to represent her in a divorce
12 action. The divorce became final on September 15, 1999.
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14 3. The last billing statement Respondent sent to Ms. Margolis reflected
15 a balance due to her in the amount of \$194.20.

16 4. Respondent did not return unearned fees to Ms. Margolis in the
17 amount of \$194.20 when the representation ended; Respondent believing that in
18 the future Ms. Margolis wanted him to pursue having her former name restored.
19

20 5. Respondent sent a refund check to Ms. Margolis in the amount of
21 \$194.20 on August 21, 2001.

22 6. Respondent was asked to provide the State Bar with copies of: his
23 client trust account bank statements from January 1999 through December 2000,
24 Ms. Margolis's client ledger card, duplicate deposit slip showing the initial
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1 deposit of the retainer into the firm trust account, and the \$194.20 refund check.
2 Respondent did not have copies of the requested trust account records due to the
3 termination of his partnership with John McKindles, as discussed in Count Two.
4

5 **COUNT TWO – FILE NO. 02-1823**

6 7. Respondent first started practicing law in Arizona in 1980, in
7 association with an attorney named John McKindles, first as the Cawood &
8 McKindles partnership and later as Cawood & McKindles, P.C. (hereinafter
9 generally “the firm”). That business relationship was terminated on or about
10 December 31, 2001.
11

12 8. During the time that they worked in association with one another,
13 Respondent and Mr. McKindles independently handled the preparation of bills to
14 their separate clients as well as the collection of money and payment of refunds,
15 when appropriate, to their separate clients. Both members had equal access to the
16 firm’s books, records and bank accounts.
17

18 9. From the start of their association until a few weeks prior to
19 Respondent’s departure, the firm’s treatment of client funds was not maintained
20 in compliance with ERs 1.15 and 1.16 and Rules 43, 44, and 51, Ariz. R. S. Ct.
21

22 10. Client retainers were routinely deposited in the firm’s operating
23 account, instead of its trust account. Settlement money and other client funds
24 were deposited into the firm’s trust account until the responsible lawyer made a
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1 distribution consistent with the needs of the relevant case. Earned fees were
2 routinely deposited in the firm's trust account and the trust account was used as a
3 savings account. Required trust account records were not correctly maintained.
4 Transactions were not promptly and completely recorded and disbursements were
5 not always made by pre-numbered check. Monthly reconciliations between the
6 trust account bank statements and the appropriate ledgers were not made. See
7 Exhibit A to Tender, Staff investigator Leigh Ann Mauger's October 21, 2003
8 report.
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11 11. Although he failed to ensure that client funds and the firm's trust
12 account were managed in accordance with the governing rules, Respondent did
13 not intentionally misappropriate client funds, and the available records do not
14 show that his conduct caused lasting injury to any client.
15

16 12. In 2002, following the dissolution of his association with the
17 Respondent, Mr. Kindles engaged a CPA to review his procedures for
18 maintaining the client trust account. During this review, it was discovered that
19 the following clients may have been owed refunds:
20

- 21 a. Betty Alisouskas;
- 22 b. Christopher Allan;
- 23 c. Robert Barry;
- 24 d. Anne Marie Cylkowski (NKA Heffernan);
- 25

- 1 e. Debbie Kelly;
- 2 f. Nancy Kovalik (NKA Picking);
- 3 g. Beverly Lloyd (NKA Conti);
- 4 h. Juanita Lombardi;
- 5 i. Andrea Moran;
- 6 j. Peggy Rector (NKA Power); and,
- 7 k. Theresa Stephens.

10 13. Respondent went back through his files and reconstructed client
11 billing statements as best he could. Respondent has provided affidavits to support
12 his contention that all funds that were held on behalf of these clients, except for
13 two, were earned. *See Exhibit B to Tender.*

15 14. The last billing statements Respondent was able to locate indicate
16 that Betty Alisouskas and Anne Marie Cylkowski (NKA Heffernan) had money
17 in Respondent's trust account. Respondent was unable to reconstruct the billings
18 for the time spent on the Alisouskas and Cylkowski cases after the two billings
19 statements were sent. Respondent will pay them restitution of \$474.00 and
20 \$515.00, respectively.

23 15. Respondent did not have copies of the requested trust account
24 records due to the termination of his partnership with John McKindles; this was
25 not due to an unwillingness to cooperate with the State Bar.

1 Because Respondent did not have copies of the requested trust account
2 records due to the termination of his partnership with John McKindles, the State
3 Bar conditionally dismisses the alleged violations of Rule 51, Ariz. R. S.C t.
4

5 ABA STANDARDS

6 The ABA *Standards* list the following factors to consider in imposing the
7 appropriate sanction: (1) the duty violated, (2) the lawyer's mental state, (3) the
8 actual or potential injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct, and (4) the
9 existence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances. ABA *Standard* 3.0.
10

11 The parties indicated that *Standard* 4.1 is the most applicable in this matter.
12 A review of ABA *Standard* 4.0 (Violations of Duties Owed to Clients) indicates
13 that censure is the presumptive sanction for Respondent's misconduct. *Standard*
14 4.13 (Failure to Preserve the Client's Property) specifically provides:
15

16 Reprimand (censure in Arizona) is generally appropriate
17 when a lawyer is negligent in dealing with client property
18 and causes injury or potential injury to a client.

19 Respondent was negligent in failing to be aware of, familiarize himself
20 with, and comply with the rules governing the treatment of client funds by
21 attorneys. Respondent violated his duties to his clients by failing to observe the
22 rules governing the treatment of client funds by attorneys. These rules are
23 designed to ensure that a client's money is not put in jeopardy, or used or taken
24 improperly, by the client's attorney. Although Respondent asserts that he was
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1 merely negligent in failing to realize that his treatment of client funds was
2 improper. He had an affirmative duty to familiarize himself with the rules
3 governing his practice of law in Arizona. Respondent's failure to comply with the
4 rules governing treatment of client funds exposed his clients to potential injury by
5 causing their funds to be held without protection against depletion, and
6 intentional or inadvertent misdirection as provided in ER 1.15 and ER 1.16 and
7 Rules 43, 44, and 51 Ariz. R. S. Ct.
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10 If this matter were to proceed to a hearing, Respondent would take the
11 position that his conduct caused no actual harm to any client and exposed his
12 clients to minimal potential harm at worst, and that he quickly and diligently
13 reported and corrected the non-compliance upon discovering it. The State Bar
14 would take the position that Respondent's failure to be aware of and comply with
15 these rules exposed his clients to significant potential injury. Additionally, there
16 was actual injury to three clients who did not have the use of their funds for a
17 period of time.
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20 **AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING FACTORS**

21 This Hearing Officer then considered aggravating and mitigating factors in
22 this case, pursuant to *Standards* 9.22 and 9.32, respectively. This Hearing Officer
23 agrees with the parties that there are no applicable aggravating circumstances in
24 this matter.
25

1 This Hearing Officer agrees with the parties that two factors are present in
2 mitigation:

3 (a) absence of a prior disciplinary record and (b) absence of a dishonest or
4 selfish motive.
5

6 PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW

7 To have an effective system of professional sanctions, there must be
8 internal consistency, and it is appropriate to examine sanctions imposed in cases
9 that are factually similar. *In re Shannon*, 179 Ariz. 52, 71, 876 P.2d 548, 567
10 (1994) (quoting *In re Wines*, 135, Ariz. 203, 207 (1983)). However, the
11 discipline in each case must be tailored to the individual case, as neither
12 perfection nor absolute uniformity can be achieved. *Matter of Riley*, 142 Ariz.
13 604, 615 (1984).
14
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16 The leading published Arizona case involving analogous facts is *In re*
17 *Riggs*, 177 Ariz. 494, 496, 869 P.2d 170, 172 (1994). That case involved a
18 lawyer who, for nearly five years while acting as trustee and personal
19 representative of an estate, deposited trust funds in a non-interest-bearing account
20 that also contained funds belonging to him and to other clients. The Supreme
21 Court adopted the recommended discipline of censure and one year of probation.
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24 In *In re Hall*, SB-02-0122-D (September 2002), Hall advance funds from
25 his firm's operating account and placed those funds into the trust account to cover

1 client costs. Records obtained by the State Bar revealed that trust account records
2 were deficient for individual client accounts. The trust account records reflected
3 negative balances during this period for a total of 12 clients. The attorney failed
4 to adequately monitor his clients' funds, which were on deposit in his trust
5 account and as a result of this failure, overdrafts occurred on the account. He
6 failed to establish sufficient internal controls in order to properly monitor his
7 client's funds. Hall was censured and placed on one year of probation.
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10 In *In re Inserra*, SB-02-0144-D (October 2002), Inserra failed to keep his
11 earned fees separate from that of his client funds held in the trust account, failed
12 to transfer fees from the trust account when earned, and commingled his own
13 funds with those of his clients. He also failed to maintain complete trust account
14 records for a period of five years, failed to exercise due professional care in the
15 maintenance of his trust account, failed to only disburse from his trust account
16 with pre-numbered checks, and failed to conduct a monthly reconciliation of his
17 trust account. Inserra and the State Bar submitted a consent agreement, agreeing
18 that a censure, two years of probation and costs were the appropriate sanction.
19 The Disciplinary Commission unanimously recommended accepting the
20 agreement and the Supreme Court accepted the recommendation of the
21 Disciplinary Commission without discretionary review.
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1 In *In re Leiber*, SB-01-0122-D (July 2, 2001), Leiber was charged with
2 failing to comply with trust account guidelines and with causing a check in the
3 amount of \$8,000.00 to be returned for insufficient funds because the attorney's
4 trust account only had a balance of \$5,859.00. Leiber's client, a long-time friend
5 and lawyer, had agreed to deposit \$8,000.00 in Leiber's California branch of his
6 trust account but only deposited \$5,000.00. Leiber also commingled funds over a
7 period of years by placing earned fees and other personal funds into his trust
8 account. The Supreme Court accepted the Disciplinary Commission's
9 recommendation for censure and one year of probation.
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12 In *In re Randall*, SB- 02-0146-D (November 2002), Randall failed to
13 conduct a proper monthly reconciliation. He used numerous counter checks to
14 withdraw money from his trust account instead of using pre-numbered checks as
15 required by the Guidelines. He also deposited and commingled his own separate
16 funds, including earned fees, with client funds in his trust account. Randall failed
17 to maintain adequate funds in the trust account resulting in the account being
18 overdrawn on two occasions. He failed to establish adequate internal controls to
19 safeguard client funds. The hearing officer recommended that Randall receive a
20 censure for his misconduct, which was accepted by the Disciplinary Commission
21 and the Supreme Court. Randall was not placed on probation, presumably
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1 because he was no longer working as a sole practitioner and was employed by a
2 medium-size firm where he was not in charge of any accounting procedures.

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4 In this case, Respondent failed to safeguard client funds by keeping unearned
5 fees in the operating account and my commingling earned fees with client funds in
6 the trust account. Respondent failed to maintain complete trust account records and
7 failed to exercise due professional care in dealing with client funds. The Supreme
8 Court “has long held that ‘the objective of disciplinary proceedings is to protect the
9 public, the profession and the administration of justice and not to punish the
10 offender.’” *In re Alcorn*, 202 Ariz. 62, 74, 41 P.3d 600, 612 (2002) (quoting *In re*
11 *Kastensmith*, 101 Ariz. 291, 294, 419 P.2d 75, 78 (1966)).
12

13 14 RECOMMENDATION

15 The purpose of lawyer discipline is not to punish the lawyer, but to protect
16 the public and deter future misconduct. *In re Fioramonti*, 176 Ariz. 182, 187, 859
17 P.2d 1315, 1320 (1993). It is also the objective of lawyer discipline to protect the
18 public, the profession and the administration of justice. *In re Neville*, 147 Ariz.
19 106, 708 P.2d 1297 (1985). Yet another purpose is to instill public confidence in
20 the bar’s integrity. *Matter of Horwitz*, 180 Ariz. 20, 29, 881 P.2d 352, 361
21 (1994).
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24 In imposing discipline, it is appropriate to consider the facts of each case,
25 the American Bar Association’s *Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions*

1 ("Standards") and the proportionality of discipline imposed in analogous cases.
2 *Matter of Bowen*, 178 Ariz. 283, 286, 872 P.2d 1235, 1238 (1994).

3
4 Upon consideration of the facts, application of the *Standards*, including
5 aggravating and mitigating factors, and a proportionality analysis, this Hearing
6 Officer recommends acceptance of the Tender of Admissions and Agreement for
7 Discipline by Consent and the Joint Memorandum in Support of Agreement for
8 Discipline by Consent which provides for the following:
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10 1. Respondent shall receive a censure.

11 2. Respondent shall be placed on probation for a period of two years
12 effective upon the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). Bar
13 Counsel will notify the Disciplinary Clerk of the date on which the probation
14 begins. The terms of probation are as follows:
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16 a. Respondent shall, within 30 days of the Supreme Court's final
17 judgment and order, contact the director of the State Bar's Law Office
18 Management Assistance Program (LOMAP) to schedule an audit of his trust
19 account. Following the audit, Respondent shall enter into a Memorandum of
20 Understanding. Respondent shall comply with all recommendations of the
21 LOMAP director or her designee. Respondent shall pay probation costs, including
22 the assessment by LOMAP and applicable monitoring of the MOU.
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