

BEFORE A HEARING OFFICER
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ARIZON

IN THE MATTER OF A MEMBER
OF THE STATE BAR OF ARIZONA,

MICHAEL L. GERTELL,
Bar No. 009458

Nos. 02-0281, 02-0703, 02-1170
02-1294, 02-1324, 02-1623

HEARING OFFICER'S REPORT
RESPONDENT.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Probable Cause Orders were filed on October 8, 2003 and October 17, 2003. A Complaint was filed on December 19, 2003. Respondent filed an Answer on February 13, 2004. A settlement conference was held on March 30, 2004. The parties filed a Tender of Admissions and Agreement for Discipline by Consent and a Joint Memorandum in Support of Agreement for Discipline by Consent on May 5, 2004. The complainants have been notified of this agreement. No hearing has been held.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. At all times relevant hereto, Respondent was an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Arizona, having been admitted to practice in Arizona on May 12, 1984.

facts contained in this agreement.

COUNT ONE (File No. 02-0281/Benjamin)

- 4. On August 28, 2002, Respondent was asked by Bar Counsel to respond to a bar charge regarding certain issues pertaining to his handling of Complainant's two personal injury auto cases, but Respondent did not respond to Bar Counsel.
- Detailed questions were asked of Respondent regarding these 5. allegations, but Respondent never responded.
- On or about September 26, 2002, Respondent requested an 6. extension indicating he would be able to respond by October 1, 2002. Respondent, however, did not respond on October 1, 2002.

10

13

14

15

16

17

18 19

20

22

21

23

25

7. Respondent failed to respond to Bar Counsel regarding Complainant's second complaint in violation of ER 8.1(b) and Rule 51(h) and (i).

COUNT TWO (File No. 02-0703/Welsh)

- 8. Respondent was retained by Dean J. Kakes to represent him in his dissolution of marriage.
- 9. On June 28, 2001, Respondent, on behalf of his client, and his client's spouse both filed for divorce. Respondent filed in Maricopa County, Arizona, and the client's spouse filed in Cook County, Illinois.
- 10. Respondents' client's petition for dissolution was filed on June 28,2001, at 3:16 pm Mountain Standard Time (MST).
- 11. The client's spouse filed her petition for dissolution on June 28,2001, at 12:27 pm CDT (10:27 am MST).
- 12. On October 10, 2001, Respondent filed an affidavit with the Circuit Court of Cook County stating that he had filed the petition for his client in Arizona at 9:00 am MST on June 28, 2001. Specifically, the affidavit stated "I filed a dissolution of marriage proceeding on June 28, 2001 at 9:00 a.m. in the State of Arizona." Even though this statement was eventually proven to be incorrect, Respondent believed at the time he signed the affidavit that the petition had been filed earlier in the morning as that was the time the petition

was given to the runner for filing and, thus, he believed the affidavit to be true.

In addition, Respondent notified local Illinois counsel immediately upon learning of the inaccuracy.

- 13. The Honorable Judge Daniel J. Sullivan of the Circuit Court of Cook County reviewed these jurisdictional issues, the affidavits filed, and the affidavit filed by the Respondent and concluded in a letter dated March 28, 2002, to the Illinois Supreme Court Discipline Commission that "Dean's attorney [Respondent] committed a fraud upon the Circuit Court of Cook County..."
- 14. On July 17, 2001, the client's spouse effectuated service on Respondent's client by the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office.
- 15. On September 12, 2001, Respondent effectuated service upon the client's spouse at her sister's home.
- 16. Respondent then proceeded to obtain and did obtain a default judgment in Arizona on December 14, 2001. The matter was later settled and satisfactorily resolved.
- 17. Respondent admits he sloppily, but not intentionally, controverted an issue without a good-faith basis in fact, thereby violating ER 3.1.
- 18. Respondent engaged in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice, thereby violating ER 8.4(d).

19. Respondent's conduct as described in this count violated Rule 42, Ariz.R.S.Ct., specifically ERs 3.1 and 8.4(d).

COUNT THREE (File No. 02-1170/York)

- 20. In November 2001, Complainant, Paul York, retained Respondent to represent him in his dissolution of marriage. The divorce included child custody issues. At that time, Complainant paid Respondent \$2,250.00 in advance fees.
- 21. During the course of the representation, Complainant contacted Respondent's office several times via facsimile and telephone and requested information regarding the status of his case and an accounting statement regarding the Respondent's earning of the advanced fees he had received.
- 22. Complainant received a letter from Respondent dated April 9, 2002, stating that Respondent had been suspended from the practice of law for 120 days, and that he had arranged for another attorney to take over Complainant's case during that time.
- 23. Following the April 9, 2002, letter from Respondent, Complainant again contacted Respondent several times to request a billing statement and refund of any unused portion of his retainer and a copy of his file. Respondent did not directly respond.

- 24. On June 14, 2002, Complainant filed his charge against the Respondent with the State Bar of Arizona.
- 25. Approximately one week after filing the charge, Complainant received an accounting and a billing statement from Respondent, showing that Complainant owed Respondent an additional \$402.20.
- 26. Respondent failed to abide by his client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation, thereby violating ER 1.2.
- 27. Respondent failed to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing his client, thereby violating ER 1.3.
- 28. Respondent failed to keep his client reasonably informed about the status of the matter and did not promptly comply with reasonable requests for information, thereby violating ER 1.4.
- 29. Respondent's conduct as described in this count also violated ERs1.15 and 1.16.

COUNT FOUR (File No. 02-1294/Sansing)

- 30. On or about November 2000, Respondent was appointed to represent Complainant, John Sansing, in a Juvenile Court dependency case involving Complainant's children.
- 31. On or about April 11, 2002, Respondent filed a Notice of Change of Attorney Within the Firm, designating Bert Roos as the new attorney for

Complainant. Complainant states he never received the notice. The notice also did not indicate that it was mailed to the Complainant.

- 32. On or about May 7, 2002, Respondent's assistant, Kim Jackson, contacted Complainant via telephone. During the telephone call, Ms. Jackson informed Complainant that Respondent would not be at the hearing scheduled for May 8, 2003, and that another attorney, Bert Roos, would cover the hearing.
- 33. Complainant asserted he never received notice of the change of attorneys and did not know that Respondent was no longer his assigned attorney.
- 34. On or about May 8, 2002, there was a Report and Review hearing on the dependency matter in front of Judge Thomas Dunevant III. Complainant attended this hearing via telephone and was represented by Bert Roos.
- 35. At the May 8, 2002, hearing, Judge Dunevant ordered that: "Father shall file any written response no later than May 20, 2002" and Respondent, therefore, believed a written response was not required but was optional.
- 36. Complainant made efforts to contact Respondent and Bert Roos through telephone, letters, and his criminal defense attorney regarding the response to the motion, but neither the Respondent nor Bert Roos contacted the

Complainant. Complainant eventually wrote his own response and sent it to the judge on July 2, 2002.

- 37. As of July 1, 2002, Respondent had lost his legal services contract with the county and was no longer under active contract that would have allowed him to provide Complainant's representation in dependency or severance matters in Maricopa County Juvenile Court.
- 38. Respondent conditionally admits that he failed to notify his client in this matter that his license to practice law had been suspended, and that he was disqualified to act as a lawyer, within ten (10) days after the court order, by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, thereby violating Rule 63.
- 39. Respondent failed to keep his client reasonably informed about the status of the matter and did not promptly comply with reasonable requests for information, thereby violating ER 1.4.

COUNT FIVE (File No. 02-1324/Lino)

- 40. On or about January 2002, Complainant, Joel Lino, retained Respondent to represent him in two separate cases.
- 41. On or about January 2002, Complainant gave Respondent three checks as a retainer for legal services. These were: check number 1477 in the amount of \$1000.00, check number 1721 in the amount of \$1100.00, and check number 1659 in the amount of \$1600.00.

- 42. After retaining Respondent, Complainant made several attempts to contact Respondent regarding the status of his case. Respondent did not personally return any of the Complainant's telephone calls.
- 43. Thereafter, Respondent, or Respondent through his assistant, informed Complainant that Respondent was in an automobile accident and was on disability.
- 44. On or about May 4, 2002 Complainant faxed Respondent a letter discharging Respondent from the representation, and requesting the return of his file along with an accounting and refund of his retainer fee.
- 45. When Complainant went to pick up his file and the retainer from Respondent, Respondent indicated that he had been sick and requested another chance for his office to file the court papers. Complainant stated he decided to give the Respondent another chance, but Respondent did little further on the case.
- 46. Thereafter, Complainant stated that he again fired the Respondent on or about May 25, 2002. As of that time, Complainant's cases still had not been filed with the court.
- 47. Complainant never received a billing statement nor any accounting regarding any work Respondent may have performed on his cases. However, Respondent did refund all of the Complainant's monies except for the filing fee.

- 48. Respondent failed to abide by his client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation, thereby violating ER 1.2.
- 49. Respondent failed to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing his client, thereby violating ER 1.3.
- 50. Respondent failed to keep his client reasonably informed about the status of the matter and did not promptly comply with reasonable requests for information, thereby violating ER 1.4.
- 51. Respondent failed to promptly deliver to his client any funds or other property that his client was entitled to, and failed to render a full accounting regarding the property of his client that was held in Respondent's possession, thereby violating ER 1.15.

COUNT SIX (File No. 02-1623/Deutsch)

- 52. On May 14, 2002, Complainant Suzanne Deutsch, met with Respondent and an office assistant, Kim Jackson, to discuss the case. During this meeting, Respondent requested a \$1500.00 retainer fee, which Complainant paid on that same date.
- 53. Respondent states he advised Complainant that he was suspended and on disability and, if her case were to require a court appearance, Bert Roos would handle it.

- 54. Complainant filed a complaint with the State Bar of Arizona on August 20, 2002, complaining, in part, that she was never told of the suspension.
- 55. Respondent failed to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing his client, thereby violating ER 1.3.
- 56. Respondent failed to keep his client reasonably informed about the status of the matter and did not promptly comply with reasonable requests for information, thereby violating ER 1.4.
- 57. After filing her complaint with the State Bar of Arizona, Complainant received a full refund of her retainer from Respondent.
- 58. When Complainant went to pick up her retainer refund, Respondent's office had her sign a document releasing Bert Roos as her attorney.
- 59. Though Complainant believed she was not told of Respondent's suspension, there was evidence presented in the form of two affidavits from two eyewitnesses that affirm Respondent's statement that she was told of his suspension.

CONDITIONAL ADMISSIONS

Respondent, in exchange for the stated form of discipline, conditionally admits that his conduct as set forth in each of the respective counts stated above violates Rule 42, Ariz. R. S. Ct., specifically:

Count One - ER 8.1(b), and Rule 51(h) and (i);

Count Two - ERs 3.1 and 8.4(d);

Count Three - ERs 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.15 and 1.16;

Count Four - ER 1.4, and Rule 63;

Count Five - ERs 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.15 and 1.16; and,

Count Six - ERs 1.3 and 1.4.

DISMISSED ALLEGATIONS

The State Bar does not believe it could prove by

The State Bar does not believe it could prove by clear and convincing evidence violations of the following ERs and therefore conditionally dismisses same:

Count One - ERs 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5 and 3.2;

Count Two - ERs 3.3, 4.1 and 8.4(c);

Count Three - ERs 1.5 and 3.2;

Count Four - none;

Count Five - ER 5.5, and Rule 63; and,

Count Six - ERs 1.2, 5.5 and 8.4(c), Rule 51(e) and (k), and Rule 63.

<u>ABA STANDARDS</u>

In determining the appropriate sanction, the parties considered both the American Bar Association's Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions ("Standards") and Arizona case law. The Standards provide guidance with respect to an appropriate sanction in this matter. The Court and Commission consider the Standards a suitable guideline. In re Rivkind, 164 Ariz. 154, 157, 791 P.2d 1037, 1040 (1990); In re Kaplan, 179 Ariz. 175, 177, 877 P.2d 274, 276 (1994).

In determining an appropriate sanction, both the Court and the Commission consider the duty violated, the lawyer's mental state, the actual or potential injury caused by the misconduct and the existence of aggravating and mitigating factors. Matter of Tarletz, 163 Ariz. 548, 789 P.2d 1049 (1990); ABA Standard 3.0.

Given the conduct in this matter, it was appropriate to consider Standards 4.1, 4.4, 6.0 and 7.0.

Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional, and causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public or the legal system. Standard 4.13.

Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services for a client and causes injury or potential injury to a client. Standard 4.42.

Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent in determining whether statements or documents are false and causes injury or potential injury to a client, or causes an adverse or potentially adverse effect on the legal proceeding. Standard 6.13

Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed to the profession, and causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public or the legal system. Standard 7.2

Respondent admits that he failed to respond to a bar complaint; failed to act diligently and communicate adequately; negligently controverted an issue without a good-faith factual basis; and failed to provide timely accountings. Such conduct diminishes the integrity of the profession. Maintaining the integrity of the profession is a duty owed as a professional. See Standards, at 5.

Based on the foregoing, the presumptive sanction for the admitted conduct is a term of suspension. After determining the presumptive sanction, it is appropriate to evaluate factors enumerated in the Standards that would justify an increase or decrease in the presumptive sanction.

AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING FACTORS

This Hearing Officer then considered aggravating and mitigating factors in this case, pursuant to *Standards* 9.22 and 9.32, respectively. This Hearing Officer agrees with the parties that four aggravating factors apply and should be considered in this matter: (a) prior disciplinary offenses - In April 2003, Respondent received a four-month suspension for violations of ERs 1.4 and 1.15, and Rules 43 and 44, Ariz. R. S. Ct.; (c) a pattern of misconduct; (d) multiple offenses; and, (i) substantial experience in the practice of law - Respondent has been practicing law for twenty years and is aware that there is an important responsibility of an officer of the court to communicate effectively with his clients and to be prompt and truthful. This Hearing Officer agrees with

the parties that three factors are present in mitigation: (c) personal or emotional problems - Respondent suffered serious problems as the result of an automobile accident (resulting in six surgical procedures during the last two years), a rare wrist disease and other physical ailments that rendered him disabled for much of the time during his handling of the underlying cases and during the State Bar's investigation of the charges concerning these matters. [See the attached medical records of the Respondent marked and sealed as Exhibit "A" to the Joint Memorandum These physical maladies and the prior suspension combined to seriously impair the Respondent's financial condition; Respondent's ability to handle the underlying matters; Respondent's ability to deal with the State Bar's investigation; and Respondent's responsibilities to his family and spouse; (d) timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify consequences of misconduct - Respondent made a good-faith effort to rectify the consequences of his action by making restitution (via refunds and fee arbitration) both before and after being confronted with the bar charge; and, (1) remorse - Respondent also expressed in a letter to bar counsel that he regretted his conduct and further explained the circumstances surrounding his disability and his failure to respond.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

The parties have identified what they believe to be the relevant aggravating and mitigating factors. The parties do not believe that these factors

justify a decrease or an increase in the presumptive sanction in this case. This Hearing Officer agrees.

PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW

To have an effective system of professional sanctions, there must be internal consistency, and it is appropriate to examine sanctions imposed in cases that are factually similar. In re Shannon, 179 Ariz. 52, 71, 876 P.2d 548, 567 (1994) (quoting In re Wines, 135, Ariz. 203, 207 (1983)). However, the discipline in each case must be tailored to the individual case, as neither perfection nor absolute uniformity can be achieved. Matter of Riley, 142 Ariz. 604, 615, 691 P.2d 695 (1984).

Respondent and the State Bar of Arizona have agreed to the imposition of a ninety-day suspension and a two-year term of probation. Respondent's misconduct involved controverting an issue without a good-faith factual basis, failure to communicate, a failure to provide accountings, and a failure to timely respond to the State Bar's screening investigation.

There are a number of prior cases that involve similar misconduct. However, none of the cases are exactly on point as they involve other violations, and different aggravation and mitigation. Nonetheless, the cases are instructive.

In Matter of Odneal, SB 02-0085-D (2002), the attorney was suspended for ninety days and placed on probation (LOMAP) for misconduct in three matters, including violations of ERs 1.4, 1.15, 1.16(d), 8.1(b), 8.4(c), and Rule 51(h) and (i) for failing to promptly return client funds and making a false statement to the court. The attorney had a prior discipline history of a censure and probation for similar misconduct.

In <u>Matter of Herbert</u>, SB-00-0014-D (2000), the attorney received a thirty-day suspension for misconduct in one matter involving violation of ERs 1.15 and 1.16(d). In determining that suspension was appropriate, the Court applied ABA Standard 4.12. Mr. Herbert had been disciplined previously approximately four years prior to that case.

In <u>Matter of Weisling</u>, SB-01-0038-D (2001), the attorney received a two-year retroactive suspension for misconduct in three matters, including violations of ERs 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.15, 1.16(d) and 3.2, and Rule 51(h) and (i). It should be noted that Weisling also involved several other violations, and the attorney had a prior suspension.

In <u>Matter of Sodikoff</u>, SB-01-0109 (2001), the attorney received a censure for misconduct in two matters including violations of ER 1.15(b) for failure to provide an accounting, and violation of Rule 51(h). The attorney had a prior discipline history.

The State Bar also notes that failure to cooperate with a discipline investigation is, standing alone, worthy of a censure. In Matter of Anderson, SB-01-0173 (2001), the attorney received a censure for failing to respond to the discipline investigation in two cases. There was no other misconduct in that matter.

Based upon the foregoing, it appears that a ninety-day suspension and probation is proportionate to the sanctions in several prior cases, in light of the particular facts of the case, and Respondent's discipline history. In this matter, Respondent has fully participated in the formal proceedings. Respondent has further indicated he will participate in all remedial programs required as a part of the sanction. For these reasons, considering the totality of the circumstances present in this case, including the underlying facts as well as the mitigating factors, the parties believe that the purposes of discipline will be served by a ninety-day suspension, along with probation.

RECOMMENDATION

The purpose of lawyer discipline is not to punish the lawyer, but to protect the public and deter future misconduct. *In re Fioramonti*, 176 Ariz. 182, 187, 859 P.2d 1315, 1320 (1993). It is also the objective of lawyer discipline to protect the public, the profession and the administration of justice. *In re Neville*, 147 Ariz. 106, 708 P.2d 1297 (1985). Yet another purpose is to instill public confidence in

the bar's integrity. *Matter of Horwitz*, 180 Ariz. 20, 29, 881 P.2d 352, 361 (1994).

In imposing discipline, it is appropriate to consider the facts of the case, the American Bar Association's Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions ("Standards") and the proportionality of discipline imposed in analogous cases.

Matter of Bowen, 178 Ariz. 283, 286, 872 P.2d 1235, 1238 (1994).

Upon consideration of the facts, application of the *Standards*, including aggravating and mitigating factors, and a proportionally analysis, this Hearing Officer recommends acceptance of the Tender of Admissions and Agreement for Discipline by Consent and the Joint Memorandum in Support of Agreement for Discipline by Consent providing the following:

- 1. Respondent shall be suspended for ninety-days. This suspension shall be effective 30 days after the date of the final judgment and order entered in this matter.
- 2. Respondent shall be placed on probation for two years under the following terms and conditions:
 - a. Respondent shall contact the director of the State Bar's Law Office Management Assistance Program (LOMAP) within 30 days of the date of the final judgment and order. Respondent shall submit to a LOMAP audit of his office's client

communications, billing and accounting practices. The Director of LOMAP shall develop a probation contract, and its terms shall be incorporated herein by reference.

- b. Respondent shall find a qualified practice monitor (PM), approved by bar counsel and the LOMAP Director, within 30 days of the effective date of probation. The practice monitor shall be an attorney who will supervise the Respondent's law practice and monitor Respondent's caseload, the quality of the services rendered by Respondent and his communication with clients. The practice monitor will report to the State Bar any manifestations of relapse, unusual behavior or conduct falling below minimum standards of the profession as set forth in the Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 42, Ariz. R. S. Ct.
- c. Respondent shall obtain and maintain contact with the practice monitor for the duration of his probation.
- d. Respondent shall have contact with the practice monitor on a weekly basis and the practice monitor will report to the State Bar the Respondent's activities on a monthly basis.
- e. In the event that Respondent fails to comply with any of the foregoing conditions, and the State Bar receives information,

bar counsel

Non-Complia

Hearing Off

frame of these term

on the State in and convincing in the state in and convincing in the state in and convincing in the state in the s

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

bar counsel shall file with the Hearing Officer a Notice of Non-Compliance, pursuant to Rule 60(a)5, Ariz. R. S. Ct. The Hearing Officer shall conduct a hearing within thirty days after receipt of said notice, to determine whether the terms of probation have been violated and if an additional sanction should be imposed. In the event there is an allegation that any of these terms have been violated, the burden of proof shall be on the State Bar of Arizona to prove non-compliance by clear and convincing evidence.

DATED this 2rd day of June, 2004.

Sandra L. Slaton

Settlement Officer 8S

Original	filed with	the Disc	iplinary	Clerk
this 2°	filed with day of	June	,2	2004.

Copy of the foregoing was mailed this and day of well 2004, to:

Robert J. Stephan, Jr.
Hearing Officer 9R
371 East Monte Vista Road
Phoenix, AZ 85004-1438

Michael L. Gertell Respondent P.O. Box 33021 Phoenix, AZ 85067 John A. Furlong
Bar Counsel
State Bar of Arizona
111 West Monroe, Suite 1800
Phoenix, AZ 85003-1742

by: KWligad

ì