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11 **SUPREME COURT**
12 **STATE OF ARIZONA**

13 CITY OF MESA; GUSTAVO WILLIAMS,

14 Petitioners,

15 v.

16 THE HONORABLE TIMOTHY RYAN,
17 Judge of the SUPERIOR COURT OF THE
18 STATE OF ARIZONA, in and for the
19 County of MARICOPA,

20 Respondent Judge,

21 PHILIP ROGERS,

22 Real Party in Interest.

Case No. CV-23-0284-PR

Arizona Court of Appeals
Case No. 1 CA-SA 23-0154

Maricopa County Superior Court
Case No. CV 2022-014378
(Hon. Timothy Ryan)

**REAL PARTY
IN INTEREST'S
SIMULTANEOUS
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF**

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1 **The Rephrased Issue**

2 In its May 7, 2024 Minute Letter granting the petition for review, this Court
3 directed the parties to address this rephrased issue: “Did the plaintiff’s notice of claim
4 comply with A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A) by offering to settle the matter for \$1,000,000 or
5 the applicable policy limits, whichever is greater?”
6

7 **Legal Argument**

8 **1. A.R.S. § 12-121.01(A) requires a “specific amount”—which the Real Party in**
9 **Interest provided in his notices of claim.**

10 “Any amount that is fixed, settled, or exact” is the dictionary definition of the
11 term “sum certain.” *Black’s Law Dictionary* 1736 (11th ed. 2019). “A sum certain is an
12 amount that is unchanging, but that is fixed at a precise number, at least for the given
13 time it is to be paid.” Stephen Michael Sheppard, gen. ed., *The Wolters Kluwer Bouvier*
14 *Law Dictionary Compact Edition* 1062 (2011).
15

16 Courts construing A.R.S. § 12-121.01(A) routinely say that it requires a claimant
17 to state a “sum certain” amount when presenting a claim to a public entity or a public
18 employee. That is very close to, but not precisely what, the statute says. In relevant part,
19 the statute says that: “The claim shall also contain a specific amount for which the claim
20 can be settled.” A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A). A “specific amount” is not necessarily and
21 strictly an exact or precise number.
22

23 Here, the notice of claim states: “Based upon the totality of the circumstances,
24 this matter can be settled at this time for \$1,000,000 or the applicable policy limits,
25

1 whichever are greater.” (PSA-Appx. 028, 039). The final amount the claimant sought
2 was specific. It was the greater of \$1 million or the applicable policy limits.

3 The claimant assumed that there were, indeed, insurance policies covering the car
4 vs. bicycle collision of November 19, 2021. That assumption was accurate. In fact, at
5 the trial court, Lisa Lorts, a City of Mesa Risk Management Claim Analyst, avowed that
6 the “City has several liability insurance policies, and it accordingly has several different
7 policy limits.” (PSA-Appx. 047, ¶ 2). Claim Analyst Lorts explained that the City had
8 the following policy limits:
9

10	Self-insured retention limit:	\$ 3 million
11		
12	Automobile-liability policy limit:	\$ 1 million
13		
14	Excess-carrier maximum policy limit:	\$50 million
15		
16	<u>Total applicable policy limits:</u>	<u>\$54 million</u>

15 (PSA-Appx. 047, ¶ 3-5).

16 Pardon the cliché, but this is not rocket science. The City of Mesa knew that the
17 maximum of the applicable policy limits was \$54 million. So, the City of Mesa had a
18 choice. It could settle the claim for \$54 million, which it did not do, or try to negotiate
19 for a lower settlement amount, which it also did not do.
20

21 The City of Mesa cannot argue in good faith that it received a claim that lacked
22 “a specific amount for which the claim can be settled.” A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A). The
23 City of Mesa, after all, had notice that the claim could be settled for the greater of \$1
24
25

1 million or \$54 million. That is a “specific amount.” Of course, as is almost always true
2 with Arizona public entities in wrongful-death and serious personal-injury cases, the
3 City apparently did not investigate the “specific amount” stated in the notice of claim,
4 refused to pay the demanded “specific amount,” refused to negotiate at all, and refused
5 to settle. The City just waited to ambush the claimant with a defense that it did not
6 know what the “specific amount” was that the claimant was seeking when in fact, the
7 City knew all along what that amount was.

9 The City of Mesa cannot claim it was paralyzed by lack of knowledge,
10 uncertainty, or confusion about the “specific amount” for which the claim could be
11 settled. The City knew that the “specific amount” of the applicable-policy-limits
12 demand was \$54 million. The claimant thus satisfied the “specific amount” requirement
13 of A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A).
14

15 In the present case, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that, in its opinion, “if a
16 notice of claim referred to a clear point of reference, such as the limits in a single policy
17 understood to be applicable, such a reference might satisfy A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A).”
18 *City of Mesa v. Ryan*, 256 Ariz. 350, 355 ¶ 19 (App. 2023). What is the difference
19 between one policy and two or more policies? In both situations, there are clear points
20 of reference for the public entity that has received the notice of claim.
21
22

23 In our case, the Complaint was filed on October 28, 2022. (PSA-Appx. 009). On
24 January 23, 2023, process was served on the City of Mesa. (IR-009). On February 13,
25

1 2023—just 21 days later—the City filed its motion to dismiss. (PSA-Appx 017). That
2 motion to dismiss relied on a detailed Declaration that City of Mesa Risk Management
3 Claims Analyst Lisa Lorts signed on February 9, 2023. (PSA-Appx 048).

4 Thus, without any appreciable effort and without conducting any discovery, the
5 City of Mesa was able to provide the trial court with the exact figure of \$54 million for
6 the applicable policy limits just 21 days after having been served with the summons and
7 complaint. And so, the City knew from the start the amount of the “specific demand”
8 that the claimant was making in the notice of claim.
9

10 The claimant asked for a very “specific amount,” which was \$1 million or “the
11 applicable policy limits, whichever are greater.” (PSA-Appx. 028, 039). The City knew
12 from the notice of claim that the \$1 million amount was irrelevant, because, as it
13 avowed to the trial court, it had \$54 million in applicable policy limits. That was the
14 “specific amount” the claimant was demanding.
15

16 The City of Mesa was immediately able to identify its applicable policy limits to
17 get to the \$54 million specific amount of the applicable policy limits. The City then
18 presented the facts about that specific amount to the trial court. The City knew the
19 specific amount demanded—it simply did not want to pay it, negotiate it, or ask for any
20 clarification from the claimant. Instead, the City waited until the claimant filed a lawsuit
21 and then, 21 days later, pounced on the supposed lack of a specific amount. But the City
22 was able to identify for the trial court the \$54 million specific amount with ease just 21
23
24
25

1 days after being served. This is not how a fair and equitable claim system operates. And
2 that is not what A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A)'s "specific demand" language envisions.

3 The Court of Appeals regarded the claimant's "applicable policy limits" demand
4 as a demand for two "alternative amounts"—

5 (1) a claim for "a specific amount" of \$1 million and

6 (2) a claim for an "an unstated amount" (the applicable policy limits") for which
7 the claimant "would prefer to settle for, were it available."
8

9 *City of Mesa*, 256 Ariz. at 353 ¶ 10.

10 That analysis is inaccurate. After all, the claimant only wanted one specific
11 amount—the greater of \$1 million or the applicable policy limits. Pay that, and the
12 claim would be settled.
13

14 The Court of Appeals concluded that a notice of claim must, as *Deer Valley*
15 memorably phrased the requirement, "include a particular and certain amount of
16 money that, if agreed to by the government entity, will settle the claim" *City of Mesa*,
17 256 Ariz. at 353 ¶ 10 (quoting *Deer Valley Unified School Dist. No. 97 v. Houser*, 214
18 Ariz. 293, 296 ¶ 9 (2007)). Within the meaning of A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A), the claimant
19 in our case asked for a particular and certain amount of money, which the City was
20 promptly able to identify for the superior court as the applicable policy limits of \$54
21 million. The City knew what that specific amount was, told the trial court what it was,
22 just did not want to pay it or negotiate about it with the claimant.
23
24
25

1 When a public entity can easily understand what the specific amount demanded is
2 through checking a few documents and doing some simple addition, it cannot argue that
3 there was no “specific amount” demanded or that it did not understand what that
4 “specific amount” might be.

5 As in all things legal and hypothetical, there can theoretically be claimants who
6 take things too far. For instance, if employees of an Arizona public entity killed a young
7 husband and father and his outraged and bereaved widow made a specific demand for
8 the net worth of the city as recompense, the public entity might justifiably respond that
9 it would have no idea what that specific amount might be. But that extreme situation
10 does not confront us here.
11

12 Instead, we confront a case where the City of Mesa provided the facts about its
13 applicable policy limits with its motion to dismiss. There was no delay, no hesitation,
14 and no guessing. By February 9, 2023, just 17 days after the City of Mesa was served
15 with the summons and complaint on January 23, 2023, a City claims analyst stated what
16 the applicable policy limits were. Thus, by shuffling a few papers and using elementary-
17 school math skills to add a few things together, the City knew that the applicable policy
18 limits came to \$54 million—and therefore knew that the specific amount demanded was
19 \$54 million. Nothing more was needed for a legitimate “specific demand” under A.R.S.
20 § 12-821.01(A).
21
22
23

24 The Court of Appeals concluded that whether an insurance policy applies is not a
25

1 calculation but a legal question. *City of Mesa*, 256 Ariz. at 355 ¶ 18. Let us, however,
2 turn from unanchored speculation to our case’s actual facts. City of Mesa Risk
3 Management Claim Analyst Lisa Lorts explained that the applicable policy limits were
4 \$54 million. (PSA-Appx. 047, ¶ 5). The claimant wanted the greater of \$1 million or the
5 applicable policy limits. The greater figure was \$54 million. There was no legitimate
6 dispute about that. And so, that was the specific amount the claimant demanded.
7

8 But assuming that, for the sake of argument, there might be a legal dispute on
9 insurance policy limits, as the Court of Appeals apparently posits, that does not change
10 the “specific amount” the claimant is seeking. The claimant is seeking the specific
11 amount of the applicable policy limits. The City identified no legal dispute about the
12 insurance policy limits, however, because there apparently is none for this simple
13 motor-vehicle collision.
14

15 The requirements A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A) imposes, such as the “specific demand”
16 requirement, are intended to let a public entity investigate and assess liability, allow the
17 possibility of pre-litigation settlement, and help the public entity in financial planning
18 and budgeting. *Falcon ex rel. Sandoval v. Maricopa County*, 213 Ariz. 525, 527 ¶ 9
19 (2006). The goal of the notice-of-claim system is not to defeat meritorious claims on
20 technicalities, but “to encourage public entities and claimants to resolve claims without
21 resorting to litigation.” *Backus v. State*, 220 Ariz. 101, 106 ¶ 21 (2009).
22
23

24 “Arizona’s notice of claims statute is not intended to abrogate or interfere with an
25

1 injured citizen's right to redress wrongs suffered due to the negligence of the State.”
2 John F. Barwell, *Notice of Claims and the “Sum Certain” Requirement: The Fallout*
3 *from Deer Valley*, 50 Ariz. L. Rev. 1205, 1214 (2008). That, at least, is the publicly-
4 touted justification.

5
6 On the other hand, a cynical student of A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A) and the cases
7 construing it might conclude that the purpose of the statute “might have been to impede
8 plaintiffs’ lawsuits against public entities or to transfer liability to plaintiffs’ attorneys
9 who fail to meet the procedural intricacies of the statute.” Phillip Beatty, *The Deer*
10 *Valley Aftermath: Manufactured Digits Thwart Original Purpose of Arizona’s Claim-*
11 *Notice Statute*, 40 Ariz. St. L.J. 1031, 1045 (Fall 2008).

12
13 Be that as it may, finding that a claimant has satisfied the “specific demand”
14 requirement by asking for a public entity’s applicable policy limits is a “specific
15 demand” that the public entity can understand. All that the public entity needs to do is
16 check its own records or, if the public entity is sloppy in its recordkeeping, to ask its
17 insurance carrier or carriers. In a system based on the principle that the notice-of-claim
18 system exists to allow for reasonable investigation and assessment by the public entity,
19 that is a justifiable, reasonable, and equitable expectation.

20
21 **2. Reasonable calculation of damages is proper in notice-of-claim cases.**

22
23 Some calculation is allowable in notice-of-claim cases. The City of Mesa and the
24 Court of Appeals rejected the idea that calculation may be used in a notice-of-claim
25

1 case to determine the “specific amount” a claimant seeks. But this Court appears to
2 have inherently approved the possibility of extensive calculation in the notice-of-claim
3 case of *City of Phoenix v. Fields*, 219 Ariz. 568 (2009). In *Fields*, class-action plaintiffs
4 seeking damages against the City had presented a notice of claim that supposedly did
5 not containing a specific amount for which the claims of the members of the class could
6 be determined and settled.
7

8 The City filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that the claimants had not
9 met the “specific amount” notice-of-claim requirement. But the superior court denied
10 the motion, finding that A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A)’s “specific amount” settlement-demand
11 requirement did not apply to class actions. *Fields*, 219 Ariz. at 531 ¶ 4. The Court of
12 Appeals, however, vacated the superior court’s order, concluding that A.R.S. § 12-
13 821.01(A) applies to class actions and that the class’s notices were supposedly deficient
14 because they had not specified “an amount for which the class claim could be settled.”
15 *Id.* at 531 ¶ 5.
16
17

18 This Court held that A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A) required some “form of settlement
19 demand for a sum certain.” *Fields*, 219 Ariz. at 534 ¶ 18. Thus, for a class action, a
20 putative class representative must include a “specific amount” for which his individual
21 claim can be settled. *Id.* at 534 ¶ 19. And because the class representatives had failed to
22 state specific amounts for their class-representative claims, this Court concluded that
23 they had failed to comply with the “specific amount” notice-of-claim requirement set
24
25

1 out in A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A). *Id.* at 534 ¶ 22.

2 But all was not lost. The class representatives argued that the City had waived
3 any reliance on the “specific amount” notice-of-claim requirement by litigating the case
4 actively for many months without raising the “specific amount” defense. *Fields*, 219
5 Ariz. at 534-36 ¶¶ 22-33. This Court held that there indeed had been waiver and
6 remanded the matter for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. *Id.* at 537 ¶ 34.
7

8 For our case, the relevant ramification of *Fields* is that, if putative class
9 representatives do file a notice of claim demanding a “specific amount” for a class
10 settlement, the “specific amount” for each of the other members of the class is a matter
11 preserved for later determination over the course of the class-action proceedings. *Fields*,
12 219 Ariz. at 534 ¶¶ 17-21.
13

14 If there can be a determination of a notice of claim’s “specific amount” based on
15 calculations made years *after* the original submission of the notice of claim in a class-
16 action case, there can be a simple check of policy limits and a mathematical addition of
17 those policy limits when a claimant submits a notice of claim in a non-class-action case.
18

19 **3. The large amount that the claimant demanded does not affect or disqualify**
20 **the demand’s legitimacy under A.R.S. § 12-121.01(A).**

21 The claimant clearly stated he sought the specific amount of “\$1,000,000 or the
22 applicable policy limits, whichever are greater.” (PSA-Appx. 028, 039).
23

24 The \$54 million demand was high. But a claimant is master of the specific
25 amount the claimant demands. If the amount seems high to others, that does not affect

1 the validity of the claim. After all, A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A) “does not call for inquiry into
2 the reasonableness of a sum certain demand.” *Yollin v. City of Glendale*, 219 Ariz. 24,
3 32 ¶ 23 (App. 2008).

4 Perhaps the City of Mesa’s claims functionaries, to the extent that they evaluated
5 the liability and damages facts and did not merely look for a loophole to defeat the
6 claim on technical grounds, were surprised by the large \$54 million demand. Perhaps
7 that is why they ignored it. But the notices of claim that the claimant served in this case
8 provided detailed information on liability and damages. The City could and did simply
9 choose to ignore that detailed information. That is, after all, its right. *See* A.R.S. § 12-
10 821.01(E) (“A claim against a public entity or public employee filed pursuant to this
11 section is deemed denied sixty days after the filing of the claim unless the claimant is
12 advised of the denial in writing before the expiration of sixty days.”). But the right to
13 simply ignore a notice of claim and the information provided within it does not give the
14 City any right to claim that the “specific amount” demanded was not “specific” enough
15 when it was, in fact, specific.
16
17
18

19 Notably, in *Backus v. State*, this Court explained that a claimant complies with
20 A.R.S. § 12–821.01(A) “by providing the factual foundation that the claimant regards
21 as adequate to permit the public entity to evaluate the specific amount claimed.” 220
22 Ariz. 101, 106-07 ¶ 23 (2009).
23

24 Thus, as long as a claimant “provides facts to support the amount claimed, he has
25

1 complied with the supporting-facts requirement of the statute, and courts should not
2 scrutinize the claimant's description of facts to determine the 'sufficiency' of the factual
3 disclosure." *Id.* at 107 ¶ 23. If the claimant provides those facts that the claimant
4 regards as supporting the claimed specific amount—as the claimant did in our case—
5 that complies with A.R.S. § 12–821.01(A). *Id.* at 107 ¶ 29.
6

7 The \$54 million demand was large, but it was specific, and the notices of claim
8 set out facts supporting the "specific amount" that the claimant demanded. The specific
9 amount demanded was therefore proper in its specificity and not subject to attack
10 simply because of its rather large size.
11

12 **DATED** this 26th day of May, 2024.

13 **AHWATUKEE LEGAL OFFICE, P.C.**

14 /s/ David L. Abney, Esq.
15 David L. Abney
16 Appellate Counsel for Real Party in Interest

17 **Certificate of Compliance**

18 This document: (1) uses Times New Roman 14-point proportionately spaced
19 typeface for text *and* footnotes; (2) contains 2,954 words (by computer count); (3)
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22 On this date, this document was electronically filed with the Clerk of the Arizona
23 Supreme Court and copies of it were delivered to:

- 24 • Hon. Timothy Ryan, **MARICOPA COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT**, East Court Building,
25 ECB 814, Phoenix, AZ 85003, (602) 372-3081, Respondent Judge [via TurboCourt].

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