BEFORE THE DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA

IN THE MATTER OF A NON-MEMBER OF THE STATE BAR OF ARIZONA **MICHAEL T. STOLLER,** RESPONDENT.	No. 08-0816 **DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION REPORT**

This matter came before the Disciplinary Commission of the Supreme Court of Arizona on January 22, 2011, pursuant to Rule 58, Ariz.R.Sup.Ct., for consideration of the Hearing Officer's Report filed January 6, 2001, recommending acceptance of the Tender of Admissions and Agreement for Discipline by Consent ("Tender") and Joint Memorandum ("Joint Memorandum") providing for censure and costs.

Decision

The seven members[1] of the Disciplinary Commission unanimously recommend accepting and incorporating the Hearing Officer's findings of fact and conclusions of law and recommendation for censure and costs of these disciplinary proceedings including any costs incurred by the Disciplinary Clerk's office.[2]

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 22 day of February, 2011.

Pamela M. Katzenberg/mou
Pamela M. Katzenberg, Chair
Disciplinary Commission

[1] Commissioner Belleau and Horsley did not participate in this proceeding.
[2] The Hearing Officer's Report is attached as Exhibit A. The State Bar's costs total $1,486.61.

Original filed with the Disciplinary Clerk
this 22 day of February, 2011.

Copy of the foregoing mailed
this 24 day of February, 2011, to:

Nancy A. Greenlee
Respondent's Counsel
821 East Fern Drive North
Phoenix, AZ 85014

Jason B. Easterday
Bar Counsel
State Bar of Arizona
4201 North 24th Street, Suite 200
Phoenix, AZ 85016-6288

Copy of the foregoing hand delivered
this 24 day of February, 2011, to:

Hon. Jonathan H. Schwartz
Hearing Officer 6S
1501 W. Washington, Suite 104
Phoenix, AZ 85007

by Deana Baker

/mps

EXHIBIT A

EXHIBIT
A

BEFORE A HEARING OFFICER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA

IN THE MATTER OF A NON-MEMBER OF THE STATE BAR OF ARIZONA,

MICHAEL T. STOLLER,

Respondent.

File No. 08-0816

HEARING OFFICER'S REPORT

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 14, 2010 the parties filed a Tender of Admissions and Agreement for Discipline by Consent and a Joint Memorandum in Support of Tender of Admissions and Agreement for Discipline by Consent. No Complaint has been filed. The Hearing Officer was assigned on November 1, 2010. The Hearing Officer conducted a telephonic hearing on the Agreement on November 18, 2010. A court reporter recorded the proceedings.

FINDINGS OF FACT [1]

1. At all times relevant, Michael T. Stoller was licensed to practice law in California. He is not licensed to practice law in Arizona.

COUNT ONE

2. In or about late 2007, Respondent developed a business plan to operate and manage a multi-state bankruptcy practice. His plan was to use a central office for preparation of the petitions and pleadings so as to maximize economies of scale. The plan envisioned starting first in California, where Respondent is licensed, and in Colorado and Arizona, where Respondent's brother-in-law, William Birdsall, is licensed.

[1] The facts are found in the Tender of Admissions in Support of Discipline by Consent unless otherwise noted.

3. Respondent used a marketing company who obtained prospective client names by searching public records for people who had foreclosure proceedings instituted. The marketing company then, with Respondent's approval, mailed postcards to those individuals advertising a "Fresh Start Program" which was described as "a government program designed for homeowners ... who may have fallen behind on their mortgages". The postcards listed Respondent's firm phone number. In actuality, the postcards advertised Respondent's bankruptcy firm, and not a governmental program. While Respondent admits that his advertising was misleading in violation of ER 7.1, Respondent contends the advertising program was short-lived, and indeed ended in March 2008, and the State Bar does not contest this assertion for purposes of this agreement. Respondent also contends that anyone who called as a result of the mailer received Respondent's law firm, and the receptionist clearly announced that the phone number rang to a law office; the State Bar does not contest this assertion for purposes of this agreement. Respondent testified at the hearing that he knew that the postcards were describing a purported government program. (TR 5:8)

4. Respondent and the paralegals that he hired were to handle the telephonic communications with client. Mr. Birdsall would be the attorney of record in Arizona, and contract lawyers would be used to cover the first meeting of creditors and other hearings, with the view of bringing those attorneys on as associates of the firm once the law firm was fully up to speed.

5. Problems began to surface soon after the firm began handling bankruptcy cases. There were problems with the petitions that were filed and with finding coverage attorneys for the various meeting of creditors and hearing. The logistics of the daily operations began to be

unworkable. Arizona's Chapter 13 trustee became concerned and the Arizona Bankruptcy Court set an Order to Show Cause hearing.

6. On or about February 4, 2008, Respondent, or someone at his firm under his supervision, filed a bankruptcy petition in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court, District of Arizona on Dennis Dodd's ("Dodd Matter") behalf. The petition filed under William Birdsall's name and Arizona bar number at a time when William Birdsall was suspended from the practice of law. Neither Respondent nor Mr. Birdsall knew that Mr. Birdsall's license had been suspended for non-payment of bar dues at the time of the filings. (TR 18:9 through 19:16) The suspension was remedied immediately upon discovery of the suspension. In or around July 2008, the Dodd Matter was transferred from Respondent's firm to subsequent counsel.

7. On or about February 7, 2008, Respondent, or someone at his firm under his supervision, filed a bankruptcy petition in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court, District of Arizona, on Filiberto Rodriguez's and Guillermina Flores' ("Rodriguez/Flores Matter") behalf. The petition was filed under William Birdsall's name and Arizona bar number at a time when William Birdsall was suspended from the practice of law. (See explanation in paragraph 6 above). On or about May 13, 2008, the Rodriguez/Flores Matter was dismissed for failing to file the debtors' 2004 to 2007 income tax returns as required by local rules, even after a notice of deficient filing was previously filed and sent to the parties on or about February 11, 2008. Respondent asserts that in bankruptcy court this dismissal was without prejudice, which allowed the debtor to re-file.

8. On or about February 14, 2008, Respondent, or someone at his firm under his supervision, filed a bankruptcy petition in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court, District of Arizona, on Jorge Lizarraga's ("Lizzarraga Matter") behalf. On or about March 31, 2008, the Lizarraga

Matter was dismissed for failure of the debtor to appear at a required and previously scheduled creditor's meeting. Respondent asserts that the dismissal was without prejudice, which allowed the debtor to re-file.

9. On or about March 14, 2008, Respondent, or someone at his firm under his supervision, filed a bankruptcy petition in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court, District of Arizona, on Paula Allen's ("Allen Matter") behalf. On or about May 2, 2008, the Allen Matter was dismissed for failure of the debtor to appear at a required and previously scheduled creditor's meeting. Respondent asserts that the dismissal was without prejudice, which allowed the debtor to re-file.

10. On or about April 18, 2008, Respondent, or someone at his firm under his supervision, filed a bankruptcy petition in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court, District of Arizona, on Marvin and Jamie Hayes' ("Hayes Matter") behalf. On or about March 9, 2009, the Hayes Matter was dismissed for failure to comply with the trustee's recommendations. Respondent asserts that the dismissal was without prejudice, which allowed the debtor to re-file.

11. On or about May 19, 2008, Respondent, or someone at his firm under his supervision, filed a bankruptcy petition in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court, District of Arizona, on John Boyer's ("Boyer Matter") behalf. On or about July 1, 2008, the Boyer Matter was dismissed for failure of the debtor to appear at a required and previously scheduled creditor's meeting. Respondent asserts the dismissal was without prejudice, which allowed the debtor to re-file.

12. Respondent entered into an agreement with the U.S. Trustee's Office in Arizona. As part of the agreement, Respondent's firm has agreed to cease handling bankruptcy cases in Arizona and Respondent assisted in securing local counsel to handle all Arizona bankruptcy cases. All fees paid by Arizona clients are being refunded according to a time schedule as set forth in the agreement.

13. Respondent admits that he did not adequately communicate with Arizona clients who retained his firm and did not adequately explain to them that coverage attorneys would be handling the bankruptcy hearings. Respondent admits that his conduct violated ER 1.4.

14. Respondent did not have in place reasonable measures to ensure adequate supervision of his non-lawyer staff so as to ensure that the staff's conduct was compatible with Respondent's professional obligations. Respondent admits that his conduct violated ER 5.3. Respondent testified that his original plan was to have his brother-in-law Bill Birdsall who was a licensed Arizona attorney be responsible for the bankruptcy hearings in Arizona bankruptcy court. However before that plan was in place Respondent was using what he called "appearance attorneys and other contract people" to cover the bankruptcy hearings. (TR 6: 5-9) Respondent had not taken sufficient measures to make sure that the contract attorneys and Respondent's non-lawyer staff were talking to the clients and forwarding documents for the bankruptcy hearings. The contract attorneys were either not taking the documents with them to the bankruptcy hearing or were not reviewing the documents or not contacting the clients. Respondent's staff was not making sure that the clients understood that a contract attorney would be appearing with them and that the clients would be prepared for whatever questions or information the bankruptcy trustee would ask. (TR 6:10-25)

15. Respondent admits his advertising as described above was misleading in that a reasonable person may have viewed the postcards as solicitation for a governmental assistance program rather than an advertisement for a bankruptcy law practice, although as Respondent asserted above, and the State Bar does not contest for purposes of this agreement, any misperception was corrected by the receptionist identifying the called telephone number as a law office. Respondent admits his conduct violated ER 7.1.

16. Based upon the foregoing, Respondent admits his conduct caused prejudice to the administration of justice and Respondent admits his conduct violated ER 8.4(d). Respondent testified that instead of a disposition of the bankruptcy case at the hearing, due to the breakdown of communication of information between Respondent's staff, the contract attorneys and the clients' subsequent hearings were required that otherwise would not have been necessary. (TR 6:21 through 7:11)

CONDITIONAL ADMISSIONS/CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Respondent conditionally admits that his conduct, as set forth above, violated Rule 42, ERs 1.4(a) and (b) [lack of communication], 5.3 [failure to supervise staff], 7.1 [misleading advertising] and 8.4(d) [conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice].[2] Based on the admissions and the findings of fact the Hearing Officer concludes that the State Bar has established by clear and convincing evidence violations of the ERs set forth above.

RESTITUTION

Restitution is not an issue in this matter as Respondent is making full refunds to clients per his agreement with the U.S. Trustee's Office.

ABA STANDARDS [3]

The *Standards* are designed to promote consistency in the imposition of sanctions by identifying relevant factors that courts should consider and then applying these factors to situations where lawyers have engaged in various types of misconduct. *Standards* 1.3, Commentary. The *Standards* provide guidance with respect to an appropriate sanction in this matter. The Court and Commission

[2] The parties conditionally agree not to cite 5.1, 5.5, 8.4(a), 8.4(b), and 8.4(c) as Respondent's conduct is better represented by the conditionally admitted ethical rules cited above.

[3] The information in this section comes from the Joint Memorandum in Support of the Tender of Admissions unless otherwise noted.

consider the *Standards* a suitable guideline. *In re Rivkind*, 164 Ariz. 154, 157, 791 P.2d 1037, 1040 (1990); *In re Kaplan*, 179 Ariz. 175, 177, 877 P.2d 274, 276 (1994).

In determining an appropriate sanction, both the Court and the Commission consider the duty violated, the lawyer's mental state, the actual or potential injury caused by the misconduct and the existence of aggravating and mitigating factors. *In re Tarletz,* 163 Ariz. 548, 789 P.2d 1049 (1990); *Standard* 3.0.

Duty Violated

Respondent testified at the hearing that he violated his duty to his clients and the duty to the profession in general by not making sure that the process he began was operated effectively and efficiently. (TR 8:11-17)

Mental State

In the instant case, based on Respondent's assertions, the parties have conditionally agreed that Respondent acted with a negligent mental state as defined by *In re Van Dox*, 214 Ariz. 300, 152 P.2d 1183. The Hearing Officer agrees that with the lack of communication (ER 1.4), the failure to supervise staff (ER 5.3) and the prejudicial effect on the administration of justice (ER 8.4) violations Respondent's mental state may fairly be called "negligent". The Hearing Officer determines that in the misleading advertising (ER 7.1) violation Respondent's mental state could also be labeled as "knowingly". In *In re Van Dox*, the Supreme Court quoted from the ABA Standards in defining "negligence" as the failure "... to heed a substantial risk that circumstances exist or that a result will follow, which failure is a deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable lawyer would exercise in the situation". 214 Ariz. at 304, 152 P.3d at 1187 The Court also concluded that a higher standard must be proven before an attorney can be said to have acted knowingly. Citing *In re Levine*, 174 Ariz. 146, 171, 847 P.2d 1093, 1118 (1993) the Court

stated that the Bar would have to prove that the offending lawyer knew that his conduct may have been violated an ethical rule. 214 Ariz. at 305, 152 P. 3d at 1188 Respondent knew that the advertising program was sending postcards telling people about a governmental program that would help them. Respondent knew that he was not in any way involved in a governmental program to aid people. Therefore, he knew that the advertising was misleading and that to mislead the public was for an attorney an ethical violation. At the hearing Respondent explained that a government program of a "fresh start" was a phrase used frequently in bankruptcy court vernacular and that he did not know that the advertising campaign violated a particular bar provision. However, Respondent also testified that there was no such government program called "a fresh start". (TR 15:13 through 17:10) This disagreement with the conclusion of the parties does not change the recommendation of the Hearing Officer that censure is appropriate in this case.

Injury

The potential for injury existed due to Respondent's actions concerning the misleading advertising. Clients and the court were actually injured by Respondent's failure to communicate and adequately supervise staff.

Given the conduct in this matter, the most applicable provisions from the *Standards* are *Standards* 4.4 "Lack of Diligence" and 7.0 "Violations of Other Duties Owed as a Professional". Specifically, *Standard* 4.43 is applicable because it provides that "(r)eprimand [censure in Arizona] is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent and does not act with reasonable diligence in representing a client, and causes injury or potential injury to a client." *Standard* 7.3 provides that "(r)eprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer negligently engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional, and causes injury or potential injury

to a client, the public, or the legal system." Therefore, the presumptive sanction in this case is censure.

Having determined the presumptive sanction is censure, the Hearing Officer and the parties next considered the applicable aggravating and mitigating circumstances, as set forth in the *Standards* and agree that the following apply in this matter.

Aggravating Factors

Standard 9.22(a) Prior Disciplinary History: In State Bar of California Case Number 09-J-11153-RAH (Oct. 7, 2009) Respondent received a two-year stayed suspension and was placed on two years of probation. Respondent violated Rule 3-110(A), California Rule of Professional Conduct, by failing to provide the required counseling prior to filing bankruptcy petitions, filing an incomplete bankruptcy petition, failing to appear at hearings, and failing to properly supervise his office staff. The Hearing Officer agrees with the State Bar of Arizona and Respondent that the events of the California matter occurred in the same time period as the events in this matter and thus, this aggravating factor should be given less weight.

Standard 9.22(d) Multiple Offenses. Respondent violated more than one ethical rule.

Standard 9.22(i) Substantial Experience in the Practice of Law: Respondent was admitted to the practice of law in California in 1985.

Mitigating Factors

Standard 9.32(d) Timely Good Faith Effort to Make Restitution or to Rectify Consequences of Misconduct: Respondent cooperated with the bankruptcy trustee, agreed to disgorge all collected fees, transfer all cases to local counsel, and to not practice in U.S. Bankruptcy Court, District of Arizona. Respondent has timely paid all scheduled restitution payments. At the hearing Respondent testified that he is in the process of repaying all the fees that clients paid. He

stated, "There was a schedule I'm attempting to comply with. There's an understanding as soon as possible I will continue to handle that, but I've had - - I have made payments. I have an agreement to handle that obligation and will continue to do so." Respondent also testified that he estimated that the total amount of fees would be $100,000 and he could not tell how much of those fees he has repaid. (TR 10:11-11:17)

Standard 9.32(e) Full and Free Disclosure to Disciplinary Board or Cooperative Attitude Toward Proceedings: Respondent timely and fully responded to all of the State Bar's requests for information in this matter.

Standard 9.32(k) Imposition of Other Penalties: Respondent agreed to disgorge all collected fees, transfer all cases to local counsel, and to not practice in U.S. Bankruptcy Court, District of Arizona.

The Hearing Officer agrees with the parties that the aggravating and mitigating factors do not support a sanction that deviates from the presumptive sanction.

PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW [4]

In the past, the Supreme Court has consulted similar cases in an attempt to assess the proportionality of the sanction recommended. *See In re Struthers,* 179 Ariz. 216, 226, 887 P.2d 789, 799 (1994). The Supreme Court has recognized that the concept or proportionality review is "an imperfect process." *In re Owens,* 182 Ariz. 121, 127, 893 P.3d 1284, 1290 (1995). This is because no two cases "are ever alike." *Id.*

To have an effective system of professional sanctions, there must be internal consistency, and it is appropriate to examine sanctions imposed in cases that are factually similar. *In re Peasley,*

[4] The information in this section comes from the Joint Memorandum in Support of the Tender of Admissions unless otherwise noted.

208 Ariz. 27, at ¶ 33, 90 P.3d 764, 772. However, the discipline in each case must be tailored to the individual case, as neither perfection nor absolute uniformity can be achieved. *Id.* at 208 Ariz. at ¶ 61, 90 P.3d at 778 (citing *In re Alcorn,* 202 Ariz. 62, 76, 41 P.3d 600, 614 (2002); *In re Wines*, 135 Ariz. 203, 207, 660 P.2d 454, 458 (1983)).

The Supreme Court "has long held that 'the objective of disciplinary proceedings is to protect the public, the profession and the administration of justice and not to punish the offender.'" *In re Alcorn*, 202 Ariz. 62, 74, 41 P.3d 600, 612 (2002) (quoting *In re Kastensmith*, 101 Ariz. 291, 294, 419 P.2d 75, 78 (1966)). The State Bar and Respondent conditionally agree that the sanction proposed here is consistent with these principles.

In *In re Struble*, SB-09-0062-D (2009), Struble was censured and placed on one year of probation. Struble failed to diligently communicate and represent clients. Struble failed to consult with a client and also failed to supervise an attorney over whom he had supervisory authority which delayed court proceedings and created additional work for other parties. There were two aggravating factors: *Standards* 9.22(d) multiple offenses and 9.22(i) substantial experience in the practice of law. There were two mitigating factors: *Standards* 9.32(a) absence of a prior disciplinary record and 9.32(e) full and free disclosure to a disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward the proceedings. Struble was sanctioned for violation of Rule 42, Ariz. R. Sup. Ct., specifically ERs 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 3.2, 5.1, and 8.4(d).

In *In re Phillips*, SB-02-0127-D (2002), Phillips was censured and placed on two years of "intensive" probation. Phillips failed to adequately supervise subordinate attorneys and non-lawyer assistants. Specifically, intake personnel failed to affirmatively identify themselves as non-attorneys and failed to adequately explain the limitations on the applicability of his "no money down" advertising. There were two aggravating factors: *Standards* 9.22(c) pattern of

misconduct and 9.22(d) multiple offenses. There were five mitigating factors: *Standards* 9.32(a) absence of prior disciplinary history, 9.32(b) absence of selfish or dishonest motive, 9.32(d) timely good faith effort to make restitution or rectify consequences of misconduct, 9.32(e) full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings, and 9.32(l) remorse. Phillips was sanctioned for violating Rule 42, Ariz. R. Sup. Ct., specifically ERs 5.1, 5.3, and 7.1.

In *In re Seplow*, SB-02-0108-D (2002), Seplow was censured and placed on two years of probation. Seplow employed a convicted felon as a legal assistant and permitted him to meet and accept clients and to accept advance fees and costs. Seplow failed to adequately supervise the legal assistant and aided in the unauthorized practice of law. Seplow also failed to provide competent representation, failed to communicate with clients, failed to diligently pursue the clients' legal matters, and failed to timely respond to the State Bar in its investigation. There were six aggravating factors: *Standards* 9.22(a) prior disciplinary offenses, 9.22(c) pattern of misconduct, 9.22(d) multiple offenses, 9.22(e) bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with rules or orders of the disciplinary agency, 9.22(h) vulnerability of the victim, and 9.22(i) substantial experience in the practice of law. There were six mitigating factors: *Standards* 9.32(b) absence of selfish or dishonest motive, 9.32(c) personal or emotional problems, 9.32(d) timely good faith effort to make restitution or rectify consequences of misconduct, 9.32(e) full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings, 9.32(g) character or reputation, and 9.32(l) remorse. Seplow was sanctioned for violation of Rule 42, Ariz. R. Sup. Ct., specifically ERs 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.15, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4(c), 5.3, 5.5, 8.4(a), 8.4(d), 8.4(e), and Rule 51(h), Ariz. R. Sup. Ct.

CONCLUSION/RECOMMENDATION

The Hearing Officer agrees with the parties that under the specific facts of this case the agreed-upon sanction is proportionate and appropriate. A censure and payment of all costs and expenses of the disciplinary proceedings as set forth in the Tender of Admissions will serve to protect the public, instill confidence in the public, deter other lawyers from similar misconduct, and maintain the integrity of our self-regulated profession. This agreement provides for a sanction that meets the goals of the disciplinary system.

A lawyer who had practiced law in California since 1985 should have known better than to use an advertising campaign with false information to entice new clients. It is not clear whether the California Bar sanctioned Respondent for false advertising. However, since Respondent is not licensed to practice law in Arizona, the greatest sanction that the Court can impose is a censure. The Hearing Officer is willing to recommend the sanction of censure and paying the costs of this proceeding because the false advertising campaign was short-lived, the clients were not permanently prejudiced (their petitions were dismissed without prejudice), Respondent will no longer represent clients in Bankruptcy Court in Arizona, Respondent made arrangements for replacement counsel, Respondent cooperated with the Bar and Respondent is making payments to reimburse clients for fees.

SANCTION

The Hearing Officer recommends that the following sanction be imposed:

1. Respondent shall be censured;

2. Respondent shall pay all costs incurred by the State Bar in bringing these disciplinary proceedings. In addition, Respondent shall pay all costs incurred by the Disciplinary Commission,

the Supreme Court and the Disciplinary Clerk's Office in this matter. The State Bar's Itemized Statement of Costs and Expenses is attached as Exhibit "B", and is incorporated herein by reference.

Dated this 6a day of January, 2011

Jonathan H. Schwartz
Hearing Officer 6S

Original filed with the Disciplinary Clerk
this 7 day of January, 2011.

Copy of the foregoing mailed
this 7 day of January, 2011, to:

Nancy Greenlee
821 East Fern Drive North
Phoenix, AZ 85014

Jason B. Easterday
Bar Counsel
State Bar of Arizona
4201 North 24th Street, Suite 200
Phoenix, AZ 85016-6288

Copy of the foregoing hand-delivered
this 7 day of January, 2011, to:

Honorable Jonathan Schwartz 6S
1501 W. Washington, Suite 104
Phoenix, AZ 85007

by: Jeanna DeAnn Bark

EXHIBIT B

Statement of Costs and Expenses

In the Matter of a Non-Member of the State Bar of Arizona,
Michael Thomas Stoller, Respondent

File No(s). 08-0816

Administrative Expenses

The Board of Governors of the State Bar of Arizona has adopted a schedule of administrative expenses to be assessed in disciplinary proceedings. The administrative expenses were determined to be a reasonable amount for those expenses incurred by the State Bar of Arizona in the processing of a disciplinary matter. An additional fee of 20% of the administrative expenses is also assessed for each separate matter over and above five (5) matters due to the extra expense incurred for the investigation of numerous charges.

Factors considered in the administrative expense are time expended by staff bar counsel, paralegal, secretaries, typists, file clerks and messenger; and normal postage charges, telephone costs, office supplies and all similar factors generally attributed to office overhead. As a matter of course, administrative costs will increase based on the length of time it takes a matter to proceed through the adjudication process.

General Administrative Expenses for above-numbered proceedings **$1200.00**

Additional costs incurred by the State Bar of Arizona in the processing of this disciplinary matter, and not included in administrative expenses, are itemized below.

Staff Investigator/Miscellaneous Charges

09/03/09	Computer investigation	$ 35.00
02/02/10	Computer investigation	$ 61.25
02/05/10	Computer investigation	$ 78.75
02/18/10	Computer investigation	$ 91.61
Total for staff investigator charges		$286.61

TOTAL COSTS AND EXPENSES INCURRED ***$1,486.61***

Sandra E. Montoya

Sandra E. Montoya
Lawyer Regulation Records Manager

9-15-10

Date