**Probate Rules Task Force**

**State Courts Building, Phoenix**

**Meeting Minutes: June 15, 2018**

**Members attending:** Hon. Rebecca Berch (Chair), Marlene Appel, John Barron III, Colleen Cacy, Hon. Julia Connors, Robert Fleming, Hon. David Mackey, Aaron Nash, Hon. Patricia Norris, Hon. Robert Carter Olson, Hon. John Paul Plante, Hon. Jay Polk, Lisa Price (by telephone), Catherine Robbins, T.J. Ryan, Denice Shepherd, Hon. Wayne Yehling (by telephone)

**Absent:** Hon. Andrew Klein

**Guests:** None

**AOC Staff:** Jodi Jerich, Mark Meltzer, Angela Pennington

**1. Call to order; preliminary remarks; approval of meeting minutes.** The Chair called the third Task Force meeting to order at 10:00 a.m. She advised that each workgroup met twice after the second Task Force meeting, and she commended the thought and effort the workgroups put into their drafts. She then asked members to review draft minutes of the second Task Force meeting. Judge Olson requested that those minutes reflect a presumption to delete current comments absent a reason to keep a comment. This revision, with one member opposing it, will appear at the end of section 3 of those minutes. There were no other corrections to the draft.

**Motion:** A member moved to approve the May 8, 2018 meeting minutes as revised, the motion received a second, and it passed unanimously. **PRTF: 002**

**2. Workgroup 1.** Workgroup 1 presented Rules 6 and 11 at the May 8 Task Force meeting. Members had returned those two rules to the workgroup with additional directions. After the workgroup's reconsideration, Judge Polk presented these rules again.

***Rule 6 (currently "Probate Information Form," and as proposed, "Probate Information Form and Notice of Change of Contact Information Form"):*** Judge Polk recalled that at the previous Task Force meeting, members were generally supportive of a new statewide probate information form, which would allow removal from Rule 6 of the form's required content. Workgroup 1 also considered certain provisions in Rule 10 (currently, "Duties Owed by Counsel, Fiduciaries, Unrepresented Parties, and Investigators") that require updates of contact information. The workgroup's revised Rule 6 begins with two definitions, one for "contact information" and the other for "fiduciary." The workgroup removed Rule 6's enumerated contact information details and relocated those details into three forms: Form 11, for decedent's estates; Form 12, for a guardianship/conservatorship; and Form 13, for a trust. The workgroup also proposed

new Forms 14 and 15, one for a changes of the fiduciary's contact information, and the other for a change of the ward's contact information.

Members had mixed comments. A judge member noted that considerable court resources and time are spent locating fiduciaries. He would adopt New Mexico's requirement that a fiduciary provide the names and addresses of two individuals who would always be able to contact the fiduciary. Another member observed that asking proposed fiduciaries for such personal details as hair color and weight might be considered invasive and might not even be helpful when serving a warrant. One member noted a provision in the rule that states the clerk may not reject a petition because a party failed to provide all the required information and suggested that certain categories of information should be optional. An attorney member observed that the number of probate forms is already burdensome, and these new forms would add to that burden.

In this regard, members confirmed that it was appropriate to strike proposed Rule 6(b)(2), which would exempt fiduciaries who are operating as a bank, title insurance company, or trust company from the requirement to complete the form. Accordingly, these fiduciaries would still be required to complete the form. For licensed fiduciaries, contact information is already on file with the Administrative Office of the Courts. But Judge Polk responded that superior court clerks don't contact the A.O.C. to obtain a fiduciary's contact information, and it is necessary that licensed fiduciaries complete the form. Judge Polk also observed that Form 13 for trustees was optional. However, unlike guardians, conservators, or personal representatives, trustees typically are not under the court's continuing supervision. Moreover, one member believed that requiring birth dates and email addresses for each trust beneficiary was worrisome. Members agreed to delete proposed Rule 6(b)(3) ("probate information form: trust proceedings"), and corresponding Form 13. After further discussion that emphasized the distinctions between Forms 11 and 12, members on a straw vote overwhelmingly supported having two separate probate information forms rather than a single consolidated form.

Members recommended utilizing annual reports as a mechanism for requesting updated information. The bottom of the annual report could include text such as, "to help us keep in contact with you, please provide [updated information]." But they questioned whether Rule 6 should include the need to update contact information. Rule 6 requirements arise at the inception of a case, whereas Rule 10 requirements to update information occur with subsequent changes in circumstances during a case. Rather than putting the update requirements in a sequential rule, however, they agreed to retain those requirements in proposed Rule 6(c)(1)(A) ("change in contact information for fiduciary" and (B) ("change in contact information for ward"), and to delete (C) ("other information") and (D) ("trusts") from the workgroup's draft. They also agreed to add in subpart (c)(3) ("service) the word "current" ("must mail or deliver a copy of the form to…all current parties…") and to delete in subpart (b)(5) ("no service") the words "including an updated Probate Information form." In response to an inquiry from a

member, they confirmed that subpart (c)(2) permits the court to maintain contact information as confidential in certain circumstances. Finally, members agreed that there is a duty to correct erroneous information in a probate information form. Members agreed to effect this change by moving the substance of subpart (c)(1)(C), which they previously struck, to section (b). The Task Force sent the rule back to Workgroup 1 to make these changes and to further discuss today's comments.

***Rule 11 ("Telephonic Attendance and Testimony"):*** Judge Polk summarized issues raised at the May 8 meeting and noted the workgroup's proposed responses to those issues. In section (b) ("when permitted"), the workgroup inserted a new introductory sentence that provides, "Parties and their attorneys are expected to appear in open court for court proceedings unless the court, in its discretion, permits telephonic attendance under this rule." Judge Polk explained that this new sentence is intended to balance the efficiency of telephonic attendance with the drawbacks of random attendance by telephone without prior notice.

Judge Polk further explained that the crux of the Rule 11 issue is in section (d) ("time for making request"). The workgroup had two views on the issue. One view, labeled #1, was subjective, and would permit the court to allow telephonic attendance "in a timely manner considering the attendant circumstances at the time the request was made, and the court has discretion to grant or deny the motion." The other view, #2, was objective, and would require a motion to allow telephonic attendance "no later than 30 days before the proceeding at which the telephonic attendance or testimony is requested. However, if the notice setting the proceeding provides less than 30 days' notice, the motion must be made no later than 5 days after receipt of the notice of the proceeding. The court may modify or waive these time limits."

Task Force members were also split between these two views. One workgroup member favored the objective standard with a default time limit, whereas another member noted that requests are often late but still should be decided promptly and, if necessary, on the spot. One member questioned whether the 30 and 15-day time limits were feasible, particularly when a hearing might be set with only 15-days' notice. Another member thought there should be different approaches for routine hearings and evidentiary hearings. A responsive comment, however, observed that many hearings, such as conservatorship hearings, may be both evidentiary and routine. Still another member opined that the real distinction under Rule 11 should be hearings that are uncontested, where telephonic attendance should be readily allowed, from hearings that are contested, where a request for telephonic attendance should be more closely scrutinized. Judge Polk observed that if an individual makes the request on the day of, or a day before, the hearing, and he denies the request, he might be required to reset the hearing, which is an inefficient use of court time. But another judge member thought that requiring a request by a fixed time in advance of a hearing was too inflexible and contravened principles of prudent cost management. This judge noted that a routine 5-

minute hearing should not require two hours of driving, particularly in rural counties, and the court should proactively encourage telephonic attendance. One member asked whether the rule should completely shift the paradigm by requiring requests to attend hearings in-person.

While revising Rule 11, and at the bottom of their draft, the workgroup noted 6 factors a court might consider in determining the timeliness of a request. A member suggested adopting the subjective view (option #1 above) but adding two or more of these factors. On a straw vote, three-fourths of the members supported that suggestion, and the Task Force returned the rule to the workgroup to integrate those factors it deemed appropriate. One member proposed changing the word "telephonic" in this rule to "electronic" to encompass attendance by video, but video is already incorporated within the definition of "telephonic" in subpart (a)(2). Moreover, making the proposed change could incorrectly suggest attendance by email or text messaging. Another member asked to change the word "proceeding" to another term because "proceeding" has a carefully constructed meaning under Rule 2. The word "proceeding," however, has a definition in subpart (a)(1) that applies "when used in this rule," and members declined to make the requested change.

Judge Polk also noted that Workgroup 1 had prepared another rule to present at a future meeting provisionally titled Rule XX, which will describe, and eliminate confusion between, various court events, such as an appearance hearing and a non-appearance hearing. When that rule is approved, it might be practical to change the word "proceeding" in Rule 11 to "court event."

**3.** **Workgroup 2.** Judge Olson presented Rules 16, 17, and 18 on behalf of the workgroup. He noted that these three rules were complementary, particularly Rules 16 and 17, which have similarly sequenced sections. He also noted the workgroup's expectation that dabblers and self-represented litigants would use the probate rules, and the workgroup wanted to clarify the concepts of the application and the petition.

***Rule 16 (currently, "Applications," and as proposed, "Applications in Probate Proceedings"):*** Judge Olson observed that section (a) ("meaning of 'application'") clarifies that an application requests the registrar to take specific actions authorized by statute. The action is usually requested without prior notice, except in instances when someone has filed a demand for notice, but notice follows the registrar's action. Section (b) ("form of application") includes references to civil rules. Judge Olson then reviewed section (c) ("probate registrar's action upon application.") The proposed rule would require the clerk to "immediately file" the application. Filing would help ensure there is a record of the application. Otherwise, if the application is rejected, there would be no record. Section (c) would require the registrar to act "promptly, but within two business hours," to approve or deny the application, or refer it to a judicial officer. Section (d) is titled "notice," although the action required under this section is service of the

application. Section (e) ("objection to application") is the bridge to Rule 17, because a person who opposes an application would be required to file a petition under Rule 17, which brings the matter before a judicial officer. This proposed section differs from section (e) of the current rule, which requires that opposition to an application be in the form of an "objection." The Chair invited members' comments on the proposed rule.

Most of the comments concerned section (c) and the time requirement for the registrar's action on an application. One judge member did not believe that two hours was realistic, especially if the registrar had a question concerning the application that required guidance from a judicial officer. A judicial officer may be unavailable during certain two-hour windows. Another judge thought that registrars had neither sufficient personnel nor resources to act on every application within two hours. A clerk member, Mr. Nash, noted a fundamental objective that clerks process applications correctly, and observed that a two-hour window creates undesirable pressure and puts speed ahead of doing it right. He suggested using the general adverb "promptly," but he also suggested that he obtain input from other clerks before the next Task Force meeting, and the Chair agreed with his suggestion. On the other hand, one member believed that two-hours was consistent with the statute's use of the term "expeditious." This member noted there are good reasons to process applications promptly, particularly for families who may need immediate access to a decedent's accounts in routine cases. Another member observed that family members may travel to Phoenix after a death and have little time available for a second trip to the registrar's office to retrieve subsequently issued letters. If the clerks cannot act timely, judges may serve as registrars (*see* A.R.S. § 14-1307) and review walk-in applications. Members noted that counties throughout Arizona may take several days to issue letters, whereas years ago the letters were processed after a very short wait in the clerk's office. Judge Olson believed that the statute intended a short turnaround, and although the workgroup is not tied to two hours, the public as well as the clerks would benefit from designating a specific time limit for processing an application. Another member noted, however, that even if the rule included a specific time, it would be aspirational, and there would be no penalty—for example, refunding the filing fee or deeming the application approved—when that time is exceeded.

The registrar may reject an application for administrative reasons, i.e., the paperwork is incomplete, or for substantive reasons, that is, something is amiss with the application. Judge Polk observed that under the afore-referenced statute, registrars are appointed by the presiding judge, and this contemplates that the presiding judge has authority to remove a registrar who repeatedly fails to act promptly. However, members would like input from the clerks, and Mr. Nash agreed to inquire about why it is taking longer to process applications now than previously.

Members supported the filing of applications, even if the application is subsequently rejected. Court processes involve creating and preserving a file. It is the clerks' duty to file documents that are presented to the clerk and filing applications would

regularize the process. One member explained a nuanced distinction between a rejection, which could be followed by an amended application, and a declination, which would be followed by a petition. However, a member noted the registrar uses the same form in both instances. Another member asked about the consequence of rejection on the filing fee. Members agreed that once the fee is paid, there should be no additional fee for a subsequent filing under the assigned case number. In circumstances where an application has been filed in an improper venue, one judge noted that he may order a refund of the fee. A member asked what the clerk should do with an original will filed with an application if the application is rejected. Members concurred that the clerk, as a precaution against loss, should photocopy or scan the original will before returning it to the applicant. A complete record also should include the registrar's documentation of the basis for rejecting an application. If the basis of the rejection is curable, the registrar should inform the applicant of how it could be cured, and a time limit for doing so. Members agreed that a provision to this effect should be added to section (c).

One member requested removal of a phrase in section (c) that would authorize the registrar to "refer it [the application] to a judicial officer." The members concern was two-fold. First, it might place the judge in a conflict that precludes the judge from subsequently hearing the matter, and second, it could require the judge to give legal advice to the registrar. Another member believed the concerns were misplaced because the judge has a registrar's authority under A.R.S. § 14-1307. A member also questioned use of the phrase in proposed section (a) that an application is a request to a registrar "for an order," because registrars do not enter orders. Members agreed and deleted that phrase. In concluding the discussion concerning Rule 16, the Chair noted the members' agreement that the clerk must file applications, and that the registrar must act promptly on applications. A decision on whether to specify a time limit for acting promptly, within the rule or in a comment to the rule, is pending Mr. Nash's inquiry with the clerks.

***Rule 17 (currently, "Petitions," and as proposed, "Petitions in Probate Proceedings"):*** Rule 17 follows the structure of Rule 16. However, section (a) ("meaning of 'petition',") is briefer because it does not include a list of statutory references. Section (b) ("form of petition") is like the corresponding section in Rule 16. Section (c) ("hearing date") clarifies that the obligation to obtain a hearing date rests with the petitioner, even though the clerk sometimes provides a date before petitioner requests one. Section (d) ("notice of hearing on the petition") is similar, but not identical, to Rule 16(d).

Section (e) ("response to a petition") recognizes that there might not be time before the hearing for filing a written response, but a response may be made orally at the hearing provided a written response is filed within 10 days thereafter. The time for filing a written response without the necessity of an oral objection is currently no fewer than 3 days before the hearing date, but Workgroup 2 believed that was impractical and changed that time to no later than 7 days before the hearing. The workgroup was concerned that if the objection was filed only a few days before the hearing, the judge might not be aware of

the filing and could be required after-the-fact to modify or vacate a ruling made at the hearing. Members agreed to insert in the provision on an oral response a reference to Civil Rule 12, so it has symmetry with the provision on a written response. They also agreed that it was unnecessary to include a proof of notice requirement in the provisions regarding a response. Members noted that the last sentence of subpart (e)(3), which refers readers to Rule 18 for details concerning a response, should be stricken because of significant modifications to Rule 18.

Judge Olson also reviewed sections (f) ("joinder") and (g) ("reply"). In section (g), and to accommodate the multiple types of petitions, members agreed to change "the petitioner may not file a reply" to "a party may not file a reply."

***Rule 18 (currently, "Motions," and as proposed, "Motions in Probate Proceedings"):*** The workgroup eviscerated most of the content of current Rule 18, but Judge Olson noted that the proposed rule, although brief, was still significant because it distinguished motions from applications and petitions. The proposed rule states simply that a motion is "a request to a judicial officer made by a party seeking procedural rather than substantive relief." A judge member noted that it is not always easy to distinguish what is a substantive motion from what is a procedural one, but members declined to clarify this further in the rule. In response to a member's suggestion that Rule 18 explain various types of motions, Judge Olson said that a rule on what subjects a motion could address might not be helpful.

One member suggested that Rule 18 include a reference to Civil Rule 7.1 on motions, but Judge Olson responded that this was unnecessary because there is a general reference to the Civil Rules in Probate Rule 3. However, a member suggested, and the Task Force agreed, that Rule 18 should clarify, as Civil Rule 7.1 does, that the court can rule on a motion without a hearing. Workgroup 2 referred current Rule 18(c) concerning repetitive filings to Workgroup 1 for its consideration with Rule 10.5's provisions regarding vexatious conduct.

Judge Olson concluded by inquiring about Rule 38 ("forms"), which has been assigned to Workgroup 2. He asked whether the assignment is limited to the text of Rule 38, or whether it also encompassed the forms themselves. He believes the forms may contain errors. The Chair responded that the Court probably would appreciate the Task Force noting errors in the current forms, as well as ways to improve the forms.

**4.** **Workgroup 3.** Judge Mackey presented on behalf of Workgroup 3.

***Rule 19 (currently, "Appointment of Attorney, Medical Professional, and Investigator," and as proposed, "Appointment of an Attorney, Medical Professional, or Investigator"):*** Judge Mackey began by noting that Workgroup 3's member Lisa Price recently passed the Arizona Bar Examination, and Task Force members joined in congratulating her. Regarding the rule, Judge Mackey began by distinguishing situations where an attorney already represents the ward from those requiring court-appointment

of counsel. A workgroup member believed that if the court appoints counsel, the appointment should be made before any emergency hearing. The workgroup member indicated that in an emergency petition, counsel can be appointed with no notice or with minimal notice, but the rule should clarify a preference that appointments be made before the hearing.

Judge Mackey also said the workgroup was concerned with situations where the court was unaware before a hearing that the ward had counsel of the ward's choosing. The workgroup would like counsel to become aware of the necessity for prompt action on the probate matter, and the entry of an appearance, to avoid the need for the court to appoint an attorney. The rule should specify, as it does already, that the petitioner should not be able to select the ward's counsel, but rather, the court should appoint an independent counsel, unless the ward already has counsel. Members discussed whether section (b) ("appointment of a specific attorney"), which used the phrase "should appoint an attorney," should be "must appoint an attorney." One member thought the provision should be broken down into more than a single sentence for better clarity. The member also believed the 5-day reference in subpart (b)(2) was unclear because it did not specify the starting point for the 5-day period. Another member questioned whether a proposed ward has the competence to choose counsel and indicated that a better alternative in that situation might be to request court appointment as the ward's attorney. One member noted concern about whether counsel of choice was involved in a matter that related to probate, and if it was unrelated, e.g., a divorce or a DUI, whether that would rise to being counsel of choice. A judge member also observed that counsel of choice might have a conflicting relationship with the petitioner, which could compromise the independence of the counsel of choice. But another member was protective of the right to choose counsel, even when the ward has limited capacity.

Another judge member expressed concern with Rule 19(b)'s attempt to restate statutory provisions (i.e., §§ 14-5303(C), 14-5401.01, and 14-5407(B)), but doing so incompletely or inaccurately. He gave as an example the issue regarding attorneys in guardianships of minors, a subject that is covered by statute but which the proposed rule omits. Judge Mackey added that the workgroup's attention was on adult guardianships rather than minor guardianships because that is the focus of the current rule, although the workgroup can revisit the latter issue. A workgroup member explained that the workgroup's intent was to fortify and implement the concept that an adult ward must have independent counsel. Judge Mackey indicated that the workgroup would consider the members' comments at today's meeting, including the issues on minors and emergency appointments, and revise the proposed rule. On the other hand, if the Task Force believes that the statutes do not require clarifying rules, then Rule 19(b) possibly should be abrogated.

In section (c) ("prohibited representation"), a member noted that no mechanism currently exists in Maricopa County for the court to enforce disclosure of the specified conflict. Such conflict issues typically arise after the fact rather than before. But a

workgroup member noted that the rule says the attorney should not accept—it does not say the court may not appoint—and this places the onus on the attorney to avoid accepting appointments under the specified conflict circumstances at the outset of a case.

Section (d) ("requesting appointment of a medical professional") includes language also provided by statute that permits the appointment of a psychologist or psychiatrist in specified cases requesting inpatient treatment authority. Members also agree that the rule encompasses situations when the ward has not previously seen a doctor because in those situations the order can name a doctor. In most cases, the petitioner names the doctor because the court may not have a list of physicians from which it can make appointments. A member suggested that because the petitioner has such flexibility in naming a physician, the language "if the medical professional has previously treated or recently evaluated the subject person" may be unnecessary. A.R.S. § 14-5303(C) states a preference for a physician with whom the proposed ward has an established relationship, and members discussed whether it might be appropriate to remove similar language from Rule 22. Judge Mackey said the workgroup would consider these remarks and return its revisions to the Task Force. He also noted that for Rules 19 and 22, the workgroup recommended abrogation of the current comments.

***Rule 22 (currently, "Orders Appointing Conservators, Guardians, and Personal Representatives; Bonds and Bond Companies; Restricted Assets," and as proposed, "Order Appointing Guardian, Conservator, Personal Representative, or Special Administrator"):*** The workgroup reorganized the rule but retained its substance. The three sections of the rule are now titled (a) orders, (b) bonds, and (c) restrictions on authority and accounts. The guardianship finding in subpart (a)(2) concerns the ward's right to possess a firearm.

The text of restrictions under the current rule is mandatory. The workgroup revised this to allow text that is "similar to" the designated language, which permits the court to modify restrictions as circumstances warrant. Subpart (c)(6) includes the words, "unless otherwise ordered," and a member suggested that those words should modify the entirety of section (c). The member also noted that although temporary letters contain a date when the fiduciary's authority expires, permanent letters do not, and he suggested that they should. Other members disagreed. Another member noted the inclusion in section (a) of the terms "personal representative or special administrator," but a special administrator is a personal representative and the term is unnecessary. After discussion, however, it was retained in both the rule and the body of section (a) because special administrators commonly have restrictions. Subpart (a)(3) says "letters will not issue until the bond has been filed." The member proposed changing "will" to "must," and Judge Mackey agreed to make this change.

Subpart (c)(2) contains language of a restriction beginning with the words, "no realty." A member suggested that restrictions should identify specific property because all the decedent's realty might not warrant identical restrictions. Another member added

that recorded letters are indexed by owner rather than by property address. One member raised an issue concerning the restriction that realty may not be leased for more than one year without court approval. The member noted that the statute does not require such approval for a leasehold, although it is in the current rule. The member added that it is burdensome to request annual approval for a lease term greater than a year. A member observed that adding the "unless otherwise ordered" language at the beginning of section (c) would address this issue, and members agreed with this solution.

Members also discussed subparts (c)(4-6), and who under each of these subparts has the responsibility to file proof of a restricted account. A judge member requested that subpart (4) include a reference to a financial institution, which often files the proof directly with the court, but the fiduciary must have ultimate responsibility for assuring the proof is filed. Members agreed with this approach. Members also discussed whether the purchase of an annuity as part of a personal injury settlement constitutes a restriction that must be included in the letters. Members did not agree on this question. One member suggested that the court's order could address this definitively, but another requested that Rule 22 codify guidance (e.g., "an order requiring the purchase of an annuity is/is not a restriction.") But after discussion, members concluded that the fiduciary does not handle the money, or directly purchase the annuity, and they declined to add this provision.

A member noted that the rule covers guardianships but does not have provisions for restrictions concerning non-financial items (e.g., not leaving the state.) Judge Mackey suggested that the workgroup could draft a new rule dealing with limited guardianships and meaningful restrictions in guardianships. One member favored a new rule because these restrictions commonly deal with the individuals rather than their assets. A new rule would require removal of the word "guardian" from the title of Rule 22. But Judge Mackey also left open the alternative of adding new provisions to Rule 22 on this subject, and the workgroup will consider both alternatives.

Members turned to the issue of expiration dates on letters. One judge member characterized letters as "high-powered powers of attorney," yet the court is not always aware of how the letters are used, or whether other restrictions might be appropriate because of changes in circumstances. The member suggested that letters be more specific. The member also suggested the because letters are utilized for years after their issuance, or even after the matter has concluded, letters should have an expiration date. The Chair observed that this is a significant issue and the members should consider it further.

The workgroup had insufficient time today to present Rules 35 and 37, which respectively deal with civil arrest warrants and investing settlement proceeds, and the Task Force will consider these rules at the next meeting.

**5.** **Roadmap.** The Chair observed that although the last rule in the current set is Rule 38, several rules have numbers to the right of the decimal point and there actually are 47 rules. In addition, the Task Force has, or will, propose several new rules, so there

will probably be about 50 rules by the time a rule petition is filed. Based on the experience of the second and third Task Force meetings, the goal of completing a draft of the rules by September is no longer feasible. At the rate of eight rules per meeting, it will probably require a half-dozen more meetings to have a complete draft of the probate rules that is suitable for stakeholder vetting. The Chair encouraged members to continue to present their diverse views notwithstanding the time necessary for discussion, but also, if there is no controversy concerning a rule, to put the rule on a consent agenda for expedited approval. She asked members to notify staff when and if there are rules suitable for a consent agenda, and staff will forward that information to the Chair.

The Chair confirmed as the next Task Force meeting date Friday, July 27, 2018, from 10 a.m. to 4 p.m. in Room 345. She directed staff to poll members concerning other future meeting dates.

**6.** **Call to the public.** There was no response to a call to the public.

**7.** **Adjourn.** The meeting adjourned at 4:08 p.m.