

**BEFORE THE PRESIDING DISCIPLINARY
JUDGE**

IN THE MATTER OF A MEMBER OF THE
STATE BAR OF ARIZONA,

JAMAL A. HARRISON,
Bar No. 017262

Respondent.

PDJ-2016-9008

FINAL JUDGMENT AND ORDER

[State Bar File Nos. 15-0857, 15-0930,
14-0715]

FILED JANUARY 6, 2017

This matter was heard by a hearing panel which rendered its decision under Rule 58, Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. Mr. Harrison appealed and by Order of the Supreme Court of Arizona filed January 4, 2017, Mr. Harrison's appeal was dismissed and the hearing panel's decision made final. Accordingly:

IT IS ORDERED Respondent, **JAMAL A. HARRISON**, is suspended for one (1) year effective May 23, 2016, as set forth in the hearing panel's Decision and Order filed April 22, 2016. A period of suspension of more than six months will require proof of rehabilitation and compliance with other requirements prior to being reinstated to the practice of law in Arizona for his conduct in violation of the Arizona Rules of Professional Conduct.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED pursuant to Rule 72, Ariz. R. Sup. Ct., Mr. Harrison shall comply with the requirements relating to notification of clients and others.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED upon reinstatement, Mr. Harrison shall be placed on probation with the length and terms of probation to be determined by the Court during reinstatement proceedings.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Mr. Harrison shall pay restitution to the following individuals in the following amounts:

John Sobczuk	\$7,673.00
David Nokes	\$3,600.00

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Mr. Harrison shall pay the costs and expenses of the State Bar of Arizona in the amount of \$6,000.00. There are no costs or expenses incurred by the disciplinary clerk and/or Presiding Disciplinary Judge's Office in connection with these disciplinary proceedings.

DATED this 6th day of January, 2017.

William J. O'Neil

William J. O'Neil, Presiding Disciplinary Judge

Copies of the foregoing emailed this 6th day of January, 2017, and mailed January 9, 2017 to:

Bradley F. Perry
Staff Bar Counsel
State Bar of Arizona
4201 N. 24th Street, Suite 100
Phoenix, Arizona 85016-6266
Email: LRO@staff.azbar.org

Jamal A. Harrison
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P.O. Box 4366
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Respondent

by: AMcQueen

**BEFORE THE PRESIDING DISCIPLINARY
JUDGE**

**IN THE MATTER OF A MEMBER OF THE
STATE BAR OF ARIZONA,**

**JAMAL A. HARRISON,
Bar No. 017262**

Respondent.

PDJ 2016-9008

**DECISION AND ORDER
IMPOSING SANCTIONS**

[State Bar Nos. 15-0857, 15-0930,
14-0715

FILED APRIL 22, 2016

On April 20, 2016, the Hearing Panel, composed of Judge Penny L. Willrich (retired), Attorney Member, and Thomas C. Schleifer, Ph.D., Public Member, and the Presiding Disciplinary Judge, William J. O'Neil held an aggravation/mitigation hearing and considered the evidence and argument submitted. Bradley F. Perry appeared on behalf of the State Bar of Arizona. Mr. Harrison did not appear. At the conclusion, the State Bar requested one year suspension, probation upon reinstatement, restitution and the payment of costs.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The State Bar of Arizona (SBA) filed its Complaint on January 29, 2016. Probable cause orders of the Attorney Discipline Probable Cause Committee relating to each individual account were attached. The complaint was served on Mr. Harrison by certified, delivery restricted mail, and by regular first class mail, under Rules 47(c) and 58(a) (2), Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. Notice of Service was filed with the Disciplinary Clerk

on February 2, 2016. The Presiding Disciplinary Judge ("PDJ") was assigned to the matter.

A notice of default was properly issued on March 1, 2016. Mr. Harrison filed no Answer or otherwise defended against the Complainants' allegations and default was properly effective on March 22, 2016, at which time a notice of aggravation/mitigation hearing was sent to all parties notifying them the hearing was scheduled for April 20, 2016, at 9:00 a.m. at the State Courts Building, 1501 West Washington, Phoenix, Arizona 85007-3231.

On March 24, 2016, Mr. Harrison filed an undated Answer which contained no certificate of service. No pleading was filed requesting the default be set aside. As a result on April 6, 2016, the Court struck Mr. Harrison's Answer as default was entered and effective.

The purpose of the aggravation/mitigation hearing is not only to weigh mitigating and aggravating factors, but also to assure there is a nexus between a respondent's judicially admitted behavior and the merits of the State Bar's case. A party against whom a default has been entered may no longer litigate the merits of the factual allegations, but retains the right to appear and participate in the hearing that will determine the sanctions. Included with that right to appear is the right to testify and the right to cross-examine witnesses, in each instance only to establish facts related to aggravation and mitigation.

A hearing panel independently determines whether, under the facts deemed admitted, sanctions should issue for the Respondent's misconduct. If the Panel finds that sanctions are warranted, then it independently determines which sanctions

should be imposed. It is not the function of a Hearing Panel to endorse or “rubber stamp” any request for sanctions.

FINDINGS OF FACT

The facts listed below are those set forth in the SBA’s Complaint and were deemed admitted by Mr. Harrison’s default. Although the allegations are deemed admitted by default, there has also been an independent determination by the Hearing Panel that the State Bar has proven by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Harrison violated the ethical rules.

1. Mr. Harrison is a lawyer licensed to practice law in Arizona having been first admitted to practice in Arizona on May 17, 1997.

COUNT ONE (File No. 15-0857)

2. John Sobczuk hired Mr. Harrison in April 2014 to assist him in getting court-ordered paternity and legal decision making authority over his child. Mr. Harrison charged Complainant a “flat, fixed” fee of \$6,500.00. The fee agreement contained no provision alerting Mr. Sobczuk that he could request a refund of unearned fees. [Exhibit 2.]

3. Mr. Harrison filed the petition on September 12, 2014. The petition filed by Mr. Harrison was a fill-in-the-blank “self-help” form provided on the Superior Court’s web page. [Exhibit 3.]

4. The child’s mother answered the complaint on October 23, 2014, and the Court set a Resolution Management Conference for January 8, 2015. Mother failed to appear at the January 8 hearing. Mr. Harrison requested an order for paternity testing and was instructed to submit a proposed order for the Court’s consideration. Mr. Harrison failed to file the order. [Exhibit 4.]

5. On February 5, 2015, Mother filed a Motion For Pre-Decree Temporary Order Without Notice For Legal Decision-Making And Physical Custody, which the Court treated as an emergency Motion for Reconsideration. The Court set a hearing on February 10, 2015. [Exhibit 6.]

6. Mr. Harrison never filed a written response to Mother's Motion for Reconsideration.

7. On February 10, 2015, the Court returned custody to Mother and appointed an advisor to investigate the child's situation. A status conference was set for March 26, 2015. [Exhibit 7.]

8. Mr. Harrison failed to communicate with Mr. Sobczuk after the February hearing. Mr. Sobczuk attempted to contact Mr. Harrison numerous times via phone and text message, but received no response to any of his case-related messages. The only message Mr. Harrison answered was the message Mr. Sobczuk sent terminating the representation. Mr. Harrison called Mr. Sobczuk after being terminated and asked to remain the attorney of record. [Exhibit 12.]

9. Mr. Sobczuk refused Mr. Harrison's request to remain on the case and requested an itemized billing statement, which Mr. Harrison never provided. [Exhibit 12.]

10. Mr. Sobczuk hired a new lawyer who was able to facilitate a joint parenting plan. [Exhibit 8, 9.]

11. Mr. Sobczuk filed a Bar complaint on April 6, 2015. The State Bar requested Mr. Harrison provide an accounting, which he failed to do. [Exhibits 10, 11, 14.]

12. On July 24, 2015, the State Bar sent Mr. Harrison a screening letter requesting a response by August 13, 2014. [Exhibit 15.]

13. On July 31, 2015, Mr. Harrison requested an extension of his response date, which was granted. The new response date was set on August 24, 2015.

14. On August 21, 2015, Mr. Harrison requested an extension of his response date, which was granted. The new response date was set on September 4, 2015.

15. On September 4, 2015, Mr. Harrison requested an extension of his response date, which was granted. The new response date was set on September 24, 2015.

16. On September 14, 2015, Mr. Harrison requested an extension of his response date, which was granted. The new response date was set on September 28, 2015.

17. On September 28, 2015, Mr. Harrison requested an extension of his response date, which was denied. The State Bar informed Mr. Harrison any response received after September 28, 2015, would be late, but urged Mr. Harrison to submit a response so the Bar knew of his position. Mr. Harrison failed to respond.

18. On October 22, 2015, the State Bar emailed Mr. Harrison to ask if he intended to submit a response. Mr. Harrison replied via email and stated he would respond, but failed to provide one.

19. On November 4, 2015, the State Bar emailed Mr. Harrison to inform him that the last day to object to the State Bar's Attorney Discipline Probable Cause Committee recommendation was November 30, 2015. Mr. Harrison indicated he would send an objection prior to that date but failed to do so.

20. Mr. Harrison's conduct in this count violated Rule 42 Ariz. Sup. Ct., specifically, ERs 1.3, 1.4(a)(2) and (3), 1.5(a) and (b)(3), 3.2, 8.1(b), 8.4(d), and Rule 54(d) Ariz. R. Sup. Ct.

COUNT TWO (File No. 15-0930/Nokes)

21. In April 2010, David Nokes hired Mr. Harrison to represent him in a civil action against Magellan, Magellan employee Jeremy Randall, and his ex-wife, Linda Gomez, who was a temporary employee of Magellan.

22. Mr. Harrison filed his Notice of Appearance on April 1, 2010. [Exhibit 24.]

23. Mr. Harrison charged Mr. Nokes \$1,500.00 to be paid in monthly installments of \$100.00 and 28% of any recovery from Magellan and/or Gomez. [Exhibit 62.] At the time of hiring, Mr. Nokes made it clear to Mr. Harrison that he wanted to proceed with aggression and speed.

24. Mr. Harrison was initially ordered to serve his expert disclosure by March 31, 2011. [Exhibit 25.] On March 31 at 7:59 p.m., Mr. Harrison filed an "Emergency Motion to Extend Deadline to Serve Expert Disclosures." [Exhibit 26.]

25. The Court granted the motion and extended the deadline to April 30, 2011. Mr. Harrison failed to meet the deadline. [Exhibit 27.]

26. On May 13, 2011, the Court granted another extension on service of expert disclosure to May 16, 2011. [Exhibit 30.] Mr. Harrison failed to meet the deadline.

27. The Court initially ordered written discovery propounded by May 5, 2011. On May 5 at 4:27 p.m., Mr. Harrison filed an "Emergency Motion to Extend

Deadline to Propound Written Discovery” requesting an extension to May 30, 2011. Mr. Harrison failed to provide written discovery by May 30, 2011. [Exhibit 29.]

28. The Court initially ordered final non-expert disclosures completed by June 1, 2011. [Exhibit 30.] On June 1 at 5:45 p.m., Mr. Harrison filed an “Emergency Motion to Extend Deadline to Serve Final Non-Expert Disclosures,” requesting an extension to June 30, 2011. [Exhibits 31, 32.] Mr. Harrison failed to provide non-expert disclosures by June 30, 2011.

29. Magellan filed a Motion to Dismiss re: Magellan employee Jeremy Randall on November 18, 2011. [Exhibit 33.] Mr. Harrison failed to file a response to the motion. On January 23, 2012, the Court granted Magellan’s Motion to Dismiss re: Jeremy Randall without prejudice. [Exhibit 38.]

30. Magellan filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on December 8, 2011. [Exhibit 35.] Magellan also filed a Motion for Summary Judgment re: Expert Opinion on December 8, 2011, alleging Mr. Harrison never noticed an expert. [Exhibit 34.] By stipulation of the parties, the Court extended Mr. Harrison’s deadline for responding to the motions for summary judgement until February 1, 2012. [Exhibit 37.]

31. On February 1, 2012, at 4:52 p.m., Mr. Harrison filed an “Emergency Motion for Extension of Time for Plaintiff to Respond to Defendant Magellan’s Motion for Summary Judgment Re: Expert Opinion and Motion for Summary Judgment Re: Claims.” [Exhibit 39.] The Court extended the deadlines to February 8, 2012.

32. On February 8, 2012, Magellan filed two Motions in Limine, requesting preclusion of all Plaintiff’s witnesses and any testimony regarding damages as Plaintiff failed to comply with applicable disclosure requirements. [Exhibits 40, 41.]

33. On February 8, 2012, Mr. Harrison filed an emergency Motion to Continue Trial and an emergency motion to extend the time to respond to Magellan's motions for summary judgment. [Exhibit 43.]

34. Mr. Nokes authorized none of the extensions requested by Mr. Harrison.

35. Mr. Harrison and Mr. Nokes settled the case for \$7,500.00 because of the pending motions for summary judgment and preclusion. Mr. Harrison informed Mr. Nokes that Magellan would likely prevail on the motions because Mr. Harrison failed to make disclosures and failed to respond to the motions.

36. Magellan previously offered to settle for \$19,000.00, but the offer was rejected by Mr. Nokes.

37. The only remaining Defendant, Linda Gomez, filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on May 1, 2012. [Exhibit 46.] The Court ordered a response by August 17, 2012. [Exhibit 47.]

38. On August 17, 2012, Mr. Harrison moved to extend the response deadline to September 7, 2012, which was granted. [Exhibits 48, 49.]

39. On September 7, 2012, Mr. Harrison filed another motion to extend the deadline requesting a response date of October 12, 2012, which was not ruled on by the Court prior to October 12. On October 12, 2012, Mr. Harrison moved to place the case on the inactive calendar and Linda Gomez filed another Motion to Dismiss, alleging the case should be dismissed for failure to prosecute. [Exhibits 50, 51.]

40. Mr. Harrison never filed a response to Linda Gomez's Motion to Dismiss.

41. Instead of placing the case on the inactive calendar, the Court granted a final extension to reply to January 18, 2013. [Exhibit 52.] Mr. Harrison filed his response on January 18. [Exhibit 53.] The Court denied the Motion for Summary

Judgment on April 5, 2013. The Court did not address the pending Motion to Dismiss at that time. [Exhibit 54.]

42. No activity occurred between April 5, 2013 and August 15, 2014, when it was placed on the dismissal calendar. Mr. Nokes contacted Mr. Harrison via email on September 9, 2014, to inform him the case was set for dismissal. This was the first contact Mr. Nokes had with Mr. Harrison since September 2013.

43. In the last communication Mr. Nokes received from Mr. Harrison, he indicated he would file the documents to get the case on an active calendar. On September 13, 2014, Mr. Harrison filed a Motion to Set and Certificate of Readiness. [Exhibit 56.]

44. Due to the extraordinary history of delay, The Court set an order to show cause hearing for October 30, 2014, for the plaintiff to explain why the case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. [Exhibit 57.]

45. On October 29, 2014, Mr. Harrison called the Judge's chambers and left a voicemail stating he could not attend the hearing due to a family emergency. On October 30, 2014, the Court granted Gomez's October 2012 Motion to Dismiss for failure to prosecute because the plaintiff had done nothing to move the case forward. [Exhibit 58.]

46. Besides Mr. Harrison's poor performance, Mr. Harrison acted unprofessionally toward Mr. Nokes.

47. On one occasion, Mr. Harrison called and asked Mr. Nokes to pay his monthly installment early. Mr. Nokes agreed and asked Mr. Harrison to meet him at a location in Scottsdale. Mr. Harrison told Mr. Nokes he would charge \$10.00 for gas since Mr. Nokes was requiring him to drive to get the money. Mr. Nokes said he would

not pay the \$10.00, which prompted a cussing and shouting match with Mr. Harrison. When Mr. Nokes informed Mr. Harrison he would mail the money on the regularly scheduled date, Mr. Harrison retracted his request for the gas money and drove to get the early payment.

48. On another occasion, Mr. Harrison requested Mr. Nokes meet him at his office when Mr. Harrison received the settlement check from Magellan. Mr. Harrison provided Mr. Nokes with the check and insisted that he accompany Mr. Nokes to the bank so he could get his contingency in cash. Mr. Nokes told Mr. Harrison he would provide the contingency when the check cleared, but Mr. Harrison insisted they go to the bank immediately. Mr. Nokes and Mr. Harrison traveled to the bank where Complainant deposited the check and gave Mr. Harrison \$2,100.00 in cash. The \$2,100.00 was drawn from Complainant's personal funds as the check had yet to clear.

49. Mr. Nokes filed a Bar complaint on June 30, 2015.

50. On July 14, 2015, the State Bar sent Mr. Harrison a screening letter requesting a response by August 3, 2014.

51. On July 31, 2015, Mr. Harrison requested an extension of his response date, which was granted. The new response date was set on August 24, 2015.

52. On August 21, 2015, Mr. Harrison requested an extension of his response date, which was granted. The new response date was set on September 4, 2015.

53. On September 4, 2015, Mr. Harrison requested an extension of his response date, which was granted. The new response date was set on September 24, 2015.

54. On September 14, 2015, Mr. Harrison requested an extension of his response date, which was granted. The new response date was set on September 28, 2015.

55. On September 28, 2015, Mr. Harrison requested an extension of his response date, which was denied. The State Bar informed Mr. Harrison any response received after September 28, 2015, would be late, but urged Mr. Harrison to submit a response so the Bar knew of his position. Mr. Harrison failed to respond.

56. On October 22, 2015, the State Bar emailed Mr. Harrison to ask if he intended to submit a response. Mr. Harrison replied via email and stated he would respond, but failed to provide one.

57. On November 4, 2015, the State Bar emailed Mr. Harrison to inform him that the last day to object to the State Bar's Attorney Discipline Probable Cause Committee recommendation was November 30, 2015. Mr. Harrison indicated he would send an objection prior to that date but failed to do so.

58. Mr. Harrison's conduct in this Count violated Rule 42 Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. specifically, ERs 1.2, 1.3, 1.4(a)(2) and (3), 1.5(a), 3.2, 3.4(c) and (d), 8.1(b), 8.4(d), Rule 41(g) Ariz. Sup. Ct., and Rule 54(c) and (d) Ariz. R. Sup. Ct.

COUNT THREE (File No. 14-0715/Smith)

59. In November 2013, Gregory Smith hired Mr. Harrison to sue various individuals and corporations for violating the Fair Housing Act. Mr. Smith paid Mr. Harrison \$1,800.00 in December 2013.

60. Mr. Harrison did not provide Mr. Smith with a written agreement at the time of hiring, but sent a contract months later that Mr. Smith never signed. The agreement states Mr. Smith shall pay a "flat, fixed fee earned upon receipt" of

\$2,500.00 and agrees to a 28% contingency fee. The agreement contains no language regarding a refund of unearned fees. [Exhibit 63.]

61. Mr. Harrison's first task was to draft a demand letter. On November 15, 2013, Mr. Harrison informed Mr. Smith the demand letter would be complete in 7 to 10 days. On December 4, 2013, Mr. Smith requested the status of the letter. Mr. Harrison claimed he could not complete the letter because his mother was ill.

62. On December 6, 2013, Mr. Smith informed Mr. Harrison he no longer wanted to send a demand letter. Mr. Smith asked Mr. Harrison to file a Complaint in federal court and proceed with a jury trial. Mr. Harrison replied that he would send the demand letter the following day, December 7, 2013. Mr. Harrison failed to send the demand letter.

63. Mr. Harrison informed Mr. Smith the Complaint would be completed by February 14, 2014, but did not complete his draft until March 2014. The initial draft contained various typographical and factual errors that Mr. Smith asked to be corrected.

64. The relationship between Mr. Smith and Mr. Harrison broke down during the revision process in March and April, 2014, culminating in an argument over how to pay the \$400.00 filing fee for the Complaint. The argument resulted in Mr. Smith firing Mr. Harrison and never receiving the final, corrected version of the Complaint.

65. On November 25, 2014, Mr. Smith requested Mr. Harrison provide him with the case file. Mr. Harrison indicated he would send the documents the following Monday. On December 9, 2014, Mr. Smith contacted the State Bar seeking help retrieving his file from Mr. Harrison. The State Bar contacted Mr. Harrison who

indicated he would provide the file by December 16, 2014. Mr. Harrison indicated he failed to send the file due to a family illness. [Exhibit 65.]

66. Mr. Harrison failed to send Mr. Smith a copy of his file. [Exhibit 64.]

67. The State Bar sent Mr. Harrison a screening letter on August 10, 2015, requesting a response by August 31, 2015. [Exhibit 89.]

68. On August 21, 2015, Mr. Harrison requested an extension of his response date, which was granted. The new response date was set on September 4, 2015. [Exhibit 70.]

69. On September 4, 2015, Mr. Harrison requested an extension of his response date, which was granted. The new response date was set on September 24, 2015.

70. On September 14, 2015, Mr. Harrison requested an extension of his response date, which was granted. The new response date was set on September 28, 2015.

71. On September 28, 2015, Mr. Harrison requested an extension of his response date, which was denied. The State Bar informed Mr. Harrison any response received after September 28, 2015, would be late, but urged Mr. Harrison to submit a response so the Bar knew of his position. Mr. Harrison failed to respond.

72. On October 22, 2015, the State Bar emailed Mr. Harrison to ask if he intended to submit a response. Mr. Harrison replied via email and stated he would respond, but failed to provide one.

73. On November 4, 2015, the State Bar emailed Mr. Harrison to inform him that the last day to object to the State Bar's Attorney Discipline Probable Cause

Committee recommendation was November 30, 2015. Mr. Harrison indicated he would send an objection prior to that date but failed to do so.

74. Mr. Harrison's conduct in this Count violated Rule 42 Ariz. R. Sup. Ct., specifically, ERs 1.5(b)(3), 1.16(d), 8.1(b), and Rule 54(d) Ariz. R. Sup. Ct.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Mr. Harrison failed to file an Answer or otherwise defend against the allegations in the SBA's Complaint. Default was properly entered and the allegations are therefore deemed admitted under Rule 58(d), Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. Based upon the facts deemed admitted and an independent review by the Panel, the Panel finds by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Harrison violated: Rule 41(g), Ariz. R. Sup. Ct., Rule 42, Ariz. R. Sup. Ct., ERs 1.2, 1.3, 1.4(a)(2) and (3), 1.5(a) and (b), 1.16(d), 3.2, 3.4(c) and (d), 8.1(b), 8.4(d), and Rule 54(c) and (d), Ariz. R. Sup. Ct.

ABA STANDARDS ANALYSIS

The American Bar Association's *Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions* ("*Standards*") are a "useful tool in determining the proper sanction." *In re Cardenas*, 164 Ariz. 149, 152, 791 P.2d 1032, 1035 (1990). In imposing a sanction, the following factors should be considered: (1) the duty violated; (2) the lawyer's mental state; (3) the actual or potential injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct; and (4) the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors.

Duties violated:

Mr. Harrison violated his duty to his clients by violating ERs 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5 and 1.16. Mr. Harrison violated his duty to the legal system by violating ERs 3.2, 3.4, 8.4(d), and Rule 54(c). Mr. Harrison violated his duty owed as a professional by violating Rule 41(g), Rule 54(d), and ER 8.1(b).

Mental State and Injury:

Mr. Harrison violated his duty to clients, implicating *Standard 4.4*. *Standard*

4.41 states:

Disbarment is generally appropriate when:

- (a) a lawyer abandons the practice and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client;
- (b) a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services for a client and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client; or
- (c) a lawyer engages in a pattern of neglect with respect to client matters and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client.

Standard 4.42 states:

Suspension is generally appropriate when:

- (a) a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services for a client and causes injury or potential injury to a client; or
- (b) a lawyer engages in a pattern of neglect and causes injury or potential injury to a client.

Mr. Harrison caused actual injury to clients by knowingly failing to perform services and by engaging in a pattern of neglect. Therefore, *Standard 4.42* applies.

Mr. Harrison also violated his duty owed as a professional, which implicates *Standard 7.0*. *Standard 7.1* states, "Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another, and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client, the public, or the legal system." *Standard 7.2* states, "Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional, and causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal system."

Mr. Harrison failed to respond to the SBA's investigation. There is however, no evidence Mr. Harrison intended to obtain a benefit by failing to respond, therefore, *Standard 7.2* applies.

AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING FACTORS

The Hearing Panel finds the following aggravating factors are present in this matter:

- *Standard 9.22(a)* – Prior disciplinary offenses [Exhibits 79-83.]
- *Standard 9.22(c)* – Pattern of misconduct
- *Standard 9.22(d)* – Multiple offenses
- *Standard 9.22(e)* – Bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with rules or orders of the disciplinary agency
- *Standard 9.22(g)* – Refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the conduct
- *Standard 9.22(h)* – Vulnerability of the victim
- *Standard 9.22(j)* – Indifference to making restitution

The Hearing Panel finds there are no mitigating factors present and that a suspension of one year, probation and restitution is the sanction.

PROPORTIONALITY

In the past, the Supreme Court has consulted similar cases to assess the proportionality of the sanction recommended. See *In re Struthers*, 179 Ariz. 216, 226, 887 P.2d 789, 799 (1994). The Supreme Court has recognized that the concept of proportionality review is "an imperfect process." *In re Owens*, 182 Ariz. 121, 127, 893 P.3d 1284, 1290 (1995). This is because no two cases "are ever alike." *Id.*

To have an effective system of professional sanctions, there must be internal consistency, and it is appropriate to examine sanctions imposed in cases factually similar. See *In re Peasley*, 208 Ariz. 27, 35, 90 P.3d 764, 772 (2004). However, the discipline in each case must be tailored to the individual case, as neither perfection nor absolute uniformity can be achieved. *Id.* at 208 Ariz. at ¶ 61, 90 P.3d at 778 (citing *In re Alcorn*, 202 Ariz. 62, 76, 41 P.3d 600, 614 (2002); *In re Wines*, 135 Ariz. 203, 207, 660 P.2d 454, 458 (1983)).

In *In re Hughes*, PDJ 2014-9087 (2014), Robert F. Hughes Jr., was suspended for four years and ordered to pay \$1,927 in restitution for violating Rule 42, Ariz. R. Sup. Ct., specifically ERs 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.15(d), 1.16(d), 3.2, and 8.1, and Rule 54, Ariz. R. Sup. Ct.

A Pennsylvania attorney hired Mr. Hughes to initiate ancillary probate proceedings in Arizona. The attorney paid Mr. Hughes \$1,927.00 for the representation. Thereafter Mr. Hughes took no action and did not respond to the attorney's requests for a case status or accounting information. Mr. Hughes did not respond to the State Bar's screening investigation, file an answer to the State Bar's complaint, or otherwise participate in the formal proceedings. The judgment and order of suspension was entered by default.

The Court found the following aggravating factors: prior disciplinary offenses, dishonest or selfish motive, a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, bad-faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding, refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct, vulnerability of victim, substantial experience in the practice of law, and indifference to making restitution, and the following mitigating factor: remoteness of two of Mr. Hughes' prior offenses.

In *In re Chang*, PDJ 2013-9083 (2013), Mr. Chang was suspended for two years and ordered to pay restitution for violations of Rule 42, Ariz. R. Sup. Ct., specifically ER 1.2(a), ER 1.3, ER 1.4(a)(2), (3) & (4), ER 1.5(a), ER 1.15(d), ER 1.16(d), ER 3.2, ER 3.4(c), ER 8.1(b), and ER 8.4(d), and Rules 32(c)(3), 54(c), and 54(d)(1) and (2), Ariz. R. Sup. Ct.

In one case, Mr. Chang failed to provide his client with copies of court orders, failed to respond to his client's numerous requests for information, and failed to keep his client reasonably informed about the status of his case. Mr. Chang failed to adequately represent his client in a post-conviction-relief proceeding and failed to help his client prepare a pro se petition, as ordered by the court. Mr. Chang failed, at the conclusion of representation, to promptly deliver a copy of his entire file to his client.

Regarding a second client, Mr. Chang failed to timely file an opening brief, failed to adequately communicate with his client, failed to respond to his client's attempts to communicate with him, and failed to keep him reasonably informed about the status of his case. Mr. Chang charged or collected an unreasonable amount for expenses, stopped representing his client without notice, and failed to promptly deliver his file to his client or his subsequent counsel.

Mr. Chang failed to respond to some requests for information and documents during the State Bar's investigation and failed to report a current address to the State Bar within 30 days of the effective date of his address change. In addition, Mr. Chang failed to file an answer to the State Bar's complaint, which resulted in the entry of default.

The Court found the following aggravating factors: dishonest or selfish motive, a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, bad-faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with rules or orders of the disciplinary agency, vulnerability of the victims, and substantial experience in the practice of law, and the following mitigating factors: absence of a prior disciplinary record, personal, or emotional problems, and remorse.

This case is similar to the above listed cases, in that in all of the cases involved abandoned clients, actual injury to the client, and failure to cooperate with the State Bar.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court "has long held that 'the objective of disciplinary proceedings is to protect the public, the profession and the administration of justice and not to punish the offender.'" *Alcorn*, 202 Ariz. 62, 74, 41 P.3d 600, 612 (2002) (quoting *In re Kastensmith*, 101 Ariz. 291, 294, 419 P.2d 75, 78 (1966)). It is also the purpose of lawyer discipline to deter future misconduct. *In re Fioramonti*, 176 Ariz. 182, 859 P.2d 1315 (1993). It is also a goal of lawyer regulation to protect and instill public confidence in the integrity of individual members of the SBA. *Matter of Horwitz*, 180 Ariz. 20, 881 P.2d 352 (1994).

The Panel has made the above findings of fact and conclusions of law and has determined the sanction using the facts deemed admitted, the *Standards*, the aggravating factors, the mitigating factor, and the goals of the attorney discipline system.

The Panel orders:

1. Mr. Harrison shall be suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year, effective thirty (30) days from this order.
2. Upon reinstatement Mr. Harrison shall be placed on probation with the length and terms of probation to be determined by the Court.
3. Mr. Harrison shall pay all costs and expenses incurred by the SBA. There are no costs or expenses incurred by the Office of the Presiding Disciplinary Judge.
4. Mr. Harrison shall pay restitution to the following persons in the following amounts:
 - a. \$7,673.00 to John Sobczuk.
 - b. \$3,600.00 to David Nokes.

A final judgment and order shall follow.

DATED this 22nd day of April, 2016.

William J. O'Neil

William J. O'Neil, Presiding Disciplinary Judge

CONCURRING:

Judge Penny L. Willrich (Retired)

Penny L Willrich, Volunteer Attorney Member

Thomas C. Schleifer, Ph.D.

Thomas C. Schleifer, Volunteer Public Member

Copy of the foregoing e-mailed
this 22nd day of April, 2016, and
mailed April 25, 2016, to:

Bradley F. Perry
State Bar of Arizona
4201 N. 24th Street, Suite 100
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Respondent


Lawyer Regulation Records Manager
State Bar of Arizona
4201 N. 24th Street, Suite 100
Phoenix, Arizona 85016-6266

by: [AMcQueen](#)

OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDING DISCIPLINARY JUDGE
SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA

JAN 29 2016

Bradley F. Perry, Bar No. 025682
Staff Bar Counsel
State Bar of Arizona
4201 N. 24th Street, Suite 100
Phoenix, Arizona 85016-6266
Telephone (602)340-7247
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FILED
BY 

**BEFORE THE PRESIDING DISCIPLINARY
JUDGE**

**IN THE MATTER OF A MEMBER OF
THE STATE BAR OF ARIZONA,**

**JAMAL A. HARRISON,
Bar No. 017262,**

Respondent.

PDJ 2016-9008

COMPLAINT

State Bar Nos. 15-0857, 15-0930,
14-0715

Complaint is made against Respondent as follows:

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

1. At all times relevant, Respondent was a lawyer licensed to practice law in the state of Arizona having been first admitted to practice in Arizona on May 17, 1997.

COUNT ONE (File No. 14-0857/Sobczuk)

2. John Sobczuk hired Respondent in April 2014 to assist him in getting court-ordered paternity and legal decision making authority over his child. Respondent charged Complainant a "flat, fixed" fee of \$6,500.00. The fee agreement did not contain a provision alerting Mr. Sobczuk that he could request a refund of unearned fees.

3. Respondent filed the petition on September 12, 2014. The petition filed by Respondent was a fill-in-the-blank "self-help" form provided on the Superior Court's web page.

4. The child's mother answered the complaint on October 23, 2014, and the Court set a Resolution Management Conference for January 8, 2015. Mother failed to appear at the January 8 hearing. Respondent requested an order for paternity testing and was instructed to submit a proposed order for the Court's consideration. Respondent failed to file the order.

5. On February 5, 2015, Mother filed a Motion For Pre-Decree Temporary Order Without Notice For Legal Decision-Making And Physical Custody, which the Court chose to treat as an emergency Motion For Reconsideration. The Court set a hearing on February 10, 2015.

6. Respondent never filed a written response to Mother's Motion For Reconsideration.

7. On February 10, 2015, the Court returned custody to Mother and appointed an advisor to investigate the child's situation. A status conference was set for March 26, 2015.

8. Respondent failed to communicate with Mr. Sobczuk after the February hearing. Mr. Sobczuk attempted to contact Respondent numerous times via phone and text message, but did not receive a response to any of his case-related messages. The only message Respondent answered was the message Mr. Sobczuk sent terminating the representation. Respondent called Mr. Sobczuk after being terminated and asked to remain the attorney of record.

9. Mr. Sobczuk refused Respondent's request to remain on the case and requested an itemized billing statement, which Respondent never provided.

10. Mr. Sobczuk hired a new lawyer who was able to facilitate a joint parenting plan.

11. Mr. Sobczuk filed a Bar complaint on April 6, 2015. The State Bar requested Respondent provide an accounting, which Respondent failed to do.

12. On July 24, 2015, the State Bar sent Respondent a screening letter requesting a response by August 13, 2014.

13. On July 31, 2015, Respondent requested an extension of his response date, which was granted. The new response date was set on August 24, 2015.

14. On August 21, 2015, Respondent requested an extension of his response date, which was granted. The new response date was set on September 4, 2015.

15. On September 4, 2015, Respondent requested an extension of his response date, which was granted. The new response date was set on September 24, 2015.

16. On September 14, 2015, Respondent requested an extension of his response date, which was granted. The new response date was set on September 28, 2015.

17. On September 28, 2015, Respondent requested an extension of his response date, which was denied. The State Bar informed Respondent any response received after September 28, 2015, would be considered late, but urged Respondent to submit a response so the Bar was aware of his position. Respondent failed to provide a response.

18. On October 22, 2015, the State Bar emailed Respondent to ask if he intended to submit a response. Respondent replied via email and stated he would provide a response, but failed to provide one.

19. On November 4, 2015, the State Bar emailed Respondent to inform him that the last day to object to the State Bar's Attorney Discipline Probable Cause Committee recommendation was November 30, 2015. Respondent indicated he would send an objection prior to that date but failed to do so.

20. Respondent's conduct in this count violated Rule 42 Ariz. Sup. Ct., specifically, ERs 1.3, 1.4(a)(2) and (3), 1.5(a) and (b)(3), 3.2, 8.1(b), 8.4(d), and Rule 54(d) Ariz. R. Sup. Ct.

COUNT TWO (File No. 15-0930/Nokes)

21. In April 2010, David Nokes hired Respondent to represent him in a civil action against Magellan, Magellan employee Jeremy Randall, and his ex-wife, Linda Gomez, who was a temporary employee of Magellan.

22. Respondent filed his Notice Of Appearance on April 1, 2010.

23. Respondent charged Mr. Nokes \$1,500.00 to be paid in monthly installments of \$100.00 and 28% of any recovery from Magellan and/or Gomez. At the time of hiring, Mr. Nokes made it clear to Respondent that he wanted to proceed with aggression and speed.

24. Respondent was initially ordered to serve his expert disclosure by March 31, 2011. On March 31 at 7:59 p.m., Respondent filed an "Emergency Motion To Extend Deadline To Serve Expert Disclosures."

25. The Court granted the motion and extended the deadline to April 30, 2011. Respondent failed to meet the deadline.

26. On May 13, 2011, the Court granted another extension on service of expert disclosure to May 16, 2011. Respondent failed to meet the deadline.

27. The Court initially ordered written discovery propounded by May 5, 2011. On May 5 at 4:27 p.m., Respondent filed an "Emergency Motion To Extend Deadline To Propound Written Discovery" requesting an extension to May 30, 2011. Respondent failed to provide written discovery by May 30, 2011.

28. The Court initially ordered final non-expert disclosures completed by June 1, 2011. On June 1 at 5:45 p.m., Respondent filed an "Emergency Motion To Extend Deadline To Serve Final Non-Expert Disclosures," requesting an extension to June 30, 2011. Respondent failed to provide non-expert disclosures by June 30, 2011.

29. Magellan filed a Motion To Dismiss re: Magellan employee Jeremy Randall on November 18, 2011. Respondent failed to file a response to the motion. On January 23, 2012, the Court granted Magellan's Motion To Dismiss re: Jeremy Randall without prejudice.

30. Magellan filed a Motion For Summary Judgment on December 8, 2011. Magellan also filed a Motion For Summary Judgment re: Expert Opinion on December 8, 2011, alleging Respondent never noticed an expert. By stipulation of the parties, the Court extended Respondent's deadline for responding to the motions for summary judgement until February 1, 2012.

31. On February 1, 2012, at 4:52 p.m., Respondent filed an "Emergency Motion For Extension Of Time for Plaintiff to Respond to Defendant Magellan's Motion For Summary Judgment Re: Expert Opinion and Motion For Summary Judgment Re: Claims." The Court extended the deadlines to February 8, 2012.

32. On February 8, 2012, Magellan filed two Motions In Limine, requesting preclusion of all Plaintiff's witnesses and any testimony regarding damages as Plaintiff failed to comply with applicable disclosure requirements.

33. On February 8, 2012, Respondent filed an emergency Motion To Continue Trial and an emergency motion to extend the time to respond to Magellan's motions for summary judgment.

34. Mr. Nokes did not authorize any of the extensions requested by Respondent.

35. Respondent and Mr. Nokes settled the case for \$7,500.00 because of the pending motions for summary judgment and preclusion. Respondent informed Mr. Nokes that Magellan would likely prevail on the motions because Respondent failed to make disclosures and failed to respond to the motions.

36. Magellan previously offered to settle the case for \$19,000.00, but the offer was rejected by Mr. Nokes.

37. The only remaining Defendant, Linda Gomez, filed a Motion For Summary Judgement on May 1, 2012. The Court ordered a response by August 17, 2012.

38. On August 17, 2012, Respondent filed a motion to extend the response deadline to September 7, 2012, which was granted.

39. On September 7, 2012, Respondent filed another motion to extend the deadline requesting a response date of October 12, 2012, which was not ruled on by the Court prior to October 12. On October 12, 2012, Respondent filed a motion to place the case on the inactive calendar and Linda Gomez filed another Motion To Dismiss, alleging the case should be dismissed for failure to prosecute.

40. Respondent never filed a response to Linda Gomez's Motion To Dismiss.

41. Instead of placing the case on the inactive calendar, the Court granted a final extension to reply to January 18, 2013. Respondent filed his response on January 18. The Court denied the Motion For Summary Judgment on April 5, 2013. The Court did not address the pending Motion To Dismiss at that time.

42. No activity occurred in the case between April 5, 2013, and August 15, 2014, when it was placed on the dismissal calendar. Mr. Nokes contacted Respondent via email on September 9, 2014, to inform him the case was set for dismissal. This was the first contact Mr. Nokes had with Respondent since September 2013.

43. In the last communication Mr. Nokes received from Respondent, Respondent indicated he would file the appropriate documents to get the case on an active calendar. On September 13, 2014, Respondent filed a Motion To Set and Certificate Of Readiness.

44. Due to the extraordinary history of delay, The Court set an order to show cause hearing for October 30, 2014, for the plaintiff to explain why the case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute.

45. On October 29, 2014, Respondent called the Judge's chambers and left a voicemail stating he could not attend the hearing due to a family emergency. On October 30, 2014, the Court granted Gomez's October 2012 Motion To Dismiss for failure to prosecute because the plaintiff had done nothing to move the case forward.

46. In addition to Respondent's poor performance in the case, Respondent acted unprofessionally toward Mr. Nokes.

47. On one occasion, Respondent called and asked Mr. Nokes to pay his monthly installment early. Mr. Nokes agreed and asked Respondent to meet him at a location in Scottsdale. Respondent told Mr. Nokes that he would charge \$10.00 for gas since Mr. Nokes was requiring him to drive to get the money. Mr. Nokes said he would not pay the \$10.00, which prompted a cussing and shouting match with Respondent. When Mr. Nokes informed Respondent he would mail the money on the regularly scheduled date, Respondent retracted his request for the gas money and drove to get the early payment.

48. On another occasion, Respondent requested Mr. Nokes meet him at his office when Respondent received the settlement check from Magellan. Respondent provided Mr. Nokes with the check and insisted that he accompany Mr. Nokes to the bank so he could get his contingency in cash. Mr. Nokes told Respondent he would provide the contingency when the check cleared, but Respondent insisted they go to the bank immediately. Mr. Nokes and Respondent traveled to the bank where Complainant deposited the check and gave Respondent \$2,100.00 in cash. The \$2,100.00 was drawn from Complainant's personal funds as the check had yet to clear.

49. Mr. Nokes filed a Bar complaint on June 30, 2015.

50. On July 14, 2015, the State Bar sent Respondent a screening letter requesting a response by August 3, 2014.

51. On July 31, 2015, Respondent requested an extension of his response date, which was granted. The new response date was set on August 24, 2015.

52. On August 21, 2015, Respondent requested an extension of his response date, which was granted. The new response date was set on September 4, 2015.

53. On September 4, 2015, Respondent requested an extension of his response date, which was granted. The new response date was set on September 24, 2015.

54. On September 14, 2015, Respondent requested an extension of his response date, which was granted. The new response date was set on September 28, 2015.

55. On September 28, 2015, Respondent requested an extension of his response date, which was denied. The State Bar informed Respondent any response received after September 28, 2015, would be considered late, but urged Respondent to submit a response so the Bar was aware of his position. Respondent failed to provide a response.

56. On October 22, 2015, the State Bar emailed Respondent to ask if he intended to submit a response. Respondent replied via email and stated he would provide a response, but failed to provide one.

57. On November 4, 2015, the State Bar emailed Respondent to inform him that the last day to object to the State Bar's Attorney Discipline Probable Cause Committee recommendation was November 30, 2015. Respondent indicated he would send an objection prior to that date but failed to do so.

58. Respondent's conduct in this Count violated Rule 42 Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. specifically, ERs 1.2, 1.3, 1.4(a)(2) and (3), 1.5(a), 3.2, 3.4(c) and (d), 8.1(b), 8.4(d), Rule 41(g) Ariz. Sup. Ct., and Rule 54(c) and (d) Ariz. R. Sup. Ct.

COUNT THREE (File No. 15-0715/Smith)

59. In November 2013, Gregory Smith hired Respondent to sue various individuals and corporations for violating the Fair Housing Act. Mr. Smith paid Respondent \$1,800.00 in December 2013.

60. Respondent did not provide Mr. Smith with a written agreement at the time of hiring, but sent a contract months later that Mr. Smith never signed. The agreement states Mr. Smith shall pay a "flat, fixed fee earned upon receipt" of \$2,500.00 and agrees to a 28% contingency fee. The agreement contains no language regarding a refund of unearned fees.

61. Respondent's first task was to draft a demand letter. On November 15, 2013, Respondent informed Mr. Smith the demand letter would be complete in 7 to 10 days. On December 4, 2013, Mr. Smith requested the status of the letter. Respondent claimed he was unable to complete the letter because his mother was ill.

62. On December 6, 2013, Mr. Smith informed Respondent he no longer wanted to send a demand letter. Mr. Smith asked Respondent to file a Complaint in federal court and proceed with a jury trial. Respondent replied that he would send the demand letter the following day, December 7, 2013. Respondent failed to send the demand letter.

63. Respondent informed Mr. Smith the Complaint would be completed by February 14, 2014, but did not complete his draft until March 2014. The initial draft of the Complaint contained various typographical and factual errors that Mr. Smith asked to be corrected.

64. The relationship between Mr. Smith and Respondent broke down during the revision process in March and April, 2014, culminating in an argument over how to pay the \$400.00 filing fee for the Complaint. The argument resulted in Mr. Smith firing Respondent and never receiving the final, corrected version of the Complaint.

65. On November 25, 2014, Mr. Smith requested Respondent provide him with the case file. Respondent indicated he would send the documents the following Monday. On December 9, 2014, Mr. Smith contacted the State Bar seeking help retrieving his file from Respondent. The State Bar contacted Respondent who indicated he would provide the file by December 16, 2014. Respondent indicated he failed to send the file due to a family illness.

66. Respondent failed to send Mr. Smith a copy of his file.

67. The State Bar sent Respondent a screening letter on August 10, 2015, requesting a response by August 31, 2015.

68. On August 21, 2015, Respondent requested an extension of his response date, which was granted. The new response date was set on September 4, 2015.

69. On September 4, 2015, Respondent requested an extension of his response date, which was granted. The new response date was set on September 24, 2015.

70. On September 14, 2015, Respondent requested an extension of his response date, which was granted. The new response date was set on September 28, 2015.

71. On September 28, 2015, Respondent requested an extension of his response date, which was denied. The State Bar informed Respondent any response received after September 28, 2015, would be considered late, but urged Respondent to submit a response so the Bar was aware of his position. Respondent failed to provide a response.

72. On October 22, 2015, the State Bar emailed Respondent to ask if he intended to submit a response. Respondent replied via email and stated he would provide a response, but failed to provide one.

73. On November 4, 2015, the State Bar emailed Respondent to inform him that the last day to object to the State Bar's Attorney Discipline Probable Cause Committee recommendation was November 30, 2015. Respondent indicated he would send an objection prior to that date but failed to do so.

74. Respondent's conduct in this Count violated Rule 42 Ariz. R. Sup. Ct., specifically, ERs 1.5(b)(3), 1.16(d), 8.1(b), and Rule 54(d) Ariz. R. Sup. Ct.

DATED this 29th day of January, 2016.

STATE BAR OF ARIZONA



Bradley F. Perry
Staff Bar Counsel

Original filed with the Disciplinary Clerk of
the Office of the Presiding Disciplinary Judge
of the Supreme Court of Arizona
this 29th day of January, 2016.

by: 

FILED

DEC 28 2015

STATE BAR OF ARIZONA

BY

**BEFORE THE ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE
PROBABLE CAUSE COMMITTEE
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA**

**IN THE MATTER OF A MEMBER OF
THE STATE BAR OF ARIZONA,**

**JAMAL A. HARRISON
Bar No. 017262**

Respondent.

No. 14-0715

PROBABLE CAUSE ORDER


The Attorney Discipline Probable Cause Committee of the Supreme Court of Arizona ("Committee") reviewed this matter on December 11, 2015, pursuant to Rules 50 and 55, Ariz. R. Sup. Ct., for consideration of the State Bar's Report of Investigation and Recommendation.

By a vote of 9-0-0, the Committee finds probable cause exists to file a complaint against Respondent in File No. 14-0715.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED pursuant to Rules 55(c) and 58(a), Ariz. R. Sup. Ct., authorizing the State Bar Counsel to prepare and file a complaint with the Disciplinary Clerk.

Parties may not file motions for reconsideration of this Order.

DATED this 28 day of December, 2015.



Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop, Chair
Attorney Discipline Probable Cause Committee
of the Supreme Court of Arizona

Original filed this 30th day
of December, 2015, with:

Lawyer Regulation Records Manager
State Bar of Arizona
4201 N. 24th Street, Suite 100
Phoenix, Arizona 85016-6266

Copy mailed this 30th day
of December, 2015, to:


Jamal A. Harrison
The Harrison Law Office
PO Box 4366
Scottsdale, Arizona 85261-4366
Respondent

Copy emailed this 30th day
of December, 2015, to:

Attorney Discipline Probable Cause Committee
of the Supreme Court of Arizona
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Phoenix, Arizona 85007
E-mail: ProbableCauseComm@courts.az.gov

Lawyer Regulation Records Manager
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Phoenix, Arizona 85016-6266
E-mail: LRO@staff.azbar.org

by:



FILED

DEC 28 2015

STATE BAR OF ARIZONA

BY

**BEFORE THE ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE
PROBABLE CAUSE COMMITTEE
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA**

**IN THE MATTER OF A MEMBER OF
THE STATE BAR OF ARIZONA,**

**JAMAL A. HARRISON
Bar No. 017262**

Respondent.

No. 15-0857

PROBABLE CAUSE ORDER


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By a vote of 9-0-0, the Committee finds probable cause exists to file a complaint against Respondent in File No. 15-0857.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED pursuant to Rules 55(c) and 58(a), Ariz. R. Sup. Ct., authorizing the State Bar Counsel to prepare and file a complaint with the Disciplinary Clerk.

Parties may not file motions for reconsideration of this Order.

DATED this 28 day of December, 2015.



Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop, Chair
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
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by: 

FILED

DEC 28 2015

STATE BAR OF ARIZONA

BY

**BEFORE THE ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE
PROBABLE CAUSE COMMITTEE
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA**

**IN THE MATTER OF A MEMBER OF
THE STATE BAR OF ARIZONA,**

**JAMAL A. HARRISON
Bar No. 017262**

Respondent.

No. 15-0930

PROBABLE CAUSE ORDER


The Attorney Discipline Probable Cause Committee of the Supreme Court of Arizona ("Committee") reviewed this matter on December 11, 2015, pursuant to Rules 50 and 55, Ariz. R. Sup. Ct., for consideration of the State Bar's Report of Investigation and Recommendation.

By a vote of 9-0-0, the Committee finds probable cause exists to file a complaint against Respondent in File No. 15-0930.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED pursuant to Rules 55(c) and 58(a), Ariz. R. Sup. Ct., authorizing the State Bar Counsel to prepare and file a complaint with the Disciplinary Clerk.

Parties may not file motions for reconsideration of this Order.

DATED this 28 day of December, 2015.



Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop, Chair
Attorney Discipline Probable Cause Committee
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by: 