

**BEFORE THE PRESIDING DISCIPLINARY
JUDGE**

IN THE MATTER OF A MEMBER OF
THE STATE BAR OF ARIZONA,

**TIMOTHY W. STEADMAN,
Bar No. 022708**

Respondent.

PDJ 2016-9081

FINAL JUDGMENT AND ORDER

[State Bar Nos. 15-2794, 15-3163, 16-0105, 16-1399, 16-1414, 16-1417, 16-1418, and 16-1419]

and
[State Bar Screening File: 16-2480]

FILED JANUARY 11, 2017

The Presiding Disciplinary Judge of the Supreme Court of Arizona, having reviewed the Agreement for Discipline by Consent filed on November 28, 2016, pursuant to Rule 57(a), Ariz. R. Sup. Ct., hereby accepts the parties' proposed agreement.

Accordingly:

IT IS ORDERED Respondent, **Timothy W. Steadman**, is suspended for a period of ninety (90) days for his conduct in violation of the Arizona Rules of Professional Conduct, as outlined in the consent documents, effective the date of this order.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED upon reinstatement, Mr. Steadman shall be placed on probation for a period of two (2) years.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Mr. Steadman shall contact the State Bar Compliance Monitor at (602) 340-7258, within ten (10) days from the date of this order. Mr. Steadman shall sign terms and conditions of participation, including reporting requirements consistent with those contained in PDJ 2015-9086, which shall be incorporated herein. The probation period will begin at the time the new terms and conditions are signed by Mr. Steadman and will conclude two (2) years from that date. Mr. Steadman shall be responsible for any costs associated with LOMAP.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Mr. Steadman shall be subject to any additional terms imposed by the Presiding Disciplinary Judge as a result of reinstatement hearings held.

NON-COMPLIANCE LANGUAGE

In the event that Respondent fails to comply with any of the foregoing probation terms, and information thereof, is received by the State Bar of Arizona, Bar Counsel shall file a notice of noncompliance with the Presiding Disciplinary Judge, pursuant to Rule 60(a)(5), Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. The Presiding Disciplinary Judge may conduct a hearing within 30 days to determine whether a term of probation has been breached and, if so, to recommend an appropriate sanction. If there is an allegation that Respondent failed to comply with any of the foregoing terms, the burden of proof shall be on the State Bar of Arizona to prove noncompliance by a preponderance of the evidence.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED pursuant to Rule 72 Ariz. R. Sup. Ct., Mr. Steadman shall immediately comply with the requirements relating to notification of clients and others.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Mr. Steadman shall pay the costs and expenses of the State Bar of Arizona in the amount of \$2,160.00, within thirty (30) days from the date of this order. There are no costs or expenses incurred by the disciplinary clerk and/or Presiding Disciplinary Judge's Office in connection with these disciplinary proceedings.

DATED this 11th day of January, 2017.

William J. O'Neil

William J. O'Neil, Presiding Disciplinary Judge

Copies of the foregoing were e-mailed this 11th day of January, 2017, and mailed January 12, 2017, to:

Timothy W. Steadman
Steadman Law Firm
1423 S. Higley Road, Suite 109
Mesa, Arizona 85206-3449
Email: tim@steadmanlawfirm.net
Respondent

Craig D. Henley
Senior Bar Counsel - Litigation
State Bar of Arizona
4201 N. 24th Street, Suite 100
Phoenix, Arizona 85016-6266
Email: LRO@staff.azbar.org

by: [AMcQueen](#)

**BEFORE THE PRESIDING DISCIPLINARY
JUDGE**

IN THE MATTER OF A MEMBER OF THE
STATE BAR OF ARIZONA,

TIMOTHY W. STEADMAN,
Bar No. 022708

Respondent.

PDJ-2016-9081

**DECISION ACCEPTING CONSENT
FOR DISCIPLINE**

[State Bar Nos. 15-2794, 15-3163,
16-0105, 16-1399, 16-1414, 16-
1417, 16-1418, and 16-1419]

and
[State Bar Screening File: 16-2480]

FILED JANUARY 11, 2017

Probable Cause Orders issued on June 16, 2016 and July 22, 2016 and the formal complaint was filed on August 29, 2016. An Agreement for Discipline by Consent ("Agreement") was filed by the parties on November 28, 2016, and submitted under Rule 57(a)(3), Ariz. R. Sup. Ct.¹

Under Rule 53(b)(3), notice of the Agreement and the opportunity to object was sent to the complainant(s) by letter on November 18, 2016. One objection was received by the complainant in File No. 15-2794 urging any term of probation be consecutive and not concurrent to Mr. Steadman's probation in PDJ-2015-9086. The PDJ notes that probation is consistent with the terms and conditions imposed in PDJ-2015-9086, however, this term of probation it is effective upon signing the terms and conditions of probation and will conclude two years from that date. The probation is not concurrent with the term of probation in PDJ-2015-9086.

¹ Unless stated otherwise, all rules referenced are the Arizona Rules of the Supreme Court.

The Agreement details a factual basis for the Agreement. In multiple counts, Mr. Steadman failed to adequately communicate and diligently represents clients. He further engaged in the unauthorized practice of law while suspended in his prior discipline matter, PDJ-2015-9086.

Mr. Steadman admits violations of Rule 42, specifically, ERs 1.2 (scope of representation), 1.3 (diligence), 1.4 (communication) 1.16(d) (declining/terminating representation), 3.2 (expediting litigation), 5.5 (unauthorized practice of law) and 8.4(d) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice). The parties stipulate to a ninety (90) day suspension and two years of probation. The parties stipulate the mental state of Mr. Steadman was negligent, that he violated his duty to his client, the profession, and the legal system and his misconduct caused actual harm and potential harm to the client profession and the legal system. Because Mr. Steadman was previously suspended for similar misconduct, the presumptive sanction is suspension instead of reprimand. See Standard 8.0.

The parties stipulate the following factors are present in aggravation: 9.22(a) prior discipline, 9.22(c) pattern of misconduct, and 9.22(d) multiple offenses. In mitigation are factors: 9.32(b) absence of dishonest or selfish motive and 9.32(e) full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings.

Accordingly:

IT IS ORDERED incorporating the Agreement and all supporting documents by this reference. The agreed upon sanctions are: ninety (90) day suspension

effective the date of this order,² two (2) years of probation, and costs totaling \$2,160.00, plus interest at the statutory rate.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED the Agreement is accepted. A final judgment and order is signed this date.

DATED 11th day of January, 2017.

William J. O'Neil

William J. O'Neil, Presiding Disciplinary Judge

Copies of the foregoing were e-mailed this 11th day of January, 2017, and mailed January 12, 2017, to:

Craig D. Henley
Senior Bar Counsel-Litigation
State Bar of Arizona
4201 N. 24th Street, Suite 100
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Email: lro@staff.azbar.org

Timothy W. Steadman
Steadman Law Firm
1423 S. Higley Road Suite 109
Mesa, AZ 85206-3449
Email: tim@steadmanlawfirm.net
Respondent

by: AMcQueen

² The Agreement called for the suspension to be effective January 2, 2017, however, that agreed upon date passed prior to the court's review.

Craig D. Henley, Bar No. 018801
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OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDING DISCIPLINARY JUDGE
SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA

NOV 28 2016

FILED
BY 

Timothy W. Steadman, Bar No. 022708
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Respondent

**BEFORE THE PRESIDING DISCIPLINARY
JUDGE**

**IN THE MATTER OF A MEMBER OF
THE STATE BAR OF ARIZONA,**

**TIMOTHY W. STEADMAN
Bar No. 022708**

Respondent.

PDJ 2016-9081

**AGREEMENT FOR DISCIPLINE BY
CONSENT**

[State Bar Nos. 15-2794, 15-3163,
16-0105, 16-1399, 16-1414, 16-1417,
16-1418, and 16-1419]

and

[State Bar Screening File: 16-2480]

The State Bar of Arizona, through undersigned Bar Counsel, and Respondent, Timothy W. Steadman, who has chosen not to seek the assistance of counsel, hereby submit their Agreement for Discipline by Consent, pursuant to Rule 57(a), Ariz. R. Sup. Ct.

The probable cause orders in the various counts outlined in the Complaint were duly entered between June 16, 2016, and July 22, 2016, and are attached to

the Complaint. The State Bar screening file SB16-2480 is also included in these Consent Documents as a pre-Complaint resolution of that file.

Respondent voluntarily waives the right to an adjudicatory hearing, unless otherwise ordered, and waives all motions, defenses, objections or requests which have been made or raised, or could be asserted thereafter, if the conditional admission and proposed form of discipline is approved.

Pursuant to Rule 53(b)(3), Ariz. R. Sup. Ct., notice of this agreement was provided to the complainant(s) by letter on November 18, 2016. Complainant(s) have been notified of the opportunity to file a written objection to the agreement with the State Bar within five (5) business days of bar counsel's notice. Copies of Complainants' objections, if any, have been or will be provided to the presiding disciplinary judge.

In accordance with the facts and circumstances outline below, Respondent conditionally admits that his conduct violated Rule 42, Ariz. R. Sup. Ct.:

- a. ER 1.2 – Respondent failed to abide the client's authority (2x);
- b. ER 1.3 – Respondent failed to act diligently during the representation (5x);
- c. ER 1.4 – Respondent failed to reasonably communicate with the client throughout the representation (3x);
- d. ER 1.16(d) – Respondent failed to take the steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interest (3x);
- e. ER 3.2 – Respondent failed to expedite the litigation (4x);
- f. ER 5.5 – Respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law while suspended (5x);

- g. ER 8.4(d) – Respondent engaged in misconduct which was prejudicial to the administration of justice (5x).

Upon acceptance of this agreement, Respondent agrees to accept imposition of the following discipline: Short Term Suspension of Ninety (90) Days. Respondent also agrees to pay the costs and expenses of the disciplinary proceeding, within 30 days from the date of this order, and if costs are not paid within the 30 days, interest will begin to accrue at the legal rate.¹

The State Bar's Statement of Costs and Expenses is attached hereto as Exhibit A.

FACTS

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

1. On December 16, 2003, Respondent was licensed to practice law in the State of Arizona.

1. On September 1, 2015, the State Bar initiated formal proceedings against Respondent in PDJ 2015-9086 [SB File Nos. 14-0274, 14-0385, 14-3052, and 15-0644]. Respondent was represented throughout the discipline case by Nancy Greenlee.

2. On December 23, 2015, the Court accepted the Consent Document in PDJ 2015-9086 [SB File Nos. 14-0274, 14-0385, 14-3052, and 15-0644] as submitted and filed a Final Judgment and Order imposing the 60 day suspension of Respondent's license effective February 1, 2016.

¹ Respondent understands that the costs and expenses of the disciplinary proceeding include the costs and expenses of the State Bar of Arizona, the Disciplinary Clerk, the Probable Cause Committee, the Presiding Disciplinary Judge and the Supreme Court of Arizona.

3. Between January 21, 2016, and February 1, 2016, Respondent requested a number of clarifications in order to properly withdraw or associate in his pending cases. These discussions included, but were not limited to, the following:

a. Respondent: "I just spoke to Nancy Greenlee and reviewed the letter you sent to her. I am in the process of withdrawing from cases. There will be a few with pending issues that I will associate with another attorney on so that they can be appropriately finalized."

b. Respondent: "On the cases where I am doing a notice of association of counsel so that I can finish up loose ends, I understand that I can't sign documents, give legal advice, appear in court etc. However, with respect to documents that are submitted to the court, does the caption of the document remain the same, with my information at the top and just add the attorney who is associating, or do I remove mine entirely and put his name, firm info etc. there?"

c. State Bar: "The State Bar has consistently taken the position that the associating attorney should file pleadings on their letterhead alone. This ensures that there are no references holding you out as a practicing attorney during the suspension period."

d. Respondent: "Can I still file the notice of association now that it's past Feb 1 and I've already filed a notice of withdrawal?"

e. State Bar: "Unfortunately, NADA. The suspension was effective as of today, so the associating counsel will have to file it. They can call the Judge's assistant (not you) to inform the Court what is going on, but you cannot 'practice law' as defined by Rule 31, Ariz. R.

Sup. Ct. until reinstated. See the attached link for the definition (<http://www.azbar.org/ethics/unauthorizedpracticeoflaw>). It covers just about every action that you can think of.”

f. Respondent: “Got it. That’s what I figured. Thanks.”

4. On March 22, 2016, Respondent filed a pleading entitled “Rule 64(e)(2)(A) Application for Reinstatement” in PDJ-2016-9027-R.

5. Rule 64(e)(2)(B), Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. states, in pertinent part, “[i]f no timely opposition is filed, the state bar shall be deemed to consent to reinstatement, and ***the member may resume the practice of law upon order of the presiding disciplinary judge.***” (Emphasis added)

6. Rule 64(e)(3), Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. states “***[s]uspended members shall remain suspended until an order is entered by the presiding disciplinary judge or the court reinstating the member to the active practice of law.***” (Emphasis added)

7. On April 15, 2016, the disciplinary clerk emailed the PDJ’s order in PDJ-2016-9027-R, thereby reinstating Respondent to the practice of law.

COUNT ONE (File No. 15-2794/Hvasta)

8. Respondent represented Diane Hvasta (hereinafter referred to as “Hvasta”) in the Maricopa County Superior Court case of *Hvasta v. Hvasta*, FN 2014-094503.

9. Hvasta paid Respondent an earned upon receipt fee of Three Thousand Five Hundred Dollars (\$3,500.00).

10. On October 28, 2014, Respondent filed a Motion for Temporary Orders regarding Hvasta's financial concerns. Hvasta is a teacher with a modest income while her husband was an airline pilot making significantly more than her.

11. On November 4, 2014, the Court scheduled a Resolution Management Conference (hereinafter referred to as "RMC").

12. On December 1, 2014, the attorneys filed a stipulation indicating that the issues contained in the Motion for Temporary Orders had been settled and requested that the RMC be converted to a telephonic hearing. The Court rescheduled the hearing as a telephonic RMC for December 2, 2014.

13. While Hvasta understood that an RMC was scheduled for December 2, 2014, she misunderstood that the RMC was different than "(Respondent) had a PHONE conference with (opposing counsel) and the Judge saying we were amicably working out a budget resolution."

14. Hvasta attempted to contact Respondent between November 26, 2014, and the December 2, 2014, court date, to no avail.

15. On December 2, 2014, the Alternative Dispute Resolution Office of the Superior Court appointed a settlement conference judge and ordered that a Settlement Conference be held on January 30, 2015.

16. That same day, Respondent appeared at the telephonic RMC and withdrew Hvasta's previously filed Motion for Temporary Orders. The Court scheduled a trial date of April 3, 2015.

17. On December 3, 2014, Respondent responded to an email Hvasta sent requesting the outcome of the hearing indicating that he was sorry that he did not call her and that he was in the Houston airport. Respondent also indicated that he

believed that the Court scheduled a trial in April. Finally, Respondent indicated that his assistant would contact Hvasta for the documents and information necessary to be disclosed to opposing party and that Respondent was "about to send out our discovery requests to them."

18. On December 8, 2014, Hvasta emailed Respondent's assistant for information and the assistant indicated that she would inform Respondent to contact her upon his return to the office on December 11, 2014. Respondent's assistant also provided Hvasta with a copy of the December 2, 2014, minute entry.

19. On December 18, 2014, Hvasta again emailed Respondent's assistant informing her that she had not been contacted as promised.

20. Despite repeated attempts to contact Respondent by phone for updates, Hvasta was unable to contact Respondent throughout the month of December 2014.

21. Respondent and Hvasta finally discussed the status of the case on January 6, 2015.

22. According to Respondent's billing records, Respondent engaged in five settlement discussions with opposing counsel or Hvasta between January 26, 2015, and March 25, 2015. The billing records do not include any additional services provided during this time.

23. In or around April 2015, Hvasta began requesting information regarding a number of financial and tax issues as well as their possible impacts upon the case.

24. Specifically, Hvasta's former husband lost his travel privileges as he began an expensive transgender transition. Similarly, while her former husband

was on short-term disability, the disability was ending and the couple faced anticipated tax liability of \$1,100.00. Accordingly, Hvasta was concerned about losing her "family travel benefits" and solely paying the taxes, so she wanted Respondent to request additional alimony. She was also interested in the impact of a recent ruling in an unrelated case which was favorable to the US Airways employees. The ruling was anticipated to provide the employees, including Hvasta's former husband, a significant increase in salary.

25. While Respondent responded to Hvasta's initial email on April 10, 2015, Respondent merely said that he would investigate the disability issue with opposing counsel and contact her later. Respondent failed to follow up or respond to Hvasta's questions.

26. In May 2015, US Airways permitted Hvasta's former husband to resume flights as a woman. While Respondent and Hvasta were scheduled to meet on May 14, 2015, at 4:00 p.m., Respondent emailed her at 4:09 p.m. and apologized to Hvasta for missing the appointment stating, in pertinent part, "I would normally stick around and still give you a call after I'm done with my appointment, but today happens to be my daughter's last band concert and my son's last T-Ball game so I need to take off a little early. Let's talk tomorrow if that works for you."

27. Hvasta was unable to get in contact with Respondent until she began emailing Respondent daily between June 1, 2015, and June 3, 2015.

28. On or about June 10, 2015, Respondent met with Hvasta to execute the final Consent Decree. The opposing party signed on June 26, 2015, and the Decree was filed on July 1, 2015.

29. On July 3, 2015, Hvasta asked if the final Consent Decree was filed as she had not heard from Respondent since signing the decree. Respondent's assistant provided a copy shortly thereafter.

30. On or about August 18, 2015, Hvasta emailed Respondent about a possible violation of the Consent Decree and was told by Respondent that "I'm headed to court this morning...I'll get back in touch with you shortly." Respondent failed to respond.

31. On September 10, 2015, Hvasta emailed Respondent stating, in pertinent part:

"I am at a loss as to why you continually ignore me. You responded to my email on August 18 that you would get back to me 'shortly.' I have yet to hear from you...I warned you of a looming economic downturn as well as my husband's moving forward with transgender surgery and other procedures and I was concerned about my portion of the 401. Nothing has been done. Today, my financial planner Steve Sanchez informed me he has left two phone messages for you over the past week with no response. This is unprofessional and unacceptable. This is not the first time I have experienced these unacceptable delays from you...At this point I feel I might need to dismiss you as my attorney and have you refund to me the unused portion of my retainer to you."

32. On September 11, 2015, Respondent emailed Hvasta and contacted the QDRO attorney, which Respondent believed effectively ended the representation.

33. On October 6, 2015, Hvasta emailed and called Respondent asking for possible recourse for Consent Agreement violations. She also requested a full accounting of her fees.

34. Having received no response to the email or phone call, Hvasta called Respondent's assistant on October 30, 2015.

35. On November 2, 2015, Hvasta terminated the representation and again requested a full accounting of her fees. Respondent immediately responded indicating that he would file a Motion to Withdraw and refund the unearned fees in 3-5 days.

36. While Respondent claims that he gave the refund check to his assistant for mailing on November 2, 2015, Hvasta did not receive the check.

37. When asked by the State Bar if he placed a stop payment on the check, Respondent stated that he did not and further explained, in pertinent part, "I remember handing a check to my former assistant Danielle and telling her to mail it to Diane but I'll be 100% honest and tell you that I can't make sense of what I did by looking at my records...At some point my check numbers got off, so I have to go back and fix that, but the check number that I have here doesn't correspond to the actual check number that went through the bank. I have searched my paper and bank records and honestly I don't know for sure what I did."

38. On November 20, 2015, Hvasta finally received a second refund check from Respondent.

39. By engaging in the above-referenced misconduct, Respondent violated Rule 42, Ariz. R. Sup. Ct., ERs 1.3, 1.4 and 1.16(d).

COUNT TWO (File No. 15-3163/Zaragoza)

40. Respondent represented Tammy Zaragoza (hereinafter referred to as "Zaragoza") in the United States Bankruptcy Court case of *In re: Tammy Zaragoza*, 2:15-bk-05297-MCW and the Gila County Superior Court case of *In re the Marriage of Tammy Zargoza*, DO-201500227.

41. As general complaints regarding the representation, Zaragoza indicates that, despite repeated requests throughout the representation, she was unable to get timely responses to questions. Zaragoza states that Respondent's paralegal would often take her call, but would not provide the requested information claiming that Respondent was the only one that could answer.

Divorce Action:

42. On July 9, 2015, Respondent filed a Petition for Dissolution of Marriage. Service of process was not effectuated until mid-August 2015.

43. While Zaragoza's former spouse was represented between September and late-October 2015, there was not much activity in the divorce action between the filing date and November 19, 2015, when Respondent filed a substitution of counsel.

44. The Court granted the substitution on November 30, 2015.

Bankruptcy Action:

45. Due in large part to the Zaragoza's failure to provide requested documents, Respondent was unable to file the petition until April 30, 2015, and, later, certain bankruptcy schedules and statements.

46. On May 1, 2015, the Bankruptcy Court provided Respondent with a Deficiency Notice that all required documents were not filed. The Court also provided dates and deadlines related to the bankruptcy.

47. On May 22, 2015, the Bankruptcy Court dismissed the case for failure to timely file the required documents.

48. On June 5, 2015, Respondent filed a Motion to Reinstate the case along with the required bankruptcy schedules and statements.

49. While Respondent was able to get the case reinstated on June 8, 2015, Respondent received another Deficiency Notice for Respondent's failure to comply with Local Rule 1007-1(c) on June 17, 2015.

50. On August 25, 2015, Respondent received a Deficiency Memo for Respondent's failure to provide proof of completion of a financial management course.

51. On September 8, 2015, Respondent informed Zaragoza that she needed to complete the course. Zaragoza completed the course on September 9, 2015, and provided proof to Respondent's office.

52. On October 2, 2015, the Court provided a second Deficiency Memo regarding Respondent's failure to provide proof of completion of a financial management course. The notice stated that this was the *Final Request*.

53. On October 28, 2015, the Court entered a notice that the case was closed without entry of the discharge for failure to file a certificate of completion of the financial management course.

54. In November 2015, Respondent contacted alternate counsel and filed a substitution of counsel in the bankruptcy case. Successor counsel successfully reinstated Complainant's bankruptcy case.

55. By engaging in the above-referenced misconduct, Respondent violated Rule 42, Ariz. R. Sup. Ct., ERs 1.3, 1.4, 3.2 and 8.4(d).

COUNT THREE (File No. 16-0105/Clift)

56. Paragraphs 1 - 8 are incorporated herein by reference.

57. Respondent represented Amelia Clift (hereinafter referred to as "Clift") in the Maricopa County Superior Court case of *Clift v. Calhoun*, FC 2009-094765.

58. As general complaints regarding the representation, Clift indicates that, despite repeated requests throughout the representation, she was unable to get timely responses to questions or a bill regarding the services rendered. Complainant states that Respondent's paralegal would often take her call, but would not provide the requested information claiming that Respondent was the only one that could answer.

59. On October 30, 2013, the parties entered into a stipulation regarding most of the issues in the case. The Court ordered that "Counsel shall submit a written form of order within 30 days."

60. On February 20, 2014, the Court issued a minute entry noting that the parties' counsel were ordered to submit a written form of order, but failed to do so. The Court further ordered that the matter would be dismissed unless a proper stipulated form of order was filed by March 3, 2014.

61. On March 3, 2014, Respondent filed a Notice of Lodging of the proposed form of order.

62. On August 11, 2015, the parties filed a Stipulation to Reappoint a certain Parenting Coordinator.

63. On August 20, 2015, Respondent filed an objection to the Parenting Coordinator's Report and Recommendation in the case.

64. On October 5, 2015, after final briefing, the Court rejected the Parenting Coordinator's Report and Recommendation.

65. On November 11, 2015, opposing counsel filed a Petition to Modify Legal Decision Making and Parenting Time requesting, among other things, that Clift pay half of all costs associated with extra-curricular activities, Clift have parenting time on every Memorial Day as it conflicts with Father's anniversary date with his new wife and other specific changes related to custody and the Parenting Coordinator's role in decision making disputes.

66. On November 17, 2015, the Court scheduled a return hearing for January 15, 2016, and issued an order for the parties and their counsel to appear.

67. On December 4, 2015, the hearing was vacated and reset for January 14, 2016, due to a conflict with the Court's calendar.

68. On December 16, 2015, the State Bar and Respondent filed a Consent Document in PDJ 2015-9086 [SB File Nos. 14-0274, 14-0385, 14-3052, 15-0644] which imposed a 60 day suspension of Respondent's license effective February 1, 2016.

69. On December 23, 2015, the Court accepted the Consent Document in PDJ 2015-9086 [SB File Nos. 14-0274, 14-0385, 14-3052, 15-0644] as submitted and filed a Final Judgment and Order imposing the 60 day suspension of Respondent's license effective February 1, 2016.

70. On December 23, 2015, Respondent filed a Notice of Conflict and Motion to Continue based upon a calendaring conflict with an unrelated case.

71. On January 5, 2016, the Court rescheduled the hearing for February 24, 2016.

72. On January 8, 2016, Respondent filed a Motion to Withdraw stating that he will begin the 60 day suspension effective February 1, 2016, and would therefore be unavailable. Respondent also stated that he may close his practice entirely and move out of state. The Court granted the motion on January 11, 2016.

73. On January 14, 2016, successor counsel filed a Notice of Appearance on behalf of Clift.

74. On January 15, 2016, successor counsel filed a Response to Father's Petition to Modify.

75. On February 10, 2016, opposing counsel filed an Objection to Clift's Response and motion to strike stating, in pertinent part, "[t]he deadline to respond to the Petition passed while Mother was represented by the prior counsel, Tim Steadman. Neither former counsel, nor current counsel has requested leave of the court to file a Response beyond the deadline. Mother's Response is five weeks past due, and should be struck in its entirety."

76. In his reply filed February 23, 2016, successor counsel states, in pertinent part, "[a]lthough Mother was late in filing her Response to Father's Petition, it is only because Mother received on January 8, 2016, a letter from her counsel, Timothy Steadman, that he could no longer represent her because he was being suspended by the State Bar."

77. As of the date of this document, the motion to strike is still pending.

78. In his response to the State Bar investigation, Respondent indicates that he did not file a responsive pleading to the petition because he was not served with either the November 11, 2015, petition or the November 17, 2015, order to appear.

79. By engaging in the above-referenced misconduct, Respondent violated Rule 42, Ariz. R. Sup. Ct., ERs 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.16(d), 3.2 and 8.4(d).

COUNT FOUR (File No. 16-1399/SBA)

80. Paragraphs 1 – 8 are incorporated herein by reference.

81. Respondent represented Elva Betancourt (hereinafter referred to as "Betancourt") in the Maricopa County Superior Court case of *Betancourt v. Dominguez*, FN2013-092319.

82. On January 29, 2016, Respondent filed a Notice of Association of Counsel indicating that Arizona attorney Bradley J. Crider (hereinafter referred to as "Crider") was associating counsel during Respondent's suspension.

83. On March 22, 2016, Respondent filed a pleading entitled "Rule 64(e)(2)(A) Application for Reinstatement" in PDJ-2016-9027-R.

84. On March 28, 2016, the State Bar informed Respondent that the State Bar received additional bar charges which, if true, may result in an additional suspension. The State Bar also suggested that Respondent consider discussing the withdrawal of the application and possible resolution of the new charges with Nancy Greenlee.

85. On March 29, 2016, Respondent stated, in pertinent part, "Please don't ask me to withdraw my application. There are a couple of hearings I need to do in April for people that I feel a moral obligation to assist. You may recall me telling

you about Elva Betancourt for example. It's not about money, but about helping someone who really needs it."

86. On April 8, 2016, Respondent filed a Notice of Appearance on his law firm's letterhead on behalf of Betancourt.

87. On April 11, 2016, Respondent filed a Separate Pretrial Statement on his law firm's letterhead on behalf of Betancourt.

88. On April 15, 2016, at 10:05 a.m., Respondent appeared at an Evidentiary Hearing as attorney of record for Betancourt. The hearing concluded at 11:45 a.m.

89. On April 15, 2016, at 3:15 p.m., the disciplinary clerk emailed the PDJ's order reinstating Respondent to the practice of law.

90. On April 19, 2016, the Court issued a Minute Entry which, among other things, awarded Betancourt attorney's fees and costs.

91. On April 28, 2016, Respondent filed an Application and Affidavit of Attorney's Fees and Costs which included the following entries:

a. "4/8/2016...Review file. Begin working on pretrial statement...2.00 250.00 **500.00**"

b. "4/11/2016...Research case law. Finish pretrial statement...1.50 250.00 **375.00**"

c. "4/11/2016...Review pretrial statement sent by opposing counsel. Detailed review of exhibits sent by opposing counsel...1.80 250.00 **450.00**"

d. "4/11/2016...Return call to opposing counsel...0.20 250.00 **50.00**"

e. "4/13/2016...Meet with Elva to discuss case and prepare for trial...0.50 250.00 **125.00**"

f. "4/14/2016...Trial Prep...1.00 250.00 **250.00**"

g. "4/15/2016...Travel to and from court. Meet with Elva prior to hearing.

Court appearance – evidentiary hearing...2.50 250.00 **625.00**"

92. In his response to the State Bar's investigation, Respondent indicates that:

"One of the last conversations I had with my former attorney Nancy Greenlee before I was no longer able to afford her services was about the process of reinstatement. She told me that I needed to submit the application for reinstatement 10 days prior to my suspension end date...If the bar did not file an objection, I was then reinstated upon the expiration of the 60 day suspension period...I suppose it's possible that I misunderstood what she told me but I certainly didn't believe that I did."

93. By engaging in the above-referenced misconduct, Respondent violated Rule 42, Ariz. R. Sup. Ct., ERs 5.5 and 8.4(d).

COUNT FIVE (File No. 16-1414/SBA)

93. Paragraphs 1 – 8 are incorporated herein by reference.

94. Respondent represented Connie Brown (hereinafter referred to as "Brown") in the Maricopa County Superior Court case of *Brown v. Brown*, FC2014-095806.

95. On November 23, 2015, opposing counsel and Respondent agreed to participate in a mediation on January 18, 2016.

96. After agreeing to a mediator, the parties had to schedule the mediation for March 1, 2016. The mediator confirmed the date by letter dated December 17,

2015, and asked for a Mediation Memorandum to be submitted pursuant to Rule 67.D.2 no later than February 24, 2016.

97. On January 30, 2016, Respondent filed a Notice of Association of Counsel indicating that Arizona attorney Bradley J. Crider (hereinafter referred to as "Crider") was associating counsel during Respondent's suspension. While Respondent mailed a copy to opposing counsel, Respondent did not send a copy to the mediator.

98. On February 26, 2016, the mediator contacted Respondent regarding his failure to file a Mediation Memorandum as requested. Respondent responded that he was suspended and that Crider associated on the case but "is unavailable on March 1 and is unfamiliar with the case."

99. In response to an email from opposing counsel, Crider stated "Mr. Steadman's client and I will not be attending as I have a previously scheduled juvenile court trial on March 1."

100. After several additional emails from opposing counsel to Crider, opposing counsel wrote "Brad - I called you again yesterday and you have not bothered to call me back to reschedule the mediation. I do not know what is going on here- but you cannot just babysit this file until Tim comes back from his suspension. If I do not hear from you by the end of the day, I am contacting the court."

101. After receiving no response, opposing counsel emailed Crider again on March 7, 2016.

102. After receiving no response, opposing counsel filed a pleading entitled "Notice Re Mediation and Non Responsiveness and Request for Attorneys' Fees" on March 9, 2016. No response was filed.

103. On April 5, 2016, the Court granted the request for attorney's fees.

104. On April 5, 2016, at 3:53 p.m., Respondent filed a Notice of Appearance on behalf of "Respondent, Cindy Stephens Olvera" instead of the Petitioner, Connie Brown.

105. On April 6, 2016, Respondent filed an Amended Notice of Appearance on behalf of "Respondent, Connie Brown" instead of "Petitioner, Connie Brown".

106. On April 8, 2016, opposing counsel filed an unopposed Application and Affidavit of Attorney's Fees and Costs.

107. On April 15, 2016, at 3:15 p.m., the disciplinary clerk emailed the PDJ's order reinstating Respondent to the practice of law.

108. On April 20, 2016, the Court signed a judgment for attorney's fees against Brown in the amount of One Thousand Six Hundred Five Dollars (\$1,605.00) plus interest to be paid no later than May 25, 2016.

109. On April 26, 2016, Respondent filed a Notice of Settlement and Motion to Vacate Trial. The pleading contained an executed agreement between the parties including, but not limited to, a provision stating that "[e]ach party will be responsible for their own attorney (sic) fees and costs not already paid."

110. On May 3, 2016, Respondent filed a Motion to Vacate Order/Judgment for Attorney's Fees claiming, among other things, that the settlement provision regarding attorney's fees and costs supercedes the Court's award of attorney's fees.

111. On May 19, 2016, the Court prematurely signed an order vacating the prior award as the response was due on or before May 23, 2016.

112. On May 19, 2016, opposing counsel filed a Motion to Dismiss Petitioner's Motion to Vacate, claiming among other things, that the agreement was silent as to the Court's prior award and neither party intended that the attorney's fee provision would have the effect of cancelling the Court's prior award.

113: Later that day, the Court reinstated and affirmed the original order awarding attorney's fees and costs against Brown.

114. By engaging in the above-referenced misconduct, Respondent violated Rule 42, Ariz. R. Sup. Ct., ERs 1.2, 1.3, 1.16(d), 3.2, 5.5 and 8.4(d).

COUNT SIX (File No. 16-1417/SBA)

115. Paragraphs 1 – 8 are incorporated herein by reference.

116. Respondent represented Robert Burgermeister (hereinafter referred to as "Burgermeister") in the Maricopa County Superior Court case of *Burgermeister v. Burgermeister*, FC2015-091758.

117. On January 30, 2016, Respondent filed a Notice of Association of Counsel indicating that Arizona attorney Bradley J. Crider (hereinafter referred to as "Crider") was associating counsel during Respondent's suspension.

118. On February 10, 2016, Crider filed a Joint Decision Making and Parenting Plan originally prepared by Respondent on Respondent's letterhead which contained the signatures of Crider and Burgermeister.

119. On February 16, 2016, opposing counsel filed a Consent Decree originally prepared by Respondent on Respondent's letterhead which contained the signatures of Crider and Burgermeister.

120. By engaging in the above-referenced misconduct, Respondent violated Rule 42, Ariz. R. Sup. Ct., ER 5.5.

COUNT SEVEN (File No. 16-1418/SBA)

121. Paragraphs 1 – 8 are incorporated herein by reference.

122. Respondent represented Lance Cole (hereinafter referred to as "Cole") in the Maricopa County Superior Court case of *Odgren v. Cole*, FC2014-093593.

123. On January 30, 2016, Respondent filed a Notice of Association of Counsel indicating that Arizona attorney Bradley J. Crider (hereinafter referred to as "Crider") was associating counsel during Respondent's suspension.

124. On April 4, 2016, Respondent filed a Notice of Appearance on behalf of Cole.

125. On April 5, 2016, Respondent filed a Resolution Statement on behalf of Cole.

126. On April 7, 2016, Respondent appeared at a Resolution Management Conference on behalf of Cole.

a. By engaging in the above-referenced misconduct, Respondent violated Rule 42, Ariz. R. Sup. Ct., ER 5.5.

COUNT EIGHT (File No. 16-1419/SBA)

127. Paragraphs 1 – 8 are incorporated herein by reference.

128. Respondent represented Cristina Myhan (hereinafter referred to as "Myhan") in the Maricopa County Superior Court case of *Myhan v. Myhan*, FC2015-095612.

129. On January 31, 2016, Respondent filed a Notice of Association of Counsel indicating that Arizona attorney Bradley J. Crider (hereinafter referred to as "Crider") was associating counsel during Respondent's suspension.

130. On April 8, 2016, Respondent filed a Notice of Intent to Relocate and Emergency Motion for Temporary Orders on behalf of Myhan.

131. By engaging in the above-referenced misconduct, Respondent violated Rule 42, Ariz. R. Sup. Ct., ER 5.5.

PRE-COMPLAINT COUNT NINE (File No. 16-2480/Long)

132. In or around June 2012, Complainant hired Respondent to represent him in the Maricopa County Superior Court case of *In re the Estate of William Long*, PB2012-091078.

133. In or around July 2012, Respondent filed paperwork establishing an informal probate as there were insufficient assets in the estate to distribute to the creditors of the estate.

134. On March 6, 2015, the Court issued a minute entry indicating that no Closing Statement or Petition for Formal Closing was filed by Respondent.

135. The minute entry also ordered that a Closing Statement or Petition for Formal Closing be filed within 60 days or Complainant would be removed as Personal Representative.

136. The minute entry further set a May 19, 2015, internal review to confirm compliance.

137. On August 4, 2016, Respondent filed a Closing Statement on behalf of the Petitioner.

138. By engaging in the above-referenced misconduct, Respondent violated Rule 42, Ariz. R. Sup. Ct., ERs 1.2, 1.3, 3.2 and 8.4(d).

CONDITIONAL ADMISSIONS

Respondent's admissions are being tendered in exchange for the form of discipline stated below and are submitted freely and voluntarily and not as a result of coercion or intimidation.

Respondent conditionally admits that his conduct violated violated Rule 42, Ariz. R. Sup. Ct.:

- a. ER 1.2 – Respondent failed to abide the client's authority (3x);
- b. ER 1.3 – Respondent failed to act diligently during the representation (6x);
- c. ER 1.4 – Respondent failed to reasonably communicate with the client throughout the representation (3x);
- d. ER 1.16(d) – Respondent failed to take the steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interest (3x);
- e. ER 3.2 – Respondent failed to expedite the litigation (5x);
- f. ER 5.5 – Respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law while suspended (5x);
- g. ER 8.4(d) – Respondent engaged in misconduct which was prejudicial to the administration of justice (6x).

CONDITIONAL DISMISSALS

The State Bar has conditionally agreed to dismiss no allegations.

RESTITUTION

Restitution is not an issue in this matter.

SANCTION

Respondent and the State Bar of Arizona agree that based on the facts and circumstances of this matter, as set forth above, the following sanctions are appropriate:

Short Term Suspension of Ninety (90) Days.

If Respondent violates any of the terms of this agreement, further discipline proceedings may be brought.

LEGAL GROUNDS IN SUPPORT OF SANCTION

In determining an appropriate sanction, the parties consulted the American Bar Association's *Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (Standards)* pursuant to Rule 57(a)(2)(E). The *Standards* are designed to promote consistency in the imposition of sanctions by identifying relevant factors that courts should consider and then applying those factors to situations where lawyers have engaged in various types of misconduct. *Standards* 1.3, Commentary. The *Standards* provide guidance with respect to an appropriate sanction in this matter. *In re Peasley*, 208 Ariz. 27, 33, 35, 90 P.3d 764, 770 (2004); *In re Rivkind*, 162 Ariz. 154, 157, 791 P.2d 1037, 1040 (1990).

In determining an appropriate sanction consideration is given to the duty violated, the lawyer's mental state, the actual or potential injury caused by the misconduct and the existence of aggravating and mitigating factors. *Peasley*, 208 Ariz. at 35, 90 P.3d at 772; *Standard* 3.0.

The parties agree that the following *Standards* are the appropriate *Standards* given the facts and circumstances of this matter, Rule 42, Ariz. R. Sup. Ct.:

ER 1.2: (Client Authority)/ ER 1.3: (Diligence)/ ER 1.4: (Communication)

Standard 4.43:

Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent and does not act with reasonable diligence in representing a client, and causes injury or potential injury to a client.

ER 1.16: (Termination of Representation)

Standard 7.3

Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional, and causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public or the legal system.

ER 3.2:(Expedite Litigation)/ ER 8.4(d):(Conduct Prejudicial To Administration of Justice)

Standard 6.23

Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer negligently fails to comply with a court order or rule, and there is injury or potential injury to a client or a party, or interference or potential interference with a legal proceeding.

The duty violated

As described above, Respondent's conduct violated his duty to his client, the profession and the legal system.

The lawyer's mental state

For purposes of this agreement the parties agree that Respondent negligently failed to act diligently, failed to communicate with his clients, failed to expedite litigation, and failed to properly terminate the representation and return the client's property in a timely manner. The parties also agree that Respondent's conduct was in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

The extent of the actual or potential injury

For purposes of this agreement, the parties agree that there was actual and potential harm to the client, profession and legal system.

Aggravating and mitigating circumstances

The presumptive sanction in this matter is suspension. The parties conditionally agree that the following aggravating and mitigating factors should be considered:

In aggravation:

A. *Standard 9.22(a)* prior disciplinary offenses:

- PDJ 2015-9086 (2015): Respondent was suspended for 60 days and placed on two years of probation for violations of Rule 42, Ariz. R. Sup. Ct., ER 1.1, ER 1.2, ER 1.3, ER 1.4, ER 1.5, ER 1.15, ER 1.16(d), ER 3.2 and ER 8.4(d).
- SB File No. 13-0210 (2014): Respondent was admonished and placed on probation for violation of ER 1.2(a), ER 1.3, ER 1.4(a) & (b), and ER 8.4(d).
- SB File No. 12-0384 (2013): Respondent was admonished and placed on probation for violation of ER 1.3, ER 1.4, ER 1.15(d), ER 1.16(d), and ER 8.4(d).

B. *Standard 9.22(c)* pattern of misconduct; and

C. *Standard 9.22(d)* multiple offenses.

In mitigation:

A. *Standard 9.32(b)* absence of a dishonest or selfish motive; and

B. *Standard 9.32(e)* full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings.

Discussion

The parties have conditionally agreed that a greater or lesser sanction would not be appropriate under the facts and circumstances of this matter. This agreement was based on the following:

Counts 1 – 3 & 9:

The misconduct outlined in Counts 1 – 3 & 9 are the same type of misconduct that occurred during the same time frame as misconduct addressed by the suspension imposed in PDJ 2015-9086.

Counts 4 – 8 (UPL Allegations):

In an interview with the State Bar, Nancy Greenlee verified Respondent's statements that Greenlee failed to completely explain the reinstatement process to Respondent during a settlement conference in PDJ 2015-9086 and that she did not subsequently provide additional information to Respondent. Greenlee believes that this probably significantly contributed to Respondent's actions in Counts 4 – 8.

Finally, while Respondent accepted employment and anticipated moving to the State of Utah, the effective date of his employment was delayed due to litigation unrelated to Respondent.

Based upon his prior disciplinary history for similar rule violations and the number of pending investigations, the parties agree that a short-term suspension will afford the public adequate protection as well as allow Respondent to implement the necessary changes to his practice that will ensure compliance with the ethical rules should he decide to return to the practice of law.

Based on the *Standards* and in light of the facts and circumstances of this matter, the parties conditionally agree that the sanction set forth above is within the range of appropriate sanction and will serve the purposes of lawyer discipline.

CONCLUSION

The object of lawyer discipline is not to punish the lawyer, but to protect the public, the profession and the administration of justice. *Peasley, supra* at ¶ 64, 90

P.3d at 778. Recognizing that determination of the appropriate sanction is the prerogative of the Presiding Disciplinary Judge, the State Bar and Respondent believe that the objectives of discipline will be met by the imposition of the proposed sanction of Short Term Suspension of Ninety (90) Days and the imposition of costs and expenses.

A proposed form order is attached hereto as Exhibit B.


DATED this 28TH day of November 2016.

STATE BAR OF ARIZONA



Craig D. Henley
Senior Bar Counsel

This agreement, with conditional admissions, is submitted freely and voluntarily and not under coercion or intimidation. I acknowledge my duty under the Rules of the Supreme Court with respect to discipline and reinstatement. I understand these duties may include notification of clients, return of property and other rules pertaining to suspension.

DATED this 17TH day of November, 2016.


Timothy W. Steadman
Respondent

Approved as to form and content


Maret Vessella
Chief Bar Counsel

Original filed with the Disciplinary Clerk of
the Office of the Presiding Disciplinary Judge
of the Supreme Court of Arizona
this 28th day of November, 2016.

Copy of the foregoing emailed
this 28th day of November, 2016, to:

The Honorable William J. O'Neil
Presiding Disciplinary Judge
Supreme Court of Arizona
1501 W. Washington Street, Suite 102
Phoenix, Arizona 85007
Email: officepdj@courts.az.gov

Copy of the foregoing mailed/emailed
this 28th day of November, 2016, to:

Timothy W. Steadman
Steadman Law Firm
1423 S. Higley Road, Suite 109
Mesa, Arizona 85206-3449
Email: tim@steadmanlawfirm.net
Respondent

Copy of the foregoing hand-delivered
this 28th day of November, 2016, to:

Lawyer Regulation Records Manager
State Bar of Arizona
4201 N. 24th Street, Suite 100
Phoenix, Arizona 85016-6266

by: 
CDH/ts

EXHIBIT A

Statement of Costs and Expenses

In the Matter of a Member of the State Bar of Arizona,
Timothy W. Steadman, Bar No. 022708, Respondent

File Nos. 15-2794, 15-3163, 16-0105, 16-1399, 16-1414,
16-1417, 16-1418, 16-1419, 16-2480.

Administrative Expenses

The Supreme Court of Arizona has adopted a schedule of administrative expenses to be assessed in lawyer discipline. If the number of charges/complainants exceeds five, the assessment for the general administrative expenses shall increase by 20% for each additional charge/complainant where a violation is admitted or proven.

Factors considered in the administrative expense are time expended by staff bar counsel, paralegal, secretaries, typists, file clerks and messenger; and normal postage charges, telephone costs, office supplies and all similar factors generally attributed to office overhead. As a matter of course, administrative costs will increase based on the length of time it takes a matter to proceed through the adjudication process.

General Administrative Expenses for above-numbered proceedings

\$1,200.00

Additional costs incurred by the State Bar of Arizona in the processing of this disciplinary matter, and not included in administrative expenses, are itemized below.

Staff Investigator/Miscellaneous Charges

Total for staff investigator charges \$ 0.00

Total Costs and Expenses for each matter over 5 cases where a violation is admitted or proven.
(4 over 5 x (20% x 1,200)): \$ 960.00

TOTAL COSTS AND EXPENSES INCURRED **\$2,160.00**

EXHIBIT B

**BEFORE THE PRESIDING DISCIPLINARY
JUDGE**

**IN THE MATTER OF A MEMBER OF
THE STATE BAR OF ARIZONA,**

**TIMOTHY W. STEADMAN,
Bar No. 022708,**

Respondent.

PDJ 2016-9081

FINAL JUDGMENT AND ORDER

[State Bar Nos. 15-2794, 15-3163,
16-0105, 16-1399, 16-1414, 16-1417,
16-1418, and 16-1419]

and

[State Bar Screening File: 16-2480]

The undersigned Presiding Disciplinary Judge of the Supreme Court of Arizona, having reviewed the Agreement for Discipline by Consent filed on _____, pursuant to Rule 57(a), Ariz. R. Sup. Ct., hereby accepts the parties' proposed agreement.

Accordingly:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Respondent, **Timothy W. Steadman**, is hereby suspended for a period of ninety (90) days for his conduct in violation of the Arizona Rules of Professional Conduct, as outlined in the consent documents, **effective on January 2, 2017.**

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, upon reinstatement, Respondent shall be placed on probation for a period of two years.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent shall contact the State Bar Compliance Monitor at (602) 340-7258, within 10 days from the date of service of

this Order/Agreement. Respondent shall sign terms and conditions of participation, including reporting requirements consistent with those contained in PDJ 2015-9086, which shall be incorporated herein. The probation period will begin at the time the new terms and conditions are signed by Respondent and will conclude two years from that date. Respondent will be responsible for any costs associated with LOMAP.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent shall be subject to any additional terms imposed by the Presiding Disciplinary Judge as a result of reinstatement hearings held.

NON-COMPLIANCE LANGUAGE

In the event that Respondent fails to comply with any of the foregoing probation terms, and information thereof, is received by the State Bar of Arizona, Bar Counsel shall file a notice of noncompliance with the Presiding Disciplinary Judge, pursuant to Rule 60(a)(5), Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. The Presiding Disciplinary Judge may conduct a hearing within 30 days to determine whether a term of probation has been breached and, if so, to recommend an appropriate sanction. If there is an allegation that Respondent failed to comply with any of the foregoing terms, the burden of proof shall be on the State Bar of Arizona to prove noncompliance by a preponderance of the evidence.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to Rule 72 Ariz. R. Sup. Ct., Respondent shall immediately comply with the requirements relating to notification of clients and others.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent pay the costs and expenses of the State Bar of Arizona in the amount of \$ _____, within 30 days from the date of service of this Order.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent shall pay the costs and expenses incurred by the disciplinary clerk and/or Presiding Disciplinary Judge's Office in connection with these disciplinary proceedings in the amount of _____, within 30 days from the date of service of this Order.

DATED this _____ day of November, 2016.

William J. O'Neil, Presiding Disciplinary Judge

Original filed with the Disciplinary Clerk of the Office of the Presiding Disciplinary Judge of the Supreme Court of Arizona this _____ day of November, 2016.

Copies of the foregoing mailed/emailed this _____ day of November, 2016, to:

Timothy W. Steadman
Steadman Law Firm
1423 S. Higley Road, Suite 109
Mesa, Arizona 85206-3449
Email: tim@steadmanlawfirm.net
Respondent

Copy of the foregoing emailed/hand-delivered this _____ day of November, 2016, to:

Craig D. Henley
Senior Bar Counsel - Litigation
State Bar of Arizona
4201 N. 24th Street, Suite 100
Phoenix, Arizona 85016-6266
Email: LRO@staff.azbar.org

Copy of the foregoing hand-delivered
this ____ day of November, 2016 to:

Lawyer Regulation Records Manager
State Bar of Arizona
4201 N. 24th Street, Suite 100
Phoenix, Arizona 85016-6266

by: _____