

BEFORE THE PRESIDING DISCIPLINARY JUDGE

IN THE MATTER OF A SUSPENDED
MEMBER OF THE STATE BAR OF
ARIZONA,

MATTHEW WILLIAM LOCKIN,
Bar No. 029946

Respondent.

PDJ-2018-9024

**FINAL JUDGMENT AND
ORDER OF DISBARMENT**

[State Bar No. 17-3400]

FILED JULY 12, 2017

This matter came for hearing before the Hearing Panel, which rendered its decision on June 21, 2018 and ordered the immediate disbarment of Matthew William Lockin on that same date. The decision of the hearing panel is final under Rule 58(k), Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. The time to file a notice of appeal has passed and none was filed.

Now therefore,

IT IS ORDERED Respondent, **MATTHEW WILLIAM LOCKIN, Bar No. 029946**, is disbarred from the State Bar of Arizona and his name is stricken from the roll of lawyers, effective June 21, 2018, as set forth in the Decision and Order Imposing Sanctions. Mr. Lockin is no longer entitled to the rights and privileges of a lawyer but remains subject to the jurisdiction of the Court.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Mr. Lockin shall immediately comply with the requirements relating to notification of clients and others and provide and/or file all notices and affidavits required by Rule 72, Ariz. R. Sup. Ct.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Mr. Lockin and LMG Holdings, LLC, shall pay restitution of \$2,500.00 to Edward and Sheba Lisogar, with interest, as provided by law.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Mr. Lockin shall pay all costs and expenses of the State Bar of Arizona pursuant to Rule 60(b), Ariz. R. Sup. Ct., as approved by the Presiding Disciplinary Judge. There are no costs or expenses incurred by the disciplinary clerk and/or Presiding Disciplinary Judge's Office in connection with these disciplinary proceedings.

DATED this 12th day of July 2018.

William J. O'Neil

William J. O'Neil, Presiding Disciplinary Judge

COPY of the foregoing e-mailed/mailed this 12th day of July, 2018, to:

David L. Sandweiss
State Bar of Arizona
4201 N. 24th Street, Suite 100
Phoenix, AZ 85016-6266
Email: lro@staff.azbar.org

Matthew W. Lockin
400 E. Van Buren St.
Phoenix, AZ 85004-2509
Email: mattlockin@gmail.com
Respondent

Lawyer Regulation Records Manager
State Bar of Arizona
4201 N. 24th Street, Suite 100
Phoenix, Arizona 85016-6266
Email: lro@staff.azbar.org

alternate addresses:

1138 W. Culver St.
Phoenix, AZ 85007

4277 Louis Rd.
Lilburn, GA 30047-4016

331 Dodge Ave.
Jefferson, LA 70121

by: AMcQueen

BEFORE THE PRESIDING DISCIPLINARY JUDGE

IN THE MATTER OF A
SUSPENDED MEMBER OF
THE STATE BAR OF ARIZONA,

MATTHEW WILLIAM LOCKIN,
Bar No. 029946,

Respondent.

PDJ 2018-9024

**DECISION AND ORDER
IMPOSING SANCTIONS**

[State Bar No. 17-3400]

FILED JUNE 21, 2018

SUMMARY

After accepting \$2,500.00 to represent his clients, Mr. Lockin filed the Answer and Counterclaim provided to him by those clients. He then abandoned them and his practice. He additionally failed to respond to the State Bar's screening letters and phone calls. The Hearing Panel ordered Mr. Lockin disbarred effective immediately for violating Rule 42, ERs 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5 (b), 1.15, 1.16, 8.1; and Rules 43 and 54, Ariz. R. Sup. Ct.¹

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Senior Bar Counsel David A. Sandweiss filed the complaint on March 28, 2018. Mr. Lockin failed to answer. The Disciplinary clerk entered effective default

¹ Unless otherwise stated all Rule references are to the Ariz. R. Sup. Ct.

on May 22, 2018. Upon that effective entry, the Court deemed all facts set forth in the complaint admitted and all rule violations established by clear and convincing evidence.²

This matter proceeded to an aggravation/mitigation hearing on June 13, 2018 before the Hearing Panel (“Panel”), comprised of Lori B. Patrick, volunteer attorney member, Thomas C. Schleifer, volunteer public member, and the Presiding Disciplinary Judge William J. O’Neil, (“PDJ”). Senior Bar Counsel David Sandweiss appeared on behalf of the State Bar of Arizona. Mr. Lockin did not appear. Exhibits 1-23 were admitted. The State Bar moved under Rule 47(b) to amend the complaint to conform with the evidence regarding minor differences in dates and the testimony presented. The motion was granted. At the conclusion of the hearing, the State Bar requested disbarment and restitution.

FINDINGS OF FACT

The Court adopts and incorporates by reference the averments in the admitted complaint, presented here in condensed form. At one time, Mr. Lockin was a lawyer licensed to practice law in Arizona having taken the oath of admission and being admitted to the State Bar of the Arizona Supreme Court on January 15, 2013. He is subject to the Court’s jurisdiction in this disciplinary proceeding.³

² See Rule 58(d).

³ See Rule 31.

Edward and Sheba Lisogar hired Mr. Lockin in September 2016 to defend them in a civil case in Arcadia Justice Court, CC2016-169424RC, and paid him \$2,500. They asked Mr. Lockin to file an answer and counterclaim that they already prepared. Mr. Lockin agreed to do so and told the Lisogars that he would try to settle the case.

Mr. Lockin had the Lisogars write the \$2,500 check to his real estate holding company, LMG Holdings, and not to his law firm. [Exhibit 5.] Mr. Lockin did not deposit their payment into an IOLTA. Mr. Lockin did not furnish his clients a written communication of the scope of representation, or of the fees and costs for which they were responsible. Mr. Lockin did not communicate to them whether the \$2,500 fee he charged them was a flat fee, advance fee, or a fee deemed nonrefundable or earned upon receipt. This is strong evidence of intentional deceit, dishonest and selfish motive. It is also evidences a lack of remorse or failure to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct. *See, e.g., People v. Katz*, 58 P.3d 1176 (Colo. O.P.D.J. 2002). It is an overt plan which also establishes his indifference to making restitution. *See, e.g., In re Augenstein*, 871 P.2d 254, 258 (Ariz. 1994).

Mr. Lockin was summarily suspended from practicing law in Arizona on January 27, 2017 for his failure to pay dues. [Exhibit 13.] Mr. Lockin never informed the Lisogars that he was summarily suspended from the practice of law. We conclude

he knew he was summarily suspended from the practice of law by the end of January 2017, because he ceased all communications with the Lisogars and abandoned them.

The Lisogars developed health issues so they did not participate actively in the case other than to ask Mr. Lockin periodically for status updates on their case. They could rarely reach Mr. Lockin. Early in the representation, on the rare occasion when they succeeded reaching him, he told them not to worry. He said he would take care of things and make it all go away. He assured them that there was no news because the opposing party had not communicated a settlement offer. From February 2, 2017 to June 2, 2017, they repeatedly tried to reach Mr. Lockin with text messages, but received only a text message from the brother of Mr. Lockin advising them that the phone number the Lisogars had for him no longer belonged to Mr. Lockin. [Exhibit 4.]

On April 6, 2017, the Justice of the Peace Court granted summary judgment against the Lisogars for \$2,900.00 but did not award the opposing parties any attorney's fees. The Justice Court sent a copy of its ruling to Respondent, as counsel of record for the Lisogars. Mr. Lockin did not notify the Lisogars of the court's ruling. [Exhibit 14.]

On April 26, 2017, the opposing parties moved for reconsideration asking the court to grant them attorney's fees. They served the motion on Mr. Lockin as counsel

of record for the Lisogars. Mr. Lockin did not notify the Lisogars of the motion. [Exhibit 16.]

On June 7, 2017, the court granted the opposing parties' motion for reconsideration and invited them to apply for attorney's fees. The court sent a copy of its ruling directly to the Lisogars, and not Mr. Lockin. [Exhibit 17.] They then learned that Mr. Lockin never appeared at any hearing and filed nothing for them other than the Answer and Counterclaim on October 10, 2016 that he had the Lisogars write to him outlining their case for him.

On June 16, 2017, the Lisogars intervened on their own behalf and asked the court to set aside its ruling. The court set their request for a hearing. [Exhibit 18-20.] They retained new counsel, Todd Feltus, for a fee of \$1,388.39, who negotiated a settlement and dismissal. [Exhibit 22-23.] The Lisogars paid the opposing parties \$2,900 to settle the case. They also incurred a \$40 service fee to file and serve their motion to set aside the summary judgment.

The Lisogars continued to try to reach Mr. Lockin through his brother to obtain their retainer back, but eventually the brother stopped responding to them after telling them that he had told Mr. Lockin to call them. We conclude from the facts his selfish motive, refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct and indifference to making restitution.

The Lisogars learned Mr. Lockin was suspended from the practice of law from another attorney. After learning of his suspension, the Lisogars went to his law office address but the space was vacant. They filed a bar charge against him with the State Bar of Arizona. [Exhibit 1.]

Mr. Lockin did not respond to the State Bar's November 29, 2017, initial screening investigation letter. [Exhibit 2.] The State Bar's investigator conducted a public records search to obtain all contact information reasonably applicable to Mr. Lockin. The information included Mr. Lockin's street addresses in Phoenix and Lilburn, Georgia; business locations; statutory agents for his businesses; and discontinued phone numbers.

The investigator could not locate Mr. Lockin anywhere, and Mr. Lockin did not respond to the bar's January 5, 2018 follow-up screening investigation letters sent to his address of record and two alternate addresses. [Exhibit 3.] The State Bar declares that Mr. Lockin has no known email address, however, the email address mattlockin@gmail.com is referenced in text messages between his brother and the Lisogars. [Exhibit 8, page 3.] Because his brother had been in contact with him, and the State Bar communicated with him, we conclude that he knew of these proceedings but has ignored them. The evidence is clear and convincing that the course of action was intentional from the beginning by the method of his deposit of their funds. We conclude he knew or should have known a bar charge would follow.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Although the allegations are deemed admitted by default, there has also been an independent determination by the Panel that the State Bar has proven by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Lockin violated the ethical rules. His conduct is egregious. The State Bar contends that Mr. Lockin violated Rule 42, ERs 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5(a) & (b), 1.7, 1.8, 1.15, 1.16, 3.2, 4.1, 8.1, 8.4(c), and 8.4(d); and Rules 43 and 54. Upon reviewing the admitted facts and evidence, the Panel finds by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Lockin violated these alleged Rule 42, ERs, Rule 43 and 54 violations with the exceptions of ERs 1.5(a), 1.7, 1.8, 8.4(c), and 8.4(d). The Panel agrees with the recommendation for disbarment.

ABA STANDARDS ANALYSIS

The American Bar Association's *Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions* ("*Standards*") are a "useful tool in determining the proper sanction." *In re Cardenas*, 164 Ariz. 149, 152, 791, P.2d 1032, 1035 (1990). In imposing a sanction, the following factors should be considered: (1) the duty violated; (2) the lawyer's mental state; (3) the actual or potential injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct; and (4) the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors. *Standard 3.0*. We find disbarment is the appropriate sanction.

(1) Duties violated:

Respondent violated all four duties that the *Standards* recognize: His duties to his clients (ERs 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5(b), 1.15, 1.16, 4.1; and Rule 43), the legal system, (ER 3.2 and 4.1) the public (ER 8.1) and to the legal profession (ERs 1.5(b), 1.16, and 8.1; and Rule 54).

(2) Mental State:

Respondent violated the foregoing rules and duties at least knowingly and more likely intentionally.

(3) Actual or Potential Injury

The Lisogars suffered actual injury by the \$2,500 loss for fees wasted on hiring Respondent, and some or all of the \$2,900 in settlement funds they paid that they may have saved had they been adequately represented during the summary judgment proceedings.

Based on the foregoing, the following *Standards* following the related violations relate to the sanction:

ER 1.2. Scope of Representation and Allocation of Authority Between Client and Lawyer

(a) Subject to paragraphs (c) and (d), a lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation and, as required by ER 1.4, shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued. A lawyer may take such action on behalf of the client as is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation. . . .

(c) A lawyer may limit the scope of the representation if the limitation is reasonable under the circumstances and the client gives informed consent.

ER 1.3. Diligence

A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.

ER 1.4. Communication

(a) A lawyer shall:

(1) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to which the client's informed consent, as defined in ER 1.0(e), is required by these Rules;

(2) reasonably consult with the client about the means by which the client's objectives are to be accomplished;

(3) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter;

(4) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; and

(5) consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the lawyer's conduct when the lawyer knows that the client expects assistance not permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.

(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.

Standard 4.41 -- Disbarment is generally appropriate when:

(a) a lawyer abandons the practice and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client; or

(b) a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services for a client and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client; or

(c) a lawyer engages in a pattern of neglect with respect to client matters and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client.

ER 1.5 Fees

(b) The scope of the representation and the basis or rate of the fee and expenses for which the client will be responsible shall be communicated to the client in writing, before or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation, except when the lawyer will charge a regularly represented client on the same basis or rate. . . .

Standard 4.61 -- Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly deceives a client with the intent to benefit the lawyer or another, and causes serious injury or potential serious injury to a client.

Standard 7.1 -- Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another, and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client, the public, or the legal system.

ER 1.15. Safekeeping Property

(a) A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in a lawyer's possession in connection with a representation separate from the lawyer's own property. Funds shall be kept in a separate account maintained in the state where the lawyer's office is situated, or elsewhere with the consent of the client or third person. . . . Complete records of such account funds and other property shall be kept by the lawyer and shall be preserved for a period of five years after termination of the representation.

* * *

(c) A lawyer shall deposit into a client trust account legal fees and expenses that have been paid in advance, to be withdrawn by the lawyer only as fees are earned or expenses incurred.

(d) [E]xcept as stated in this Rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement between the client and the third person, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that the client or third person is entitled to receive and, upon request by the client or third person, shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property.

Rule 43. Trust Accounts

(a) Duty to Deposit Client Funds and Funds Belonging to Third Persons; Deposit of Funds Belonging to the Lawyer. Funds belonging in whole or in part to a client or third person in connection with a representation shall be kept separate and apart from the lawyer's personal and business accounts. All such funds shall be deposited into one or more trust accounts that are labeled as such.

Standard 4.11 -- Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly converts client property and causes injury or potential injury to a client.

ER 8.1. Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters

[A] lawyer . . . in connection with a disciplinary matter, shall not: . . . (b) . . . knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for information from an admissions or disciplinary authority

Rule 54. Grounds for Discipline

Grounds for discipline of members and non-members include the following: . . . **(d) Violation of any obligation pursuant to these rules in a disciplinary or disability investigation or proceeding.** Such violations include, but are not limited to, the following:

1. *Evading service or refusal to cooperate.* Evading service or refusal to cooperate with officials and staff of the state bar, the committee, the presiding disciplinary judge, a hearing panel, or a conservator appointed under these rules acting in the course of that person's duties constitutes grounds for discipline.

2. *Failure to furnish information.* The failure to furnish information or respond promptly to any inquiry or request from bar counsel, the board, the committee, the presiding disciplinary judge, a hearing panel, or this court, made pursuant to these rules for information relevant to pending charges, complaints or matters under investigation concerning conduct of a lawyer, or failure to assert the ground for refusing to do so constitutes grounds for discipline. Nothing in this rule shall limit the lawyer's ability to request a protective order pursuant to Rule 70(g). Upon such inquiry or request, every lawyer:

A. shall furnish in writing, or orally if requested, a full and complete response to inquiries and questions;

B. shall permit inspection and copying of the lawyer's business records, files and accounts; [and]

C. shall furnish copies of requested records, files and accounts;

Standards 4.61 and 7.1 (above)

Standard 5.11 -- Disbarment is generally appropriate when:

(a) a lawyer engages in serious criminal conduct a necessary element of which includes . . . misrepresentation, fraud, . . . misappropriation, or theft; . . . or

(b) a lawyer engages in any other intentional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice.

(4) Aggravating and Mitigating Factors:

The Panel finds the following aggravating factors are present:

Standard 9.22--

(b) dishonest or selfish motive;

(g) refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct;

(i) substantial experience in the practice of law; and

(j) indifference to making restitution; and

The Panel finds the following mitigating factor applies:

Standard 9.32--

(a) absence of a prior disciplinary record;

The Panel finds the sole mitigating factor does not outweigh the aggravating factors. The presumptive sanction of disbarment is appropriate. The Panel determines that Respondent and his company LMG Holding, LLC, shall pay restitution to the Lisogars of \$2,500 as a refund of unearned fees, \$2,900 that the Lisogars likely would have saved had Respondent represented them adequately, or at all, and \$40 for the process fee for serving the Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Judgment, which would not have occurred but for Mr. Lockin's failure to adequately represent the Lisogars.

CONCLUSION

The primary objective of lawyer regulation and discipline is to protect the public, the profession and the administration of justice, and not to punish the offending lawyer. *In re Kastensmith*, 101 Ariz. 291, 294, 419 P.2d 75, 78 (1966). Other purposes and objectives of lawyer discipline are to deter future misconduct, *In re Fioramonti*, 176 Ariz. 182, 859 P.2d 1315 (1993); protect and instill public confidence in the integrity of individual members of the SBA, *Matter of Horwitz*, 180 Ariz. 20, 881 P.2d 352 (1994); and, to foster confidence in the self-regulatory process, *In re Hoover*, 161 Ariz. 529, 779 P.2d 1268 (1989).

Absent significant mitigating circumstances, disbarment is warranted for a lawyer that abandons the practice of law without protecting the client's interests. Mr.

Lockin not only abandoned his clients, he knowingly failed to perform services for those clients resulting in serious injury to his client.

Accordingly,

1. Mr. Lockin is disbarred from the practice of law effective immediately.

2. Mr. Lockin shall pay all costs and expenses incurred by the SBA in this proceeding;

3. Mr. Lockin and LMG Holdings, LLC, shall pay restitution to the Lisogars of \$5,440.00;

A final judgment and order shall follow.

DATED this 21st day of June, 2018.

William J. O'Neil

William J. O'Neil, Presiding Disciplinary Judge

Thomas C. Schleifer

Thomas C. Schleifer, Public Member

Lori B. Patrick

Lori B. Patrick, Attorney Member

Copy of the foregoing emailed/mailed
this 21st day of June, 2018, to:

Matthew William Lockin
400 E Van Buren St
Phoenix, AZ 85004-2509
Email: mattlockin@gmail.com
Respondent

Alternate addresses:

1138 W. Culver St.
Phoenix, AZ 85007

1427 N. 3rd St., Ste. 200
Phoenix, AZ 85004

4277 Louis Rd.
Lilburn, GA 30047-4016

331 Dodge Ave.
Jefferson, LA 70121

David L. Sandweiss
Senior Bar Counsel
State Bar of Arizona
4201 N. 24th Street, Suite 100
Phoenix, Arizona 85016-6266
Email: LRO@staff.azbar.org

by: AMcQueen

David L. Sandweiss, Bar No. 005501
Senior Bar Counsel
State Bar of Arizona
4201 N. 24th Street, Suite 100
Phoenix, Arizona 85016-6266
Telephone (602)340-7250
Email: LRO@staff.azbar.org

OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDING DISCIPLINARY JUDGE
SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA

MAR 28 2018

FILED
BY 

BEFORE THE PRESIDING DISCIPLINARY JUDGE

**IN THE MATTER OF A
SUSPENDED MEMBER OF
THE STATE BAR OF ARIZONA,**

MATTHEW WILLIAM LOCKIN,
Bar No. 029946,

Respondent.

PDJ 2018-9024

COMPLAINT

State Bar No. 17-3400

For its complaint against Respondent the State Bar of Arizona alleges:

COUNT ONE of ONE (File no. 17-3400/Lisogar)

1. At one time, Respondent was a lawyer licensed to practice law in the state of Arizona having been first admitted to practice in Arizona on January 15, 2013.
2. Respondent was suspended from practicing law in Arizona on January 27, 2017.

3. Edward and Sheba Lisogar hired Respondent in September 2016 to defend them in a civil case in Arcadia Justice Court, CC2016-169424RC, and paid him \$2,500.

4. Edward and Sheba Lisogar asked Respondent to file an answer and counterclaim that they already prepared.

5. Respondent agreed to do so and told the Lisogars that he would try to settle the case.

6. Respondent had the Lisogars write the \$2,500 check to Respondent's real estate holding company, LMG Holdings, and not to his law firm.

7. Respondent did not deposit the Lisogars' payment into an IOLTA.

8. Respondent did not furnish to the Lisogars a written communication of the scope of representation, or of the fees and costs for which they were responsible.

9. Respondent did not communicate to the Lisogars whether the \$2,500 fee he charged them was a flat fee, advance fee, or a fee deemed nonrefundable or earned upon receipt.

10. The Lisogars developed health issues so they did not participate actively in the case other than to ask Respondent periodically for status updates on their case.

11. When the Lisogars were able to reach Respondent, which was rare, he told them not to worry, he would take care of things and make it all go away, and that there was no news because the opposing party had not communicated a settlement offer.

12. In May 2017 the Lisogars received a notice from the court that it entered judgment against them.

13. The Lisogars tried to reach Respondent but received only a text message from Respondent's brother advising that the phone number the Lisogars had for Respondent no longer belonged to Respondent.

14. In June 2017 the Lisogars learned that Respondent never appeared at any hearing and filed nothing for them other than the Answer and Counterclaim on October 10, 2016 that the Lisogars had prepared.

15. The Lisogars continued to try to reach Respondent through his brother but eventually the brother stopped responding to them after telling them that he told Respondent to call them.

16. Respondent never informed the Lisogars that Respondent was summarily suspended from the practice of law on January 27, 2017.

17. The Lisogars learned of Respondent's suspension from another attorney.

18. After learning of Respondent's suspension, the Lisogars went to Respondent's office address and the space was vacant.

19. Respondent did not respond to the State Bar's November 29, 2017, initial screening investigation letter.

20. The State Bar's investigator conducted a public records search to obtain all contact information reasonably applicable to Respondent. The information included street addresses in Phoenix and Lilburn, Georgia; Respondent's business locations; statutory agents for his businesses; and discontinued phone numbers.


21. The investigator was unable to locate Respondent anywhere, and Respondent did not respond to the bar's January 5, 2018 follow-up screening investigation letters sent to his address of record and two alternate addresses.

22. Respondent has no known email address.

23. Respondent violated Rule 42, Ariz. R. Sup. Ct., ERs 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5(a) & (b), 1.7, 1.8, 1.15, 1.16, 3.2, 4.1, 8.1, 8.4(c), and 8.4(d); and Rules 43, 54, and 72, Ariz. R. Sup. Ct.


DATED this 28th day of March, 2018.

STATE BAR OF ARIZONA




David L. Sandweiss
Senior Bar Counsel

Original filed with the Disciplinary Clerk of
the Office of the Presiding Disciplinary Judge
of the Supreme Court of Arizona
this 28th day of March, 2018.

by: 
DLS:jlb

**BEFORE THE ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE
PROBABLE CAUSE COMMITTEE
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA**



**IN THE MATTER OF A SUSPENDED
MEMBER OF
THE STATE BAR OF ARIZONA,**

No. 17-3400

**MATTHEW WILLIAM LOCKIN
Bar No. 029946**

PROBABLE CAUSE ORDER

Respondent.


The Attorney Discipline Probable Cause Committee of the Supreme Court of Arizona ("Committee") reviewed this matter on March 9, 2018, pursuant to Rules 50 and 55, Ariz. R. Sup. Ct., for consideration of the State Bar's Report of Investigation and Recommendation.

By a vote of 8-0-1¹, the Committee finds probable cause exists to file a complaint against Respondent in File No. 17-3400.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED pursuant to Rules 55(c) and 58(a), Ariz. R. Sup. Ct., authorizing the State Bar Counsel to prepare and file a complaint with the Disciplinary Clerk.

Parties may not file motions for reconsideration of this Order.

DATED this 23 day of March, 2018.



Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop, Chair
Attorney Discipline Probable Cause Committee
of the Supreme Court of Arizona

¹ Committee member Ben Harrison did not participate in this matter.

Original filed this 23rd day
of March, 2018, with:

Lawyer Regulation Records Manager
State Bar of Arizona
4201 N. 24th Street, Suite 100
Phoenix, Arizona 85016-6266

Copy mailed this 20th day
of March, 2018, to:

Matthew William Lockin
400 East Van Buren St
Phoenix, AZ 85004-2509
Respondent

Copy emailed this 20th day
of March, 2018, to:

Attorney Discipline Probable Cause Committee
of the Supreme Court of Arizona
1501 West Washington Street, Suite 104
Phoenix, Arizona 85007
E-mail: ProbableCauseComm@courts.az.gov

Lawyer Regulation Records Manager
State Bar of Arizona
4201 N. 24th St., Suite 100
Phoenix, Arizona 85016-6266
E-mail: LRO@staff.azbar.org

by: 