

**BEFORE THE PRESIDING DISCIPLINARY
JUDGE**

**IN THE MATTER OF A MEMBER OF
THE STATE BAR OF ARIZONA,**

**CHRISTY C. BROWN,
Bar No. 017968**

Respondent.

PDJ-2015-9101

FINAL JUDGMENT AND ORDER

[State Bar No. 14-2108]

FILED OCTOBER 13, 2015

The Presiding Disciplinary Judge of the Supreme Court of Arizona, having reviewed the Agreement for Discipline by Consent filed on September 25, 2015, pursuant to Rule 57(a), Ariz. R. Sup. Ct., hereby accepts the parties' proposed agreement. Accordingly:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED Respondent, **Christy C. Brown**, is hereby suspended for a period of six (6) months and one (1) day, effective thirty (30) days from the date of this Order. A period of suspension of more than six (6) months will require proof of rehabilitation and compliance with other requirements prior to being reinstated to the practice of law in Arizona for her conduct in violation of the Arizona Rules of Professional Conduct, as outlined in the consent documents.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED upon reinstatement, Ms. Brown shall be placed on probation for a period of two (2) years and shall be subject to any terms as are deemed appropriate by the Hearing Panel at that time.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Ms. Brown shall be subject to any additional terms imposed by the Presiding Disciplinary Judge as a result of reinstatement hearings held.

NON-COMPLIANCE LANGUAGE

In the event that Respondent fails to comply with any of the foregoing probation terms, and information thereof, is received by the State Bar of Arizona, Bar Counsel shall file a notice of noncompliance with the Presiding Disciplinary Judge, pursuant to Rule 60(a)(5), Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. The Presiding Disciplinary Judge may conduct a hearing within thirty (30) days to determine whether a term of probation has been breached and, if so, to recommend an appropriate sanction. If there is an allegation that Respondent failed to comply with any of the foregoing terms, the burden of proof shall be on the State Bar of Arizona to prove noncompliance by a preponderance of the evidence.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED pursuant to Rule 72 Ariz. R. Sup. Ct., Ms. Brown shall immediately comply with the requirements relating to notification of clients and others.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Ms. Brown shall pay the costs and expenses of the State Bar of Arizona in the amount of \$1,200.00, within thirty (30) days from the date of this Order. There are no costs or expenses incurred by the disciplinary clerk and/or Presiding Disciplinary Judge's Office in connection with these disciplinary proceedings.

DATED this 13th day of October, 2015.

William J. O'Neil

**William J. O'Neil, Presiding Disciplinary
Judge**

Copies of the foregoing mailed/emailed
this 13th day of October, 2015 to:

Ralph W. Adams
Adams & Clark, PC
520 E. Portland Street
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Respondent's Counsel

Stacy L. Shuman
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4201 N. 24th Street, Suite 100
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Lawyer Regulation Records Manager
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by: MSmith

**BEFORE THE PRESIDING DISCIPLINARY
JUDGE**

IN THE MATTER OF A MEMBER OF THE
STATE BAR OF ARIZONA,

CHRISTY C. BROWN,
Bar No. 017968

Respondent.

No. PDJ-2015-9101

**ORDER ACCEPTING
AGREEMENT FOR DISCIPLINE
BY CONSENT**

[State Bar File No. 14-2108]

FILED OCTOBER 13, 2015

A Probable Cause Order was issued May 21, 2015. No formal complaint has been filed. On September 25, 2015, an Agreement for Discipline by Consent (Agreement) was submitted by the parties under Rule 57(a)(3), Ariz. R. Sup. Ct.¹ Upon filing such Agreement, the presiding disciplinary judge, "shall accept, reject or recommend modification of the agreement as appropriate."

Rule 57(a)(2) requires admissions be tendered solely "...in exchange for the stated form of discipline..." Under that rule, the right to an adjudicatory hearing is waived only if the "...conditional admission and proposed form of discipline is approved..." If the agreement is not accepted those conditional admissions are automatically withdrawn and shall not be used against the parties in any subsequent proceeding.

Under Rule 53(b)(3), notice of this Agreement was provided to the complainant(s) by letter dated July 28, 2015. Complainants were notified of the

¹ Unless stated otherwise, all rules referenced are the Arizona Rules of the Supreme Court.

opportunity to file a written objection to the agreement with the State Bar within five (5) days of bar counsel's notice. No objection was received.

In 2013, Ms. Brown represented a client (Mother) in a family law matter. She caused a competing Petition for Paternity, Child Custody, Parenting Time and Child Support to be filed on her client's behalf. The Court consolidated Mother's Petition with Father's Petition and set a settlement conference for September 4, 2013. The night before the conference Ms. Brown met the client at her office and then afterward, went to a restaurant for dinner and drinks. Ms. Brown and the client attended the settlement conference the next day.

After the conference, the client heard what she thought was someone snorting and then observed white resin under Ms. Brown's nose. The client would have testified Ms. Brown asked her if she would "like a line," and days later texted the client, telling her she was in recovery and attends AA (Alcohol Anonymous) and CA (Cocaine Anonymous) meetings. She also texted "I am not trying to defend what I did on Wednesday (at the settlement conference) but I want you to know that I have always had your best interests." Ms. Brown denied using an illegal substance. The client then filed a bar charge.

Ms. Brown conditionally admits she violated Rule 42, ER 1.7(a)(2) (conflict of interest/current clients), ER 8.4(b) (commit a criminal act), and Rule 41(g) (unprofessional conduct) The parties stipulate to a sanction of a six (6) month and one (1) day suspension, two years of probation upon reinstatement with terms and conditions to be determined during reinstatement proceedings, and costs.

The parties agree *Standard 5.12, Failure to Maintain Personal Integrity* applies to Ms. Brown's violation of ER 8.4(b) and provides:

Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in criminal conduct which does not contain the elements listed in *Standard* 5.11 and that seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice.

The parties agree *Standard* 4.32, *Failure to Avoid Conflicts of Interest* applies to Ms. Brown's violation of ER 1.7 and provides:

Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows of a conflict of interest and does not fully disclose to a client the possible effect of that conflict, and causes injury or potential injury to a client.

The presumptive sanction is suspension. The conditional admissions support Ms. Brown knowingly violated her duty to clients, the legal system, the profession and the public. Her misconduct caused potential harm to her client, the legal system and the public, and caused actual harm to the profession. The parties further agree aggravating factor 9.22(k) illegal conduct is present. Mitigating factors include: 9.32(a) absence of prior disciplinary offenses; 9.32(c) personal or emotional problems as reflected in sealed Exhibit 1; and 9.32(l) remorse.

The object of lawyer discipline is to protect the public, the legal profession, the administration of justice, and to deter other attorneys from engaging in unprofessional conduct. *In re Peasley*, 208 Ariz. 27, 38, 90 P.3d 764, 775 (2004). The PDJ agrees the Agreement fulfills the stated purposes of discipline. A suspension of six (6) months and one (1) day protects the public from any future misconduct as Ms. Brown will be required to participate in formal reinstatement proceedings to be reinstated to the practice of law.

Accordingly:

IT IS ORDERED incorporating the Agreement and any supporting documents by this reference. The agreed upon sanctions are: a six (6) month and one (1) day

suspension, two (2) years of probation upon reinstatement, and the payment of the costs and expenses of the disciplinary proceedings totaling \$1,200.00 within thirty (30) days from this Order. These financial obligations shall bear interest at the statutory rate.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED the Agreement is accepted. Costs as submitted are approved for \$1,200.00, and shall be paid within thirty (30) days of the final order. Now therefore, a final judgment and order is signed this date.

DATED this 13th day of October, 2015.

William J. O'Neil

William J. O'Neil, Presiding Disciplinary Judge

Copies of the foregoing mailed/emailed
this 13th day of October, 2015.

Stacy L. Shuman
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Respondent

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Respondent's Counsel

**BEFORE THE PRESIDING DISCIPLINARY
JUDGE**

IN THE MATTER OF A CURRENT MEMBER
OF THE STATE BAR OF ARIZONA,

**CHRISTY C BROWN,
Bar No. 017968**

Respondent.

PDJ 2015

State Bar File Nos. **14-2108**

**AGREEMENT FOR DISCIPLINE BY
CONSENT**

The State Bar of Arizona, through undersigned Bar Counsel, and Respondent, Christy C Brown, who is represented in this matter by counsel, Ralph W Adams, hereby submit their Agreement for Discipline by Consent, pursuant to Rule 57(a), Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. A probable cause order was entered on May 21, 2015, but no formal complaint has been filed in this matter. Respondent voluntarily waives the right to an adjudicatory hearing, unless otherwise ordered, and waives all motions, defenses, objections or requests which have been made or raised, or could be asserted thereafter, if the conditional admission and proposed form of discipline is approved.

Pursuant to Rule 53(b)(3), Ariz. R. Sup. Ct., notice of this agreement was provided to the complainant(s) by letter dated July 28, 2015. Complainant has been notified of the opportunity to file a written objection to the agreement with the State Bar within five (5) business days of bar counsel's notice.

Respondent conditionally admits that her conduct, as set forth below, violated Rule 41(g) and Rule 42, ERs 1.7(a)(2), and 8.4(b). Upon acceptance of this agreement, Respondent agrees to accept imposition of the following discipline: Long-Term Suspension of 6 months and 1 day. A period of suspension of more than six months will require proof of rehabilitation and compliance with other requirements prior to being reinstated to the practice of law in Arizona. Respondent also agrees to pay the costs and expenses of the disciplinary proceeding, within 30 days from the date of this order, and if costs are not paid within the 30 days, interest will begin to accrue at the legal rate.¹ The State Bar's Statement of Costs and Expenses is attached hereto as Exhibit A.

FACTS

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

1. At all times relevant, Respondent was a lawyer licensed to practice law in the state of Arizona having been first admitted to practice in Arizona on May 17, 1997.

¹ Respondent understands that the costs and expenses of the disciplinary proceeding include the costs and expenses of the State Bar of Arizona, the Disciplinary Clerk, the Probable Cause Committee, the Presiding Disciplinary Judge and the Supreme Court of Arizona.

COUNT ONE (File no. 14-2108/ Silvestri)

2. On December 28, 2012, Theodore Young (Father) filed a Petition to Establish Paternity, Child Custody, Parenting Time and Child Support relating to his minor daughter with Complainant, Sophia, with the Maricopa County Superior Court, Case No. FC 2012-054417.

3. On January 15, 2013, Angelina Silvestri (Complainant) retained Respondent to represent her "with respect to paternity proceedings, parenting time, child support, and other related issues against Theodore Andrew Young.

4. On January 18, 2013, Respondent caused a competing Petition for Paternity, Child Custody, Parenting Time and Child Support to be filed on Complainant's behalf in Case No. FC2013-09707, which was subsequently consolidated with Father's Petition.

5. On February 21, 2013, Respondent filed a Notice of Appearance with the Court. This notice was signed by Respondent on February 6th and the certificate of service states that it was filed on that date.

6. The Notice of Appearance in FC2012-054417 was in fact submitted to the Court on February 6, 2013. However, the Clerk would not accept the Notice of Appearance in that case without an initial filing fee until the Court ordered the 2 cases consolidated. Opposing counsel filed the Motion to Consolidate on February 7, 2013 and the Court granted the Order Consolidating the cases on February 21, 2013. Accordingly, that was the date that the Clerk "filed" the Notice of Appearance, even though it had actually been submitted on February 6, 2013.

7. When Complainant filed her Petition against Mr. Young she was unaware that he had already filed a Petition against her as she had not yet been served. When her action was filed (Case No. FC2013-09707) she paid the initial filing fee. When Respondent discovered that the other case had been previously filed, opposing counsel indicated that she would draft and file a Motion to Consolidate requesting Complainant's Petition to serve as the Response in that case and requesting the Court to transfer the filing fee to the prior case.

8. By order dated May 23, 2013, the Court appointed a settlement officer and ordered the parties to attend a settlement conference on Wednesday, September 4, 2013.

9. The night of September 3, 2013, Respondent and Complainant met at Respondent's office to discuss the upcoming settlement conference. After the office conference, they drove to a restaurant for dinner.

10. On September 4, 2013, Complainant met Respondent at her offices before going to the settlement conference. If this matter went to hearing, Complainant would testify that Respondent was late getting to the office and appeared disheveled and that Respondent's nose was clogged up and she claimed to have a cold. Respondent brought chocolate cake with her for breakfast. At hearing, Complainant would testify that Respondent looked like she could have been up all night.

11. By the time Respondent and Complainant arrived at the settlement conference, they were approximately 20 minutes late. Complainant retrieved directions on her iPhone that were different than the directions Respondent

received from Mary McDonald's office staff. Consequently there was some confusion about the directions to the conference. .

12. When they arrived at the settlement conference, Ms. McDonald called counsel into her office and left Complainant and Mr. Young in the lobby area. The attorneys and the mediator participated in settlement discussions in Ms. McDonald's office. Complainant was not in Ms. McDonald's office during the negotiations, she was in the lobby. This occurred all morning. During the several hours that they were at the settlement conference, all attorneys and the parties took breaks to use the restroom. The only time that Complainant and Respondent were in the restroom at the same time was after the settlement conference had concluded.

13. If this matter went to hearing, Complainant would testify that while they were in separate bathroom stalls, Complainant heard "what would sound like someone snorting" an illegal substance, and that she observed Respondent exit the stall and start powdering her nose. Complainant observed white resin under Respondent's nose and confronted her. Respondent denied having used an illegal substance. Complainant looked up her nose and again accused Respondent of using an illegal substance. Respondent admitted having done so. If this matter went to hearing Complainant would testify that Respondent asked Complainant if she would "like a line," and begged Complainant not to fire her.

14. On September 10, 2013, Respondent sent Complainant a text message in which she states that she is in recovery and that she goes to AA (Alcoholics Anonymous) and CA (Cocaine Anonymous) meetings "every day." The text continues:

"That one drink at dinner led to another and then a call to an old friend....I am not trying to defend what I did on Wednesday [at the settlement conference] but I want you to know that I have always had your best interests. I have fought for you and will continue to do so. I had not drank in a very very long time."

15. The text message further continued: "It was not my intent to upset you by my phone call. I have given this thought since [T]hursday. When I get through these doctors appt. (Medical) today I will try to get in to see my psychologist today."

16. On July 3, 2014, Complainant contacted the State Bar and lodged a bar charge against Respondent.

17. On August 26, 2014, Senior Bar Counsel Steve Little contacted Respondent as part of his investigation of the bar charge while it was with the Attorney Consumer Assistance Program. Attorney Little asked Respondent if she had used drugs, which she denied. When Attorney Little told Respondent that he had copies of text messages that suggested that she had used drugs, Respondent denied sending them.

18. Respondent is certain that she sent Complainant text messages, as she text messaged Respondent several times every day. However, Respondent does not remember exactly what all of the texts said. In August 2014 when Respondent saw the text that was written in September 2013, she did not know if that was the exact language she used. Also, Respondent did not see the text messages until several days after she spoke with Steve Little. She never talked to him after that because she retained counsel.

19. Attorney Little called Respondent without prior notice and indicated that an ex-client was making allegations that she was under the influence of drugs in court. He

also said that the ex-client provided him with text messages. The text messages were from a year previous. Respondent recalls that her response to Mr. Little was "no, I don't think so, I don't remember". Respondent's statements to him were made before he emailed Respondent the texts. He then asked "does that sound like something you would write?" Respondent asked him to email the texts. Importantly, Mr. Little's call to Respondent was the same day that she found out that her husband filed for divorce. Understandably, Respondent was distressed and upset during the conversation. Respondent was also surprised because she had no communication from Complainant since May 2014, so when Mr. Little called in August 2014 about her it caught her off guard.

20. By letter dated September 23, 2014, Bar Counsel sent Respondent a screening letter and asked that she respond to the allegations set forth in the bar charge. Among other things, Bar Counsel asked Respondent to confirm whether she had sent Complainant the text messages referenced in ¶¶14-15 *infra*.

21. By letter dated November 5, 2014, Respondent, through counsel, responded to the screening letter. With respect to the text messages and the allegations of drug use, Respondent "upon the advice of counsel, . . . invoke[ed] her constitutional rights pursuant to the Fifth Amendment of the United States[] Constitution." While Respondent did not confirm or deny that she had sent the text messages, Respondent stated that she "no longer has any access to the texts because they were not saved and cannot be retrieved from Sprint."

22. A contested trial was ultimately held on the pending petitions. If this matter were to go to trial, Complainant would testify that after the trial, individuals approached Complainant and her family and asked whether Complainant had been

“properly represented because they believed [Respondent] was under the influence of drugs and unable to streamline the trial and keep her thoughts organized let alone represent and defend [Complainant] in the best light.” However, Respondent would testify at a hearing in this matter that she was successful in the trial achieving all goals of the representation.

CONDITIONAL ADMISSIONS

Respondent’s admissions are being tendered in exchange for the form of discipline stated below and are submitted freely and voluntarily and not as a result of coercion or intimidation.

Respondent conditionally admits that her conduct violated Rule 41(g), which provides that the duties and obligations of members shall be to avoid engaging in unprofessional conduct. The Comment to Rule 41(g) states, in pertinent part, as follows: Lawyers, whether or not engaged in the practice of law, should act honorably and treat others with courtesy and respect. Unprofessional conduct, as defined by Rule 31(a)(2)(E), during the practice of law may result in discipline pursuant to Rules 41(g) and 53(j). Rule 31(a)(2)(E) defines unprofessional conduct as the substantial or repeated violations of the Oath of Admission to the Bar or the Lawyer’s Creed of Professionalism of the State Bar of Arizona. An attorney who takes the Oath of Admissions swears to, among other things, abstain from all offensive conduct and faithfully and diligently adhere to the rules of professional responsibility. The Lawyer’s Creed includes the following promise: “I will comply with the letter and spirit of the disciplinary standards applicable to all lawyers.”

Respondent also conditionally admits that her conduct violated Rule 42, Ariz. R. Sup. Ct., specifically ERs 1.7(a)(2) [Conflict of Interest] [A lawyer shall not

represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of interest exists if there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by a personal interest of the lawyer] and ER 8.4(b) [Misconduct] [It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects].

CONDITIONAL DISMISSALS

For purposes of this Agreement, the parties conditionally agree to dismiss the allegation that Respondent violated ER 8.1(b) because it does not appear that there is clear and convincing evidence that Respondent knowingly made a false statement to Attorney Little regarding sending the text messages to the Complainant.

RESTITUTION

Restitution is not an issue in this matter.

SANCTION

Respondent and the State Bar of Arizona agree that based on the facts and circumstances of this matter, as set forth above, the following sanctions are appropriate: Suspension for 6 months and 1 day.

If Respondent violates any of the terms of this agreement, further discipline proceedings may be brought.

LEGAL GROUNDS IN SUPPORT OF SANCTION

In determining an appropriate sanction, the parties consulted the American Bar Association's *Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (Standards)* pursuant to Rule 57(a)(2)(E). The *Standards* are designed to promote consistency in the imposition of sanctions by identifying relevant factors that courts should consider and then applying

those factors to situations where lawyers have engaged in various types of misconduct. *Standards* 1.3, Commentary. The *Standards* provide guidance with respect to an appropriate sanction in this matter. *In re Peasley*, 208 Ariz. 27, 33, 35, 90 P.3d 764, 770 (2004); *In re Rivkind*, 162 Ariz. 154, 157, 791 P.2d 1037, 1040 (1990).

In determining an appropriate sanction consideration is given to the duty violated, the lawyer's mental state, the actual or potential injury caused by the misconduct and the existence of aggravating and mitigating factors. *Peasley*, 208 Ariz. at 35, 90 P.3d at 772; *Standard* 3.0.

The parties agree that *Standard* 5.12 is the appropriate *Standard* given the facts and circumstances of this matter. *Standard* 5.12 provides that suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in criminal conduct which does not contain the elements listed in *Standard* 5.11 and that seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice.

Standard 4.32 is also appropriate under the facts and circumstances of this matter. *Standard* 4.32 provides that suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows of a conflict of interest and does not fully disclose to a client the possible effect of that conflict, and causes injury or potential injury to a client.

The duty violated

As described above, Respondent's conduct violated her duty to her client, the profession, the legal system and the public.

The lawyer's mental state

For purposes of this agreement the parties agree that Respondent knowingly engaged in the conduct detailed above and that her conduct was in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

The extent of the actual or potential injury

For purposes of this agreement, the parties agree that there was potential harm to the client, legal system and the public, and actual harm to the profession.

Aggravating and mitigating circumstances

The presumptive sanction in this matter is suspension. The parties conditionally agree that the following aggravating and mitigating factors should be considered.

In aggravation:

Standard 9.22(k) illegal conduct. Respondent's use of illegal drugs.

In mitigation:

Standard 9.32(a) absence of prior disciplinary record.

Standard 9.32(c) personal or emotional problems. Contemporaneously herewith, the parties are submitting mitigation evidence with a request that it be sealed.

Standard 9.32(l) remorse. Please see mitigation evidence referenced above.

Discussion

The parties have conditionally agreed that, upon application of the aggravating and mitigating factors to the facts of this case, the presumptive sanction is appropriate.

The parties have conditionally agreed that a greater or lesser sanction would not be appropriate under the facts and circumstances of this matter. This agreement

was based on the following: Respondent has a history of substance abuse problems. The period of suspension will enable her to continue to work to maintain her sobriety and protect the public while she does so.

Based on the *Standards* and in light of the facts and circumstances of this matter, the parties conditionally agree that the sanction set forth above is within the range of appropriate sanction and will serve the purposes of lawyer discipline.

CONCLUSION

The object of lawyer discipline is not to punish the lawyer, but to protect the public, the profession and the administration of justice. *Peasley, supra* at ¶ 64, 90 P.3d at 778. Recognizing that determination of the appropriate sanction is the prerogative of the Presiding Disciplinary Judge, the State Bar and Respondent believe that the objectives of discipline will be met by the imposition of the proposed sanction of Long-Term Suspension of 6 months and 1 day. A period of suspension of more than six months will require proof of rehabilitation and compliance with other requirements prior to being reinstated to the practice of law in Arizona and the imposition of costs and expenses. A proposed form order is attached hereto as Exhibit B.

DATED this 24th day of September 2015


STATE BAR OF ARIZONA



Stacy L Shuman
Staff Bar Counsel


This agreement, with conditional admissions, is submitted freely and voluntarily and not under coercion or intimidation. I acknowledge my duty under the Rules of the Supreme Court with respect to discipline and reinstatement. I understand these duties may include notification of clients, return of property and other rules pertaining to suspension.

DATED this 27 day of September, 2015.



Christy C Brown
Respondent

DATED this 24th day of September, 2015.

Adams & Clark PC


Ralph W Adams
Counsel for Respondent

Approved as to form and content

Maret Vessella
Chief Bar Counsel

This agreement, with conditional admissions, is submitted freely and voluntarily and not under coercion or intimidation. I acknowledge my duty under the Rules of the Supreme Court with respect to discipline and reinstatement. I understand these duties may include notification of clients, return of property and other rules pertaining to suspension.

DATED this _____ day of September, 2015.

Christy C Brown
Respondent

DATED this _____ day of September, 2015.

Adams & Clark PC

Ralph W Adams
Counsel for Respondent

Approved as to form and content


Maret Vessella
Chief Bar Counsel

Original filed with the Disciplinary Clerk of
the Office of the Presiding Disciplinary Judge
of the Supreme Court of Arizona
this 25th day of September 2015.

Copies of the foregoing mailed/emailed
this 25th day of September 2015 to:

Ralph W Adams
Adams & Clark PC
520 E Portland St
Phoenix, AZ 85004-1843
ralph@adamsclark.com
Respondent's Counsel

Copy of the foregoing emailed
this 25th day of September, 2015, to:

William J. O'Neil
Presiding Disciplinary Judge
Supreme Court of Arizona
Email: officepdj@courts.az.gov

Copy of the foregoing hand-delivered
this 25th day of September, 2015, to:

Lawyer Regulation Records Manager
State Bar of Arizona
4201 North 24th Street, Suite 100
Phoenix, Arizona 85016-6266

by:



SLS: SAB

EXHIBIT A

Statement of Costs and Expenses

In the Matter of a Member of the State Bar of Arizona,
Christy C. Brown, Bar No. 017968, Respondent

File No. 14-2108

Administrative Expenses

The Supreme Court of Arizona has adopted a schedule of administrative expenses to be assessed in lawyer discipline. If the number of charges/complainants exceeds five, the assessment for the general administrative expenses shall increase by 20% for each additional charge/complainant where a violation is admitted or proven.

Factors considered in the administrative expense are time expended by staff bar counsel, paralegal, secretaries, typists, file clerks and messenger; and normal postage charges, telephone costs, office supplies and all similar factors generally attributed to office overhead. As a matter of course, administrative costs will increase based on the length of time it takes a matter to proceed through the adjudication process.

General Administrative Expenses for above-numbered proceedings

\$1,200.00

Additional costs incurred by the State Bar of Arizona in the processing of this disciplinary matter, and not included in administrative expenses, are itemized below.

Staff Investigator/Miscellaneous Charges

Total for staff investigator charges \$ 0.00

TOTAL COSTS AND EXPENSES INCURRED \$1,200.00



Sandra E. Montoya
Lawyer Regulation Records Manager

7-31-15

Date

EXHIBIT B

**BEFORE THE PRESIDING DISCIPLINARY
JUDGE**

**IN THE MATTER OF A MEMBER OF
THE STATE BAR OF ARIZONA,**

**Christy C Brown,
Bar No. 017968,**

Respondent.

PDJ

FINAL JUDGMENT AND ORDER

[State Bar No. 14-2108]

The undersigned Presiding Disciplinary Judge of the Supreme Court of Arizona, having reviewed the Agreement for Discipline by Consent filed on _____, pursuant to Rule 57(a), Ariz. R. Sup. Ct., hereby accepts the parties' proposed agreement. Accordingly:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Respondent, **Christy C. Brown**, is hereby suspended for a period of six (6) months and one (1) day. A period of suspension of more than six (6) months will require proof of rehabilitation and compliance with other requirements prior to being reinstated to the practice of law in Arizona for his or her conduct in violation of the Arizona Rules of Professional Conduct, as outlined in the consent documents, effective thirty (30) days from the date of this order or _____.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, upon reinstatement, Respondent shall be placed on probation for a period of two (2) years and shall be subject to any terms as are deemed appropriate by the Hearing Panel at that time.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent shall be subject to any additional terms imposed by the Presiding Disciplinary Judge as a result of reinstatement hearings held.

NON-COMPLIANCE LANGUAGE

In the event that Respondent fails to comply with any of the foregoing probation terms, and information thereof, is received by the State Bar of Arizona, Bar Counsel shall file a notice of noncompliance with the Presiding Disciplinary Judge, pursuant to Rule 60(a)(5), Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. The Presiding Disciplinary Judge may conduct a hearing within thirty (30) days to determine whether a term of probation has been breached and, if so, to recommend an appropriate sanction. If there is an allegation that Respondent failed to comply with any of the foregoing terms, the burden of proof shall be on the State Bar of Arizona to prove noncompliance by a preponderance of the evidence.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to Rule 72 Ariz. R. Sup. Ct., Respondent shall immediately comply with the requirements relating to notification of clients and others.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent pay the costs and expenses of the State Bar of Arizona in the amount of \$ _____, within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this Order.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent shall pay the costs and expenses incurred by the disciplinary clerk and/or Presiding Disciplinary Judge's Office in connection with these disciplinary proceedings in the amount of _____, within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this Order.

DATED this _____ day of September, 2015.

**William J. O'Neil, Presiding Disciplinary
Judge**

Original filed with the Disciplinary Clerk of
the Office of the Presiding Disciplinary Judge
of the Supreme Court of Arizona
this _____ day of September, 2015.

Copies of the foregoing mailed/mailed
this _____ day of September, 2015.

Ralph W. Adams
Adams & Clark, PC
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Phoenix, Arizona 85004-1843
Email: ralph@adamsclark.com
Respondent's Counsel

Copy of the foregoing emailed/hand-delivered
this _____ day of September, 2015, to:

Stacy L. Shuman
Staff Bar Counsel
State Bar of Arizona
4201 N. 24th Street, Suite 100
Phoenix, Arizona 85016-6266
Email: LRO@staff.azbar.org

Copy of the foregoing hand-delivered
this _____ day of September, 2015, to:

Lawyer Regulation Records Manager
State Bar of Arizona
4201 N 24th Street, Suite 100
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by: _____