Ensuring Secure, Open, and Publicly Accessible Courts

Report and Recommendations of the Court Security Standards Committee, November 2016
# Table of Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................................1
  Creation and Charge of Committee ..............................................................................1
  Abbreviated Committee Recommendations ....................................................................2

INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................3
  Court Security Today .......................................................................................................3

COURT SECURITY SURVEY ...............................................................................................5
  Survey Methodology .........................................................................................................5
  Survey Development & Testing .........................................................................................6
  Summary of Survey Results ..............................................................................................6

COURT SECURITY STANDARDS .........................................................................................9
  Preamble ............................................................................................................................9
  Proposed Court Security Standards ................................................................................10
    Governance and Administration ......................................................................................10
    Entryway Screening .......................................................................................................14
    In-Custody Defendants .................................................................................................17
    Facilities, Alarms, and Equipment ................................................................................18
    Training ..........................................................................................................................20

RELATED RECOMMENDATIONS .......................................................................................24

GLOSSARY ..........................................................................................................................26

Appendix A: Phased Implementation Structure .................................................................28
Appendix B: Illustration of Entryway Screening Requirements Based on Court Activity Level ...........................................................................................................29
Appendix C: List of Resources ..........................................................................................30
Appendix D: Sample Emails from Court Security Survey Distribution ..............................32
Appendix E: Arizona Court Security Survey ......................................................................34
Ensuring Secure, Open, and Publicly Accessible Courts
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Creation and Charge of Committee

On November 25, 2015, Chief Justice Scott Bales issued Administrative Order 2015-104 establishing the Court Security Standards Committee. The administrative order directed the committee to: (a) develop and conduct a survey of court security measures in Arizona, (b) develop recommendations on standards for courthouse and courtroom security, and (c) develop recommendations on security officer training. The administrative order further directed the committee to file a final report and make recommendations to the Arizona Judicial Council (AJC) in 2016. The Arizona Judicial Branch’s strategic agenda, Advancing Justice Together, specifically calls for the charge of the committee in Goal 3, Improving Court Processes to Better Serve the Public.

National Center for State Courts (NCSC) consultants Timothy Fautsko, Steven Berson, and Kent Kelley assisted the committee in its work. Based on Mr. Fautsko’s recommendations, the committee established four (4) work-groups: perimeter, courthouse, courtroom, and training. Work group division was based, in part, on data reflecting where security incidents occurred in relation to the courthouse as demonstrated in Status of Court Security in State
Ensuring Secure, Open, and Publicly Accessible Courts

Court Work-groups were essential for digesting large amounts of information related to court security measures and best practices as well as creating initial drafts of survey questions and the standards themselves. The report that follows consists of 30 court security standards and additional recommendations related to implementation of those security standards, supporting structures to ensure continuous court security improvement, and funding proposals for the AJC’s review and consideration.

Abbreviated Committee Recommendations

The committee has proposed court security standards and additional recommendations that are set forth in detail in the body of the committee’s final report. The standards and recommendations not only reflect the committee’s work, but take into consideration the valuable feedback received from individual judicial officers, court administrators, and clerks of court, as well as many of the judiciary’s standing committees. The following is an abbreviated list of the standards and recommendations.

✓ Adopt the proposed court security standards as mandatory standards for Arizona courts with a three-year phased implementation period. (See Appendix A.) Standards involving creation of court security committees, security self-assessments, policy creation, and planning would be the focus of the first phase; improving or enhancing court security measures would be the focus of the second phase; and acquiring court security personnel and implementing entryway screening would be the third phase.

✓ The standards address the following:

  o Governance and administration of court security, including developing policies and procedures, court security committees, security risk-assessments, and short-term and long-term planning;

  o Entryway screening based on court activity levels, specifically that courts be categorized into one of three tiers that will determine the entryway screening requirements for that court (See Appendix B);

  o Equipment, including items such as metal detectors, duress alarms, and video cameras;

  o Protocols for prisoner transport and remand of litigants into custody;

1 Timothy Fautsko, Steven V. Berson, & Steven K. Swensen, Status of Court Security in State Courts: A National Perspective (June 2013).
Ensuring Secure, Open, and Publicly Accessible Courts

- Facilities and courtroom security measures such as fortified benches, public service counter barriers, locking door protocols, window coverings, and courtroom sweeps;
- Perimeter security such as lighting, signage, and protection of critical areas;
- Training for judges, court personnel, and court security officers.

- Develop an exemption process allowing courts with a security improvement plan and demonstrating extenuating circumstances to defer implementation of standards to a time certain.
- Establish a statewide security fund available to local courts for one-time outlays for security equipment and security system improvements.
- Provide dedicated state-level Administrative Office of Courts (AOC) staff support for coordination of court security assessments, technical assistance, court security incident reporting, and statewide training.
- Include a mechanism for assessing court compliance with the proposed court security standards, particularly standards related to training, certification requirements, and testing of equipment.
- Establish a statewide standing committee on court security and emergency preparedness to promote timely implementation of the proposed court security standards and statewide continuous improvement of court security.

INTRODUCTION

Court Security Today

Increasingly, court security is a significant issue faced by every judicial branch in the United States. A March 11, 2005, security incident at the Fulton County Courthouse in Atlanta, Georgia, resulted in the deaths of a judge and a court reporter, shot in a courtroom, and the deaths of a sheriff’s deputy and a U.S. Customs agent after the inmate fled the courthouse. That incident is often
Ensuring Secure, Open, and Publicly Accessible Courts

Cited as the turning point for state courts and the issue of court security. However, ten years later, national and local data reflect not only an increase in security threats and violent incidents but also reflect that there continues to be limited funding available from state and local governments for security staffing, security plans, and security equipment. Tragically, even as this committee was working toward its recommendations and drafting this report, the Superior Court of Navajo County in Holbrook, Arizona, experienced a shooting incident in front of the courthouse that left two family court litigants dead and one other injured.

In 2013, incident data gathered by the Center for Judicial and Executive Security (CJES) reflected, “the number of security threats and violent incidents in court buildings has increased dramatically in recent years.” The CJES Court-Targeted Acts of Violence (CTAV) study also examined where incidents took place. A subset of that data focusing on location of incidents from 2005 to 2012 revealed that the location of most incidents coincides with the locations where adverse parties and victims are co-located.

The Status of Court Security, an NCSC report, included national and local data from 225 court security assessment reports, data on security incidents gathered by CJES, a comprehensive web survey of state, local, tribal, and territorial courts, and a telephonic survey of court security directors. The report ultimately recommended the following future directions to improve court security in the United States:

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4 Fautsko, Status of Court Security In State Courts, A National Perspective, Figure 4-2, pp. 4-6.
1. Accepting the challenge that doing nothing is not an option;
2. Understanding that local, state, regional, and national communication and collaboration are key for success;
3. Providing additional funding to improve staffing and equipment is essential; and
4. Coordinating and supporting state court security programs is a definite need that must be answered.\(^5\)

National studies and reports are not the only source of information and data related to the state of court security. Increasingly, state judiciaries and local courts are conducting security assessments, convening court security committees to study court security needs at the local level, and addressing funding needs associated with increased court security. One need only to peruse the internet to see examples of court security standards implemented by state and local courts around the country, news reports of security incidents, and information on the continued issue of lack of funding to provide adequate security staff and security equipment. It is against this backdrop that the Arizona Supreme Court’s Court Security Standards Committee was created and against which it conducted its work.

**COURT SECURITY SURVEY**

**Survey Methodology**

The committee—charged with developing and conducting a survey—focused on two question types. The first assessed what security measures were in place in Arizona courts and the second asked how those surveyed felt about those security measures. Arizona’s significant differences in population county to county necessitated demographic questions that allowed analysis of data based on court type, population center, and whether a court was located in a single-use or multi-use site. Analyzing response data against demographic data also provided the committee the opportunity to analyze the potential impact of proposed standards on courts.

The survey was distributed to all court levels in the Arizona judiciary: appellate, superior, justice, and municipal courts. The audience for the survey included judges and other judicial

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**COURT SECURITY SURVEY • 5**
Ensuring Secure, Open, and Publicly Accessible Courts

officers, court administrators, clerks of court and office staff, chief probation officers, and court security personnel and law enforcement.

Survey’s were sent via email using a pre-survey email, a follow-up email 24 hours later containing the link to the survey, and a reminder email 48 hours before the survey closed. Presiding judges, court administrators, clerk of court, and chief probation officers were asked to distribute the survey. Examples of survey distribution emails are located in Appendix D.

Survey Development & Testing

Survey development involved a three-prong approach. First, committee members received and reviewed a number of resources to aid in determining what should be covered by the survey. (See Appendix C.) Second, the work groups developed lists of topics and specific security measures to assess in the survey. Third, committee staff developed a list of survey questions and NCSC staff developed a draft survey. Several rounds of drafting and editing occurred before the committee determined the survey was ready for testing. After testing and additional revisions, the survey was approved for distribution. (See Appendix E for survey.)

Summary of Survey Results*

The survey was opened by 929 recipients and completed by 830 respondents with partial replies of varying lengths. The number of respondents roughly corresponded to the relative population of each individual county. Every county provided at least seven (7) responses, resulting in representative data. Nearly 20% of respondents were judges, while 8% of respondents were court administrators. More than 800 respondents worked in courts where security was provided by court employed court security or law enforcement officers. Approximately 32% of

6 Unless otherwise specified, all references to data and survey results are from the Arizona Court Security Survey conducted by the Court Security Standards Committee in 2016. See Appendix E for survey.

COURT SECURITY SURVEY • 6
respondents worked in courts where security was provided by a private security company and approximately 8.5% of respondents worked in courts with no security at all.

The community of respondents agreed that every proposed security measure included in the survey was either extremely important or very important. The category “unimportant” was never used by more than 2.4% of respondents regardless of the security measure proposed.

Although survey data revealed that respondents agreed on the importance of security measures in the court, it also demonstrated that a high rate of respondents “did not know” if those security measures were in place at their courts. One exception was to respondent’s knowledge of entryway screening. Although analysis of the data on entryway screening for the public demonstrated some type of metal detection device was used in courts where 85.5% of respondents worked, respondents working in rural courts (population 5,001 to 25,000) were the least likely to have any type of entryway screening (52.2% no metal detector; 65.7% no x-ray screening).

Survey data was used to evaluate the impact of each standard on courts, including fiscal impact, architectural considerations, and whether the proposed standard would deter, detect, or otherwise reduce the most likely of security threats and incidents. The committee also used the data on court employees’ knowledge base in drafting its recommended standards on security training. Survey results for the question on whether respondents had been trained in the prior 18 months on various security measure and topics revealed that for most of the topics listed, less than 50% of respondents had received any security training. This data was not surprising in light of the percentage of “don’t know” responses to many of the questions on whether security measures were in place in the respondents’ court. However, during the time covered by the training related questions, the AOC had instituted a required cyber security training as part of annual COJET training requirements and had recently disseminated an online active shooter training, also COJET credit approved. That 71.74% of respondents had completed the cyber
security training and 52.81% of respondents completed the active shooter training indicates the importance of mandatory training requirements.

Comparison of population data to several common security measures revealed that certain security measures are present in the majority of courts, regardless of population or type of court:

- alarmed doors at entrances and exits,
- security cameras in publicly accessible areas,
- protective barriers at public transaction counters,
- employee offices can be locked from the inside,
- posted notice that firearms are prohibited, and
- assigned security personnel for transport and control of in-custody defendants.

Regardless of location or court type, the majority of court employees lack awareness of the following security measures, or their court lacks the following security measures:

- sheltering in place policies or procedures,
- lockdown policies and procedures,
- evacuation route information and procedures,
- regular sweeps of courtrooms,
- barriers to protect against vehicular assaults on the court building,
- bullet-resistant covering on windows and doors, and
- bullet-resistant materials at courtroom benches or courtroom clerk stations.

Additional supporting data is included in the section of the report that contains the proposed court security standards.
COURT SECURITY STANDARDS

Preamble

Through its research and discussion, the committee concluded that court security could be maintained only through an ongoing process of continuous improvement. (See Figure 1.8) For a comprehensive approach, oversight of court security should also include business continuity planning and encompass emergency preparedness.

Proposed Standard 1 calls for the formation of standing local and county court security and emergency preparedness committees9 (“SEPC”). Composed of representatives of the court, law enforcement, first responders, and other stakeholders, these committees provide policy direction and planning recommendations on all facets of court security and emergency preparedness.

Specifically, as envisioned, the SEPCs conduct risk assessments, develop policies and procedures, establish deterrence measures, and conduct debriefing of security incidents in three interrelated spheres: (1) court operations, (2) facilities and equipment, and (3) training and communication. The efficacy of security policies and practices should be evaluated through periodic drills and audits. This ongoing process will provide SEPCs and judicial leadership with valuable feedback and actionable recommendations to maximize court security.

9 Security committees are the number one foundational item in the National Center for State Courts. See, Nathan W. Hall, et. al. Steps to Best Practices for Court Building Security, p. 3-7 (2016).
Proposed Court Security Standards

Several of the proposed court security standards include comments providing explanatory information, exceptions to the standard, or other important recommendations. The standards may also include reference to survey data from the Arizona Court Security Survey or reference to other resources in support of the proposed standard. Appendices A and B demonstrate phased implementation and entryway screening requirements based on court activity level.

Governance and Administration

1. Court Security and Emergency Preparedness Committees. The presiding judge of the county must establish a court security and emergency preparedness committee (county SEPC) chaired by the presiding judge of the county or a designee.\textsuperscript{10} The county SEPC shall consist of a representative cross-section of each local SEPC in the county. The presiding judge may appoint other members as deemed necessary. The committee shall meet at least twice a year.

The function of each county SEPC includes, but is not limited to, setting goals for implementation of the court security standards, review of local court security plans and self-

\textsuperscript{10} See AO-2005-32, Presiding Judges Authority (establishing duties over court security and facilities).
assessments, coordination of security needs countywide, and ensuring continuous court security improvement.

Additionally, each court building or court complex shall have a court security and emergency preparedness committee (local SEPC) that meets at least quarterly. The chairperson of the local SEPC shall be the presiding judge of the court or a designee and the chairperson shall appoint members of the local SEPC. Local SEPCs shall include at least one representative from law enforcement and a first responder. Local SEPCs shall meet at least quarterly.

The functions of each local SEPC include, but are not limited to, implementation of court security standards adopted by the Arizona Supreme Court within each court building or court complex; development and allocation of resources necessary for security needs; and coordination of security self-assessments, security drills, and testing of security equipment.

**Comment:** The committee recognizes that the make-up of SEPCs should be based on the needs of the varied geographical size and population of each county as well as the structure of each county’s court system. Survey results indicate 57.8% of respondent court employees work in courts co-located in buildings with other agencies or entities. The likelihood that a security incident would impact other agencies or entities co-located with a court is therefore relatively high. The role other agencies or businesses may play in court safety and security is an important aspect of security and emergency preparedness planning that requires inclusion of representatives from those other agencies or entities. Therefore, the committee highly recommends that courts co-located in spaces with other agencies or businesses include a representative of those other agencies or businesses on the local SEPC.

"A court building security committee, meeting regularly and empowered to exercise oversight and sustain matters related to security within the court building, is a prerequisite to enable the court and its stakeholders to properly assess and address the myriad of security challenges facing court and stakeholder leadership."
- Hall, *Steps to Best Practices for Court Building Security*

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11 First Responders as used here refers to medical and emergency personnel such as fire, rescue, or paramedic.
2. Court Security Manual. The Arizona AOC shall develop and promulgate a court security manual addressing the basic tenets of court safety and security. The manual shall include court security standards, security assessment tools, security incident and threat reporting forms, personal security tips for judges and court personnel, and templates for written policies on evacuations, hostage situations, sheltering in place, and bomb threats. The manual should also include practical tools, checklists, and templates for use by local courts. Each court shall add additional security related information unique to the needs and security plans of the court.\textsuperscript{12}

Comment: Because 57.8% of respondents work in courts co-located in buildings with other agencies or entities, the committee recommends courts invite those co-located in the building to participate in security manual training or receive a copy of the manual as appropriate.

3. Court Security Self-Assessment. Courts shall conduct a court security self-assessment at least every three years.\textsuperscript{13} The local SEPC shall conduct the self-assessment using a security assessment template or checklist and summarize the assessment in a report.\textsuperscript{14} However, court security assessments may be conducted by an outside team with members who have knowledge of court security best practices or who are not employed by the court being assessed. Reports of court security self-assessments shall be shared with local and county SEPCs for use in developing plans for security improvement and for resource justification.

Recommendation: The committee recommends that a court security coordinator be hired within the AOC that would coordinate or assist in court security self-assessments and assessment reports.\textsuperscript{15}

\begin{itemize}
  \item Nearly 61\% of respondents worked in courts with written court security policies and procedures and approximately 97\% of respondents indicated written policies and procedures were important, very important, or extremely important.
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{12} Security manuals shall not be open to the public per Rule 123(e)(4), Arizona Rules of Supreme Court.
\textsuperscript{13} Security assessments and security assessment reports shall not be open to the public per Rule 123(e)(4), Arizona Rules of Supreme Court.
\textsuperscript{14} See Court Security Guide, 2005, pp. 6-8, National Association for Court Management. Committee members reviewed the detailed Court Security Assessment tool and report template used by the Superior Court in Pima County.
\textsuperscript{15} See Related Recommendations section of this report.
4. Response to a Negative Event.\(^\text{16}\) Court staff shall have a way to report negative events. Each court shall have access to an emergency phone number or access and contact information for a control center operated by law enforcement. Courts shall develop policies related to reporting negative events and shall train employees on those policies.

> Threat and incident reporting is of paramount importance to the safety of judges, court employees, and the public who visit the court building.

5. Incident and Threat Reporting.\(^\text{17}\) The court administrator, lead clerk, or a designee shall report all significant threats made against a court, a judge, or a court employee and all significant incidents that occur within the courthouse or its perimeter. The AOC shall establish a process for reporting incidents and threats and shall develop guidelines for defining criteria for what is a major incident or significant threat.

Recommendation: The committee recommends two levels of incident reporting: (a) contemporaneous reporting of significant security threats and incidents to the AOC and to employees and stakeholders to be defined by the AOC, and (b) annual reporting of security incident data by courthouse. Information from the first type of incident report shall be securely shared in real time.\(^\text{18}\) The second form of incident reporting should include reports to local and county SEPCs and the AOC.\(^\text{19}\)

The second type of report should serve as a basis for determining areas for security improvement and should provide resource and funding request justification from local funding authorities. Moreover, these reports should be required as part of funding requests for monies from the statewide court security fund. This standard follows the national best practice of maintaining records of all threats and incidents for use in local decision-making related to security measures and funding.\(^\text{20}\)

\(^{16}\) See the Glossary for definition of ‘negative event’.

\(^{17}\) See the Glossary for definition of ‘incident’, ‘threat’, and ‘significant threat’.

\(^{18}\) The committee recommends use of a tiered alert system as used by many government agencies and colleges around the country for alerting those in need of emergency alert information.

\(^{19}\) Incident and threat reports are not open to the public per Rule 123(e)(4), Arizona Rules of the Supreme Court.

Entryway Screening


(a) Entrances. Each court shall establish one main entrance through which the public can enter the court building. Additional entryways for the public are allowed if the additional entryways are staffed and use entryway screening of at least one hand held metal detector (magnetometer). Additional entrances may be established to comply with Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) standards; however, appropriate screening of individuals using such entrances is required.

(b) Screening Devices. Based upon court activity levels, courts will be categorized into one of three tiers, which will determine the level of entryway screening of visitors to the courthouse, using walk through, or handheld metal detectors (magnetometers). (See Appendix B.) Courts that will not be required to have entryway screening due to low court activity levels shall establish policy and procedure for screening during a high conflict or high-risk event. Courts may also choose to use x-ray (fluoroscope) machines in conjunction with metal detector screening.

Courts that do not have a walk through or handheld metal detector at the time these standards are initially adopted shall obtain at least one hand held device for use in the event of a high risk event\textsuperscript{21} until such time as the entryway screening protocol based on the courts activity level can be accomplished. Entryway screening shall be by trained court security personnel or law enforcement.

(c) Prohibited Item Signage. Each court building shall have signage posted at each entrance stating that all persons are subject to search by security personnel and that firearms and dangerous weapons are prohibited pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-3102 (2016). Each court shall provide secure lockers at the entryway for storage of firearms pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-3102.01.\textsuperscript{22} Law

\textsuperscript{21} ‘High risk event’ is defined in the Glossary.

enforcement who come to the court for personal business\textsuperscript{23} rather than professional business shall be required to store their firearms in secure lockers the same as other persons.\textsuperscript{24} (See Standard 8, Armed Court Personnel in Courthouses for when law enforcement may carry a firearm in a court building.)

(d) Screening Device Training and Calibration. Court personnel or security personnel who conduct entryway screening shall be trained and receive refresher training on the operation of the devices that they use. Each court shall ensure that regular calibration and testing of metal detectors and x-ray machines occur.

\begin{quote}
Eighty-two percent of respondents work in courts where there is posted signage indicating firearms are prohibited in the court.
\end{quote}

(e) Prohibited items. Courts shall develop a list of items prohibited in the court building.\textsuperscript{25} The list shall be a part of the local materials in the court security manual and all employees shall be trained on what are prohibited items.

Policies and procedures shall be developed for the confiscation, handling, and disposition of prohibited items found during entryway screening.\textsuperscript{26} Courts shall track the types and amount of contraband detected through screening and maintain monthly reports reflecting that information.

Comment: The committee recommends the AOC develop a list of standard prohibited items that courts should include as a minimum standard in local administrative orders and policies. This list should be part of the tools available in the court security manual for use by local courts.

\textsuperscript{23} E.g. party to a legal matter, witness in a legal proceeding in a capacity other than official law enforcement duties, or an observer of a legal proceeding where not involved in an official law enforcement capacity.

\textsuperscript{24} See Arizona Supreme Court AO 2005-32 and A.R.S. § 38-1113(C)(2) et. seq. (current through 2016).

\textsuperscript{25} See Arizona Supreme Court AO 2005-32 establishing authority for presiding judge of county over court security including prohibiting or regulating possession of weapons of potential weapons in the court; e.g. Superior Court for Pima County AO 2014-05 list of items prohibited in the Superior Court of Pima County; Arizona Supreme Court AO 1998-0008, list of prohibited items in the Arizona Supreme Court

\textsuperscript{26} Such policies and procedures shall be in accord with A.R.S. § 12-941 on the disposal of unclaimed property.
7. Court Employee Screening. In jurisdictions that do not conduct full entryway screening of all employees, each court must develop a policy on, and randomly carry out, court employee screening upon entry to the courthouse.

Comment: Unfortunately workplace violence is all too common. It is the risk of workplace violence that can be mitigated through periodic employee screening for prohibited items.

8. Armed Court Personnel in Courthouses. The presiding judge of the county shall determine whether court security officers may carry firearms in the courthouse for the purpose of maintaining court security.27 Required training as approved and provided by the AOC must be completed prior to actively carrying a firearm in the courthouse.28 Contract security guards with valid armed guard cards shall have six months to complete AOC training. Moreover, courts with armed court security shall develop protocols for court security officer involved shootings.29

Presiding judges of the county shall establish written policies on the carrying of firearms for personal safety by judicial officers or other court staff. Specifically, the policy shall address the following points: who may carry a firearm, the process for registering or otherwise notifying the court and court security of the status of being armed, the process for confirming training requirements, type of firearm and ammunition that can be carried, and the conformance with all applicable state and local statutes and ordinances.30 Additionally, until such time as AOC adopts firearm training standards, judges or other court staff authorized to carry firearms shall meet the requirements of A.R.S. § 13-3102(D).

Comment: The committee recommends that courts adopt a policy prohibiting law enforcement officers from carrying firearms in the courthouse unless the officers are appearing for official

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28 This training requirement does not apply to law enforcement meeting the training requirements of A.R.S. § 38-1113 (current through 2016) or sheriff’s officers who are present pursuant to A.R.S. § 11-411 (current through 2016).
29 The existing use of force code section for armed probation officers would be an example of a comprehensive use of force policy. See ACJA § 6-112.
business, providing court security, or responding to an emergency.\textsuperscript{31} The committee further recommends all law enforcement officers who are allowed to carry firearms in the courthouse be required to sign in and record the purpose for the officers presence at the court and the courtroom(s) in which the officer has business. This sign in process allows court security to be aware of the officers’ location in the courthouse and the official purpose for which they are present. As a general guiding principal, in policy formulation, law enforcement officers should not be permitted to carry weapons in the courthouse when they are present for personal business or in a personal capacity, such as a party to a case or witness or observer to a case where they were not acting in an official law enforcement capacity.\textsuperscript{32}

\textbf{In-Custody Defendants}

\textit{9. Entrance for In-Custody Defendants.} Courts shall ensure in-custody defendants are brought into and leave the court building through an entrance separated from any public entrance to the courthouse.

\textbf{Comment:} Courts that cannot meet this standard because of the architectural construction of a building shall have written procedures for ensuring that in-custody defendants are segregated from the public when entering and exiting the court to ensure the safety of all.

\begin{quote}
Eighty-one percent of respondents work in courts that currently have an entrance for in-custody defendants that is separate from the public entrance(s). Ninety-three percent of respondents found this security measure to be extremely or very important.
\end{quote}

\textit{10. In-Custody Defendants; Transport and Control.} In-custody defendants must be transported, controlled, and monitored at all times by appropriately trained court security personnel or law enforcement officer(s).

\textsuperscript{31} See A.R.S. § 38-1113(C)(2) et. seq. (authority to prohibit officers from carrying firearm unless appearing in official capacity or providing security or responding to an emergency).

\textsuperscript{32} See A.R.S. § 38-1113(C)(2) et. seq.; Arizona Supreme Court AO 2005-32.
11. In-Custody Defendants; Protocols for Taking Individuals into Custody. Courts shall have written protocols for taking individuals into custody and securing individuals into custody for transport to a detention facility. Courts should make every effort to alert security personnel or law enforcement responsible for transporting detainees in advance if it is anticipated a litigant will be taken into the immediate custody of a county jail or correctional facility, or otherwise taken into custody.

Facilities, Alarms, and Equipment

12. Duress Alarms.

(a) At Public Transaction Counters. Courts are required to have at least one active and monitored duress alarm “panic button” behind each public transaction counter.

(b) In the Courtroom. Courts are required to have active and monitored duress alarm “panic buttons” at the judges’ or other judicial officers’ benches and at the courtroom clerks’ stations.

(c) Training on and Testing of Duress Alarms. The court administrator, lead clerk, or a designee shall physically show all employees working in a court building the location of duress alarm “panic buttons” and how and when to use them. The court administrator, lead clerk, or a designee shall ensure testing of duress alarm systems occurs at least quarterly and that such testing is documented. Reports of duress alarm system testing shall be reported to local and county SEPCs.
13. **Locking Protocols.**

(a) **Locked Courtrooms.** Courts shall keep public doors to courtrooms locked at all times when a courtroom is not in use. Courts shall install or obtain a type of locking mechanism that will allow the courtroom and judicial chambers to be locked from the inside to allow for the ability to shelter in place, but will also allow emergency exit, such as crash bars, one way door handles, alarmed doors, or remote locks.

(b) **Locked Jury Deliberation Rooms.** Courts shall keep jury deliberation rooms locked when not in use, unless jury deliberation rooms are behind secured areas.

14. **Courtroom, Jury Room, and Perimeter Sweeps.** Court security, bailiffs, or designees of the presiding judge or court administrator, shall ensure sweeps of courtrooms, hearing rooms, jury deliberation rooms, and the perimeter of the court building are conducted at least daily. Reports of these sweeps shall be maintained.

15. **Secured Access to Non-Public Areas.** Areas of the court not open to the public shall be electronically card-key or hard-key controlled. The court administrator, the lead clerk, or a designee shall ensure that doors remain locked at all times and are not propped open.

16. **Security Cameras.** Courts shall have video cameras in areas including, but not limited to, entryways and common public areas. Security camera systems shall be equipped with recording capability.

> Eighty-eight percent of respondents work in courts with exterior lighting, and the response was uniform across population and court type. However, only 38% of courts have barriers or other materials to protect court building from attack by vehicular assault.

17. **Exterior Lighting.** Each court location shall have exterior lighting at building entrances and exits.

Comment: The committee recommends that where a court facility includes parking areas, such parking areas also have exterior lighting.

18. **Protection of Critical Locations.** Courts shall prevent unauthorized vehicular access to critical areas with obstacles such as, but not limited to, bollards or natural landscapes.
Ensuring Secure, Open, and Publicly Accessible Courts

Comment: Courts that cannot meet this standard because of the architectural construction of a building shall have written procedures for ensuring monitoring of areas where vehicle accessibility is within close proximity to the building.

19. Window Coverings. Court windows shall have coverings to prevent views from the outside into the court building. Window coverings must allow visibility from inside to the outside.

20. Creation of Barriers at Public Transaction Counters. Clerk transaction counters and public service windows shall have a barrier between the public customers and court staff. The type and manner of barrier shall be a local decision, based upon evaluation of each courts’ design and operations.

21. Bullet-Resistant Material in Courtrooms. Courtroom benches and staff work areas in courtrooms shall be reinforced with bullet-resistant material.

22. Data Centers and Electronic Equipment. Courts with computer data centers shall have separate, secure electronic key-card or hard-key controlled, limited access areas for computer data centers, network equipment, video recording systems, and other critical electronic equipment. Courts shall maintain disaster recovery “hot sites” pursuant to ACJA § 1-507.

Training

23. New Hire Security Training Requirements. All court employees, including judges, shall participate in and complete, whether in person or online, a course in court security. That course should address general security principals, the court security manual, personal safety on the job, emergency preparedness including what to do in a negative event, evacuation routes, and sheltering in place protocols.³³

“Every single person who works on a court building has the potential to materially enhance the safety and security of his or her work environment, to be the “eyes and ears” of a workforce constantly alert to risks and threats. Judges and court staff that have been well trained on well-publicized policies and procedures provide the best means for this eyes and ears function to be effectively discharged.”

³³ The committee notes ACJA § 1-302(J)(2) requires new hire orientation for all staff within 90 days of hire. The committee recommends that an amendment be made to § 1-302(J)(2) reducing this time frame to within 30 days of hire.
Comment: The committee recognizes that judges are subject to a separate orientation program pursuant to ACJA § 1-302 and that court security is generally addressed in that program. However, the committee emphasizes that court security is not a one-size-fits-all topic. As such, court security training provided to newly hired employees, including judges, should not be limited to a one-size-fits-all course that provides generalized content only. Each court will have its own policies and procedures on court security topics such as, but not exclusively: who provides security, what evacuations routes are, how to respond to negative events, who to report security threats and incidents to, and courtroom and courthouse lockdown procedures. In order for effective training to occur, each new employee, including judges, needs to receive training specific to the courthouse they will be working in. Therefore, the committee recommends that the AOC develop new orientation training on court security that has statewide applicability but that the AOC also work with local courts to develop guidelines for training specific to local courts.

24. Annual Security Training Requirements. All employees of the Arizona Judicial branch, including judicial officers, shall be required to engage in court security-related training or drills annually as part of the COJET core curriculum.

Comment: The committee recognizes that security training in the form of broadly applicable training videos is useful for many security related topics. However, local training and drills that require employees to actively engage the security protocols of a given court are proved to be the most effective method of ensuring employees are prepared to appropriately react to and manage security incidents. As such, the committee highly recommends that the focus of annual training be local court security-related drills and training. The committee notes the current annual requirement of one COJET-accredited course related to cyber security for all court personnel and judges. The committee recommends a separate and distinct annual court security training requirement for all judges and court personnel.

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34 The committee notes the annual training requirements for judges set forth in the Arizona Code of Judicial Administration (ACJA). However, judges should receive the same amount of training as employees because they are an integral part of security in the courts and they face similar security risks. The committee recommends the ACJA be amended to include specific court security requirements for judges in keeping with the training structure set forth in the ACJA.

35 See ACJA § 1-302(H)(1).
25. **In-Service Court Security Officer Training.** Court security officers employed by a court must receive annual training including, but not limited to:

- use of force training;\(^{36}\)
- metal detection devices and x-ray machines, based on what is used at the officer’s court;
- de-escalation tactics;
- defensive tactics;
- active shooter;
- incident reporting;
- policies and procedures on the handling of prohibited items; and
- emergency preparedness.

26. **Contract Court Security Training.** Private contract court security officers shall be subject to the minimum court security training standards established by the AOC for in-house court security officers. Contract security with valid guard cards shall complete AOC training within 6 months of hire by a court.

27. **Security Officer Equipment.** Court security officers shall restrict equipment and tools carried on their person to items for which they are trained in the use of and where applicable, certified in the use of. Security officers shall restrict equipment to items approved by the court security officer-training program adopted by the AOC or otherwise designated by the AOC. Court security officers who are armed shall wear a bullet proof vest that is rated to at least the caliber weapon the officer carries.

28. **Courtroom, Jury Deliberation Room, and Perimeter Sweep Training.** Court employees or court security assigned to conduct daily courtroom, jury deliberation room, or perimeter sweeps shall be trained on how to conduct such sweeps, identification of suspicious items or conditions, protocols for reporting suspicious items or conditions, and securing of the location if a suspicious item or condition is identified.

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\(^{36}\) The committee recommends that use of force regulations that are similar to ACJA § 6-112 be adopted for court security officers, excluding law enforcement whom the committee recognizes are governed by separate specific use of force laws and regulations.
29. Court Security Officer Training. Court security officers shall be trained in accordance with a court security officer training program developed by or approved by the AOC Education Services Division. The Committee makes the following recommendations related to court security officer training:

- A security training workgroup should be developed to collaborate with the AOC Education Services Division to determine the specific training curriculum and annual training hours necessary for an effective, security officer training, education, and certification program.
- Trainers be approved by the AOC or AZ POST certified.
- There be a method for establishing the proficiency of current security officers for purposes of determining if any court security officer training program adopted or approved by the AOC needs to be completed in whole or in part by the officer.
- Court security officers, including contracted private court security, be readily identifiable via clothing or some type of marking on their clothing.

30. Firearms Training. Any person proving court security to a court, excluding POST certified law enforcement officers, shall complete training in the use of firearms as designated by the AOC before being allowed to carry a firearm within the court. Contract security with a valid guard card for armed guards shall have six months to complete AOC training.

Comment: The committee recommends that any person, whether court security armed for court security purposes or judges or other court employees authorized to carry a firearm for personal security, complete training similar to that established for Arizona probation officers in A.C.J.A. § 6-113. The committee further recommends that firearms standards be adopted for armed court security, excluding POST certified law enforcement officers, that are similar to the standards in ACJA § 6-113. The committee recommends that the AOC Education Services Division develop such training and standards.\(^\text{37}\)

\(^{37}\) The committee notes A.R.S. § 13-3102(D) provides for judges to be held to the standard for those who obtain a concealed carry permit. However, the committee strongly encourages that all persons authorized to carry a firearm in a court, excluding law enforcement who have separate training standards, be trained and held to a uniform standard.
RELATED RECOMMENDATIONS

The committee considered a number of related measures to ensure a continued focus on court security and an ongoing program of security system improvements. To this end, the committee respectfully offers the following recommendations:

1. Given the additional resources and degree of planning required for implementation of proposed court security enhancements, the committee recommends a three year, phased implementation period for the proposed court security standards. (See Appendix A.)

2. Authorize the AOC to establish a definitive structure of tiers for categorizing courts by activity level which will be used to determine the level of entryway screening. (E.g., Appendix B.)

3. Develop an exemption process allowing courts that can demonstrate extenuating circumstances preventing implementation of any security standards to defer implementation to a time certain.

4. Establish a statewide court security fund to assist local courts with one-time outlays for security equipment and security system improvements. The fund will be non-lapsing and non-reverting. Several possible sources of monies for the fund have been explored. Sources that were identified early on proved to be lacking in monies that could be transferred to the security fund or revenues proved to be declining leading to a lack of surplus monies. The committee recommends that the Supreme Court consider an increase in filing fees based upon an increase in the Consumer Price Index (CPI). The Court has not instituted a CPI increase in several years and an increase is in line with economic data. A 1 to 2 percent increase would generate a significant amount of monies for the court security fund.

Local courts will continue to pursue local funding for court security personnel and ongoing security-related court operations. However, the committee also recommends funding proposals that would benefit local courts in securing local monies for court security improvements. One recommendation is that there be a legislative proposal to abrogate the surcharge on local court enhancement fees.
5. Provide dedicated state level (AOC) staff support for coordination of court security assessments, technical assistance, and training. AOC staff should also assist in oversight of compliance with any court security standards adopted by the Arizona Supreme Court. The committee notes that a staff member dedicated to court security would allow for court security to be pursued in an active rather than reactive manner. Core duties of AOC staff should include, but not be limited to:

- Develop statewide court security manual and accompanying resources
- Assist with creation of county and local SEPCs
- Coordinate court security assessments and post-assessment reports
- Administer an incident reporting system
- Develop compliance reporting systems for standards requiring reports and certifications.

6. Include a method for assessment of or accountability for compliance with the proposed court security standards, particularly standards that require training, certification, and testing.

7. Maintain the Court Security Standards Committee or a subset of this body to promote timely implementation of the proposed court security standards, address emergency preparedness policies and procedures, and statewide information sharing and coordination of a systemic court security program. Such a committee could also assist the AOC Education Services Division on development of court security training curriculum and programs.
GLOSSARY

The following definitions govern the meaning of terms within the standards proposed by the Court Security Standards Committee.

Standard - A court security standard is a policy or measure that is required to be in place in order to improve the general state of security in a court building and to ensure the personal safety and security of the public, judges, judicial officers, court staff, city and county employees and the law enforcement officers and court security officers that protect them.

Guideline - A court security guideline is a policy or measure that is recommended to be in place in order to improve the general state of security in a court building and to ensure the personal safety and security of the public, judges, judicial officers, court staff, city and county employees and the law enforcement officers and court security officers that protect them.

Incident - An incident is an action or communication that causes or threatens to cause personal injury, property damage, or disruption of courthouse proceedings.

Hierarchy of seriousness of incident - In descending order: (1) incident against persons, (2) incident against property, (3) threats without violence.

High risk event – This type of event can occur at any time and often arises with little notice to a court. The following characteristics are commonly associated with high risk events: multiple victims involved in the matter, incidents involving female victims and multiple offenders, homicides that involve intimate partners and family relationships, celebrated or featured articles or media coverage are associated with the matter, demonstrations may occur before, during, or after hearings or otherwise be associated with the events of the case.38

Negative event - A negative event is an event that has potential to, or does cause interruption of court operations or poses a risk to the safety and security of those in and around a court facility. Negative events may include, but are not limited to, threats, such as threats to

the physical safety of someone on or associated with a court, bomb threats, or suspicious or unattended packages; security incidents such as physical violence, active shooter, hostage taking; and other incidents such as cyber attacks, medical emergencies, fires, severe weather, or power outages.

**Significant threat** – Any threat against court personnel, including judge and court staff, that impacts operations of the court.

**Threat** – A statement of an intention to inflict pain, injury, damage, or other hostile action on someone (court employee) or an institution (court building) in retribution for something done or not done now or in the future. A threat is synonymous with a threatening remark, warning, or ultimatum such as a menace to a person or institution. A threat can be a person or a thing likely to cause damage or danger.
## Appendix A: Phased Implementation Structure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Standard</th>
<th>Year 1</th>
<th>Year 2</th>
<th>Year 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Governance &amp; Administration</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Court Security Committee (SEPC)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Self-Assessment &amp; Report</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Security Manual</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Incident Response Policies</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Incident Reporting Policies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Policy on Armed Personnel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Other Security Policies</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>In-Custody Defendants</strong></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Training</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>New Hire Training</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual Court Employee Training</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Task Specific Training</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Officer Training</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firearms Training</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Facilities &amp; Equipment</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duress Alarms</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locking Protocols</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Courtroom, Jury Room, Perimeter Sweeps</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secured Access to Non-Public Areas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameras</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exterior Lighting</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Window Coverings</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Counters, Benches, &amp; Clerk Stations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protecting Critical Areas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Entryway Screening</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visitors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix A: Phased Implementation Structure • 28
Appendix B: Illustration of Entryway Screening Requirements Based on Court Activity Level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Court Hearing Frequency &amp; Judicial Officers</th>
<th>Level of Entryway Screening</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. One or more full-time judicial officers, court proceedings occur throughout daily business hours and on a daily basis</td>
<td>Entryway screening during courthouse business hours e.g., business hours are 8:00 a.m. – 5:00 p.m.(^{39})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Full-time or part-time judicial officer(s), court proceedings held to 2 to 3 days a week and occur only a few hours a day (court proceedings do not occur daily throughout the week)</td>
<td>Entryway screening during hours of court proceedings. e.g. court proceedings occur Tuesday and Wednesday 8:30 a.m. to noon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Single full-time judicial officer or part-time judicial officer(s), court proceedings occur infrequently (generally occur 1 to 2 days a week and only a few hours each day)</td>
<td>Request for exemption from regular entryway screening standard; however, entryway screening should occur upon request of a judicial officer for a high conflict or high-risk hearing.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{39}\) National Center for State Courts Best Practices for Court Security, 2016, recommends screening stations be staffed 30 minutes before and after business hours or court proceeding hours.
Appendix C: List of Resources

**Court Security Resources**


**Surveys**


Minnesota Judicial Branch, Minnesota Courthouse Security Survey by National center for State Courts.

**State Court Security Plans, Manuals, and Standards**


Ensuring Secure, Open, and Publicly Accessible Courts

https://www.courts.state.co.us/userfiles/File/Administration/Financial_Services/Court_Security_Resource_Guide.pdf

Georgia Standards for the Security of Courthouses and Other Court Facilities, Revised June 2012.  


Ohio Court Security Standards, Ohio Supreme Court Advisory Committee on Court Security and Emergency Preparedness.  

https://www.courts.wa.gov/newsinfo/content/pdf/securitystandards.pdf

Data

Data charts on pages 10-23 and data references throughout the proposed court security standards section of the report reflect data compiled by the National Center for State Courts based upon the Arizona Court Security Survey. See Appendix C for survey questionnaire.
Appendix D: Sample Emails from Court Security Survey Distribution

The following is an example of the pre-survey email:

Dear Presiding Judges:

Court security has been identified as a high priority initiative and the Supreme Court established a Court Security Standards Committee to recommend court security standards for Arizona courts. In order to develop these recommendations, the Committee seeks your assistance in (1) completing a survey and (2) distributing the survey to the judges within your court (including judges located in other physical locations) and to other judicial officers.

The survey was created by the Committee with assistance from the National Center for State Courts (NCSC) and seeks to discover what security measures are in place in your building and what you believe are the most important security measures. Your court’s participation in the survey will help the Committee to develop recommendations that are meaningful for Arizona courts, large and small, rural and metropolitan.

The survey will be sent to you within 24 hours and will take less than 10 minutes to complete. Please complete the survey at your earliest convenience, and no later than Friday, May 6, 2016, and forward the message containing the survey to the other judges and judicial officers in your court.

Court Administrators and Court Clerks will receive the survey as well and will assist with distribution to other court employees. However, if your court does not have a court administrator or clerk, the Committee would appreciate your help in distributing the survey to court employees as well as judges and judicial officers.

Thank you for your assistance in this endeavor,
The following is an example of the email distributing the survey:

Dear Presiding Judges:

In an email yesterday, the Court Security Standards Committee asked for your assistance (1) completing a survey and (2) distributing the survey to the judges within your court (including judges located in other physical locations) and to other judicial officers. This is the link for the survey:

Court Security Survey

Please complete the survey no later than Friday, May 6, 2016, and forward the message containing the survey to the other judges and judicial officers in your court.

Thank you for your assistance in this endeavor,

The following is an example of the reminder email:

Dear Judges, Clerk of Court, Court Administrator, Court Security, and Probation Chief:

In an email last week, the Court Security Standards Committee asked for your assistance (1) completing a survey and (2) distributing the survey to other judges, security personnel and staff within your court. It is important that each level of court (LJ and GJ) and each court location for those courts with multiple locations be represented in the survey results. It is also important that the survey reach someone who provides security for your court.

The Committee recognizes the time involved in taking the survey and forwarding it to others and sincerely thanks you for your willingness to participate.
If you have not had an opportunity to take the survey, this is the link:

Court Security Survey

The survey should be completed by Friday, May 6, 2016.

Again, thank you for your assistance,
Appendix E: Arizona Court Security Survey

Dear Respondent,

In an effort to improve safety and security in our court buildings, the Supreme Court has established the Court Security Standards Committee to recommend standards and guidelines for court security. Standards are those security measures that would be required to be in place in every court building; guidelines are those security measures that would be recommended to be in place in every court building.

As an important step in this process, the Committee is conducting this survey to discover two things: 1) What is currently in place in the way of security measures?; and 2) What do you believe are the most important measures to have in place in your court building?

Please complete this survey and submit your answers by Friday, May 6, 2016.

Thank you,

Marcus Reinikasneuer
Chair, Court Security Standards Committee
Arizona Court Security Survey

1. Position Title
   - Judge
   - Other Judicial Officer (e.g., Hearing Officer, Commissioner)
   - Judicial or Courtroom Support Staff
   - Court Clerk
   - Clerk's Office Staff
   - Court Administrator
   - Probation
   - Other Court Staff
   - Law Enforcement Officer
   - Court Security Officer (Non-Sheriff Deputy / Non-Police Officer)
   - Employee of another agency sharing building with court
   - Other

2. County (select from dropdown menu)

3. Population
   - Urban (population 200,001+)
   - Suburban (population 100,001-200,000)
   - Small Suburban (population 25,001-100,000)
   - Rural (population 5,001-25,000)
   - Small Rural (population 5,000 or under)

Please Note: If you have responsibility for multiple court building locations, please answer this survey for the location at which you spend the most of your time working.

As feasible, users should access the survey on a computer, not on a cell phone or mobile device. If you use a cell phone or mobile device, some of you may experience input issues.

You must provide answers to all of the questions before you can proceed to the next page.
### Appendix E: Arizona Court Security Survey

4. Type of court building
   - Single use (court only)
   - Multiple use (shared with other agency/entity)

5. Court Type
   - Appellate Court
   - Superior Court
   - Justice Court
   - Municipal / City Court

6. Who provides security for your court building (mark all that apply)?
   - Court-employed security officers
   - Sheriff's office
   - Police department
   - Private security company
   - Don't know
   - Have no security officers
   - Other
### Arizona Court Security Survey

7. Do you have the following security measures around the perimeter of your court building?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Measures</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don't Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security officer(s) regularly patrol around perimeter of court building</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security cameras outside located around perimeter</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed doors, entrances, and exits</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secured or monitored parking areas for judges</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secured or monitored parking areas for court staff</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entrance for in-custody defendants separate from public entrance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exterior building lighting</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barriers to protect against vehicular assault on building</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ballistic-resistant glass on doors and windows</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Window coverings to prevent views from outside into courtrooms, chambers, or offices</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8. How important do you think it is for the following security measures to be in place around the perimeter of your court building?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Measure</th>
<th>Extremely Important (5)</th>
<th>Very Important (4)</th>
<th>Important (3)</th>
<th>Somewhat Important (2)</th>
<th>Unimportant (1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security officer(s) regularly patrol around perimeter of court building</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security cameras outside located around perimeter</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alarmed doors, entrances, and exits</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secured or monitored parking areas for judges</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secured or monitored parking areas for court staff</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entrance for in-custody defendants separate from public entrance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exterior building lighting</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barriers to protect against vehicular assault on building</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ballistic-resistant glass on doors and windows</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Window coverings to prevent views from outside into courtrooms, chambers or offices</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Arizona Court Security Survey

9. Do you have the following security measures inside your Court Building?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don’t Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Active security committee</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Written security policies and procedures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security command center area</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Security cameras in publicly accessible areas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Screening station for public that includes a metal detector</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Screening station for public that includes an X-ray machine</td>
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<tr>
<td>Screening station for public that includes a hand wand</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapons screening for employees (including random screening)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Screening station for employees that includes a metal detector</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regular security officer patrols inside the court building</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security for after-hour access</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security committee keeping track of incidents and contraband</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix E: Arizona Court Security Survey

#### 10. How important do you think it is for the following security measures to be in place in your Court Building?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Measure</th>
<th>Extremely Important (5)</th>
<th>Very Important (4)</th>
<th>Important (3)</th>
<th>Somewhat Important (2)</th>
<th>Unimportant (1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Active security committee</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Written security policies and procedures</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security command center area</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security cameras in publicly accessible areas</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entry-way weapons screening for the public</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapons screening for employees (including random screening)</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
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<td>Regular security officer patrols inside the court building</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix E: Arizona Court Security Survey

|                                                          | Extremely Important (5) | Very Important (4) | Important (3) | Somewhat Important (2) | Unimportant (1) |
|-----------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------|---------------|------------------------|----------------
| Security for after-hour access                           |                          |                   |               |                        |                |
| Security committee keeping track of incidents and contraband |                          |                   |               |                        |                |
| Duress alarms at public transaction counters             |                          |                   |               |                        |                |
| Protective barrier at public transaction counters         |                          |                   |               |                        |                |
| Policy or procedure for package and mail screening       |                          |                   |               |                        |                |
| Building orientation procedures for first responders     |                          |                   |               |                        |                |
| Employee offices can be locked from the inside           |                          |                   |               |                        |                |
| Policy or procedure for sheltering in place              |                          |                   |               |                        |                |
| Posted notice that firearms prohibited in courthouse or courtroom |                          |                   |               |                        |                |
| Policy or procedures for reporting and evaluating threats and/or incidents |                          |                   |               |                        |                |
11. Do you have the following security measures for your courtroom?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Measure</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don't Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assigned armed security personnel presence in courtroom</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased security for high profile cases</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned security personnel for transport and control of in-custody defendants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decorum instructions/orders</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Posted rules about cell phone use, including pictures and recording</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Posted information on evacuation routes or procedures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Posted information on lockdown procedures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Posted information on shelter in place</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ballistic-resistant material on bench/clerk stations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duress alarms: On bench</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Duress alarms: At clerk station</td>
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<tr>
<td>Duress alarms: In chambers</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Duress alarms: In jury deliberation rooms</td>
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<tr>
<td>Secured jury deliberation rooms</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular “sweeps” of courtroom</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keeping courtroom doors locked when courtroom not in use.</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
12. How important do you think it is for the following security measures to be in place for your courtroom?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Measure</th>
<th>Extremely Important (5)</th>
<th>Very Important (4)</th>
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</tbody>
</table>
## Arizona Court Security Survey

13. Have you been trained since January 2015 on the following topics/areas?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don't Recall</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Written court security policies and procedures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual training on court security</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threats against judges/judicial officers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Active shooter/sheltering in place</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hostage-taking</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Communications: Phone tree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications: Incident reporting</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Communications: Whose directions to follow if security incident occurs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Use of duress alarms/testing of alarms</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Items prohibited from the court building</td>
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<tr>
<td>Safety at home/to and from work</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mental health identification</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>De-escalation tactics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Suspicious package</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cybersecurity</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
14. How important do you think it is for the following security measures to be in place in training programs?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Measure</th>
<th>Extremely Important (5)</th>
<th>Very Important (4)</th>
<th>Important (3)</th>
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<td>Annual training on court security</td>
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<tr>
<td>Security training as part of new hire orientation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Security training as part of employee transfer from another court</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
15. How important do you think it is to have security standards and guidelines in every court building?
   - Standards are those security measures that are readily achievable and would be required to be in place in every court building.
   - Guidelines are those security measures that may take longer to achieve and would be recommended to be in place in every court building.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Extremely Important (5)</th>
<th>Very Important (4)</th>
<th>Important (3)</th>
<th>Somewhat Important (2)</th>
<th>Unimportant (1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security standards</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td></td>
<td>□</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security guidelines</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
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<td>□</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

16. What do you think is a reasonable time frame (in number of years) for implementing security standards and guidelines?
   - Standards are those security measures that are readily achievable and would be required to be in place in every court building.
   - Guidelines are those security measures that may take longer to achieve and would be recommended to be in place in every court building.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>One year</th>
<th>Two years</th>
<th>Three years</th>
<th>Four years</th>
<th>Five years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security standards</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security guidelines</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

17. When was the last time you had a practice evacuation of your court building (e.g., fire drill)?
   - □ Within the last year
   - □ Within the last two years
   - □ Within the last five years
   - □ Can’t recall the last time
18. When was the last time you had an evacuation of your court building because of an actual emergency?

- Within the last year
- Within the last two years
- Within the last five years
- Can’t recall the last time